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This study is concerned with Mae Sot and its vicinities in the Thailand-Burma 
borderland. This study examines how the Burmese are integrated in the social system 
of the town, although they lack proper legal status. This study attempts to overcome 
the conventional description of these people as victims and thus passive actors. Unlike 
earlier pathological approaches to people’s ways of life, this study reveals that the 
Burmese, regardless of whether they are illegal residents, constitute the border society 
as prominent members. The society of the town is not possible without their 
participation and contribution.  
The case of Mae Sot vindicates that the society is not just founded in the legal or 
formal basis. This study suggests that it is quite necessary to take into account 
illegality or informality as a norm in constituting the society to achieve an adequate 
explanation of societal formation in the border town. Furthermore, it proposes that the 
integration of these legal and illegal parts gives a holistic understanding of the society.  
This study first traces the historical formation of the border social system. It 
discusses that migration of various groups, notably from Burma, engendered the 
formation of the society in the town throughout history. This study reveals that the 
multitudinous migration since the period of the late 1980s differentiates the societal 
formation from the previous periods. The social system was abruptly expanded and 
needs to incorporate even illegal others who are prominent in sustaining the town.      
I then go on to explore the integration of “others” in the border social system in the 
sectors of administration, economy, education, and culture. My research reveals that 
the administrative system of the state does not monopolize governance in the town, 




the town is not under the total control of the state, this study focuses on the various 
strategies that vulnerable people devise and the localized behaviors of state agencies. 
In dealing with the town’s economy and border trade, I show that the Burmese 
actively participate in trading activities in the central town market as merchants and 
customers though they lack legal status. In dealing with border trade, the study reveals 
that smuggling is a part of regular economic activities in the border and ethnic politics 
and political development are very much reflected in border trade.  
I pay special attention to migrant schools because “others” have their own 
educational institution which distinguishes Mae Sot from other border towns. I 
observe that migrant schools are positively recognized by the state as regular 
educational organizations.   
In the cultural aspects of Burmese lives, the study describes how they maintain 
their own culture and are influenced by other cultures. I particularly focus on the roles 
of festivals in breaking boundaries between the Thai locals and the Burmese. 
This study reveals that the border social system is very dynamic by showing the 
constant flowing of people revolving around the town and the border. Particularly, the 
study deals with the current phase of movement amongst the Burmese to Bangkok 
and other countries. Also, I touch on the strengthening of state involvement in the 
town through the implementation of development projects. The town is situated 
within this dynamic challenge of people’s movement and state engagement. The 
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Kyat is the Burmese currency. As of 2005, 1,000 kyat was equivalent to 1 US 
dollar at a black market or street. This street rate more accurately reflects the actual 
economy than the official exchange rate which has remained 6 kyat to 1 US dollar. 
Baht is the Thai currency. During my stay from July 2004 to July 2005, US 1 
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This study is concerned with Mae Sot, a Thai border town in the Thailand-Burma1 
borderland, and its vicinities. Many Burmese2 stay in these areas without legal status. 
My research was induced by a deep frustration with superficial descriptions of the 
lives of borderlanders, which are not uncommon in the perception of the outside 
people, let alone journalistic and even academic works (e.g. BLSO 2002; Arnold 
2004; 2006; World Vision 2004; Thornton 2006). Although I acknowledge the 
various precarious aspects of their lives, which have been documented in previous 
journalistic and scholarly works, the “normalcy” with which they carry on their daily 
lives have largely been ignored; in other words, how their “normal” lives are 
constituted is missing in these works. Although dramatic events often attract our 
attention, indulgence in cases such as “suffering”, “deportation”, “drugs”, and 
“trafficking” do not reveal the totality of the lives of borderlanders at all. Why do they 
insist on staying there despite alleged hardships? How can we explain the delightful 
environment of Burmese tea shops which are packed with illegally-staying Burmese 
                                                 
1 Throughout this study, I use the name of “Burma” instead of “Myanmar.” Since the current military 
junta had changed the name of the country from “the Union of Burma” to “the Union of Myanmar” in 
18 June 1989, the choice of the name among individuals and various groups has become a political act 
(those engaging in democracy movements have been persistent in using “Burma”). Scholars often use 
both names interchangeably. The reason behind my choice in using Burma does not necessarily reflect 
a political stance. The main reason of doing so is to appreciate the historical use of the name and to 
maintain consistency in naming the country throughout my study. 
2 The term referring to “people” in Burma has also not seen consensus after the official change in the 
name of the country. Some people refer to them as “Burmese” while others refer to them as 
“Myanmarese.” This study uses the term “Burmese” when referring to people in Burma; while 
adopting “Burman” when pointing to the majority ethnic group in the country. For details on the name 




people? Why is the town not in disarray despite the predominant presence of “illegal 
aliens”? How is it possible that unauthorized Burmese merchants (often referred to as 
“smugglers”) are selling smuggled goods just next to a formally established border 
market in the midst of border-patrolling Thai soldiers?   
I seek to delve into the dynamics where borderlanders’ lives are based in 
contradistinction to earlier works that only focus on the borderlanders’ problems and 
victimization. Minghi (1991: 17) points out that there is a tendency for traditional 
border studies to view “the boundary as an interface between two or more discrete 
national territories and subject to problems directly reflecting the relations between 
the nation-states it divides.” In the sense that states are desperate to mark “our 
territory” against “other’s” (Wilson and Donnan 1998: 9), it is obvious that 
borderlands inherently contain certain levels of conflict between neighboring states 
and states’ aspiration for dominance and independence.  
However, borderlands are also living environments where ordinary people root 
their mundane everyday lives. As Donnan and Wilson mention (1999: 4), “borders are 
meaning-making and meaning-carrying entities, parts of cultural landscapes which 
often transcend the physical limits of the state and defy the power of state 
institutions.” Borderlanders, though they lack legal status, make the border town as a 
living environment with which they have deep relationships in their everyday lives. 
The town is a “normal” place for them unlike the conventional description of the town 
as the place where problems, as mentioned above, presides. Borderlanders as 
legitimate actors actively constitute the society of the town even in the absence of 
legal recognition and in precarious conditions. 
Though this study does not disregard the various imminent difficulties that they 




their contribution to the operation of the town in various sectors. They are not 
necessarily destroying the social system of the town. It is too simplistic to criminalize 
them as people destroying the social system. An understanding of the town with this 
simplified notion is totally misleading. The town which is dominated by “illegal 
others” has much more complexities. Although social scientists have raised it before, 
the question regarding how societies/communities are potentially cohesive entities 
despite complex social and cultural relations remains extremely relevant for the 
understanding of border communities/towns.  
In addressing this question, I use the border town of Mae Sot and its surroundings 




Map 1.3 Mae Sot District 
 
Mae Sot is located in the northwestern region of Thailand, 509 km from Bangkok, 




Ramat in the north, Phop Phra in the south, muang Tak in the east, and Myawaddy, 
Karen State of Burma in the west across the Moei River. 
Mae Sot is located in a flat valley which is formed by two mountain ranges – the 
Thanon Thongchai mountain range and the Dawna mountain range. The former 
extends up from Chiangmai Province and ends at Kanchanabri Province, dividing Tak 
Province into two halves. The latter runs along the border between Thailand and 
Burma up from the north of Karen State down to Tenasserim Division. The rugged 
mountains of these ranges have always restricted communications between Mae Sot 
and the areas beyond the ranges. This feature, in turn, has attributed to Mae Sot’s 
uniqueness in various sectors such as population formation, culture, economy, and so 
on as we will see in the following chapters. Also, it was conducive to Mae Sot’s 
central position in the western Tak Province which also has the same geographical 
restrictions. Up from Tha Song Yang down to Umphang, for people in this region, 
Mae Sot is like a capital town, where they pursue their livelihoods and education. 
Even when they go to Bangkok and the inner places, there is a need to stopover in 
Mae Sot before continuing their journey because a big and convenient road over the 
mountain range is only connected from Mae Sot.3  
Mae Sot historically played a linking role for traders traveling between the Indian 
Ocean and mainland Southeast Asia. It also paved a way for military operations for 
the pre-modern kingdoms of Burma and Thailand. It was a buffer area between these 
two archrivals throughout history. It is against this background that Mae Sot and its 
adjacent areas as “in-between” places accommodated various kinds of people such as 
traders, fugitives and ethnic traitors even before the modern period.   
                                                 
3 During my stay from July 2004 to July 2005, I visited a very remote village in the southern part of 
Umphang District and found that many residents were sending their children to attend secondary 
schools and a college in Mae Sot. Their commercial activities also centered on Mae Sot. I went there 
together with the Karen to take part in a ceremony for the establishment of a church in the village, 




Up until several decades ago Mae Sot remained just a small village. When the 
Burmese military took power and subsequently introduced the Burmese Way of 
Socialism with her doors closed to the outside world from the early 1960s to the late 
1980s, Mae Sot was a prominent entry point for the black markets along the Thailand-
Burma borderland which was controlled by ethnic rebels, notably the Karen National 
Union (KNU). The prolific operation of the black markets drew enormous attention 
from Thai locals as well as the ethnic Burmese who were seeking to eke out a 
livelihood. Specifically, the black markets gave rise to big local businessmen who 
originated from other areas, particularly Bangkok. During the days of the operation of 
the black markets, in tandem with existing ethnic mixtures, Mae Sot saw the trend of 
domestic migration from other areas of Thailand to Mae Sot for border trade.  
As the economic conditions of Burma were comparable to that of Thailand at this 
point,4 the Burmese did not pursue economic opportunities in Thailand. Although the 
black markets operated near Mae Sot, since they primarily engaged in trade and 
transportations, they rarely sought permanent residence in Mae Sot.  
However, conditions changed dramatically in the latter part of the 1980s. The 
Burmese economy fell to awful conditions, achieving the status of “Least Developed 
Country (LDC),”5 while Thailand went through an enormous economic boom during 
the 1980s. A newly shaped Burmese military junta came to power and opened her 
long secluded doors to the outside countries. However, it kept a tight leash on 
domestic affairs and harshly trampled the democratic uprising and penetrated into the 
liberated areas held by ethnic rebels. In a series of assaults from the military regime, 
the black markets were rendered out of date, and the trading trend between both 
countries mostly took on official and formal ways.  
                                                 
4 For the economic conditions during the period of 1962-88, see Myat Thein (2004: 85-120). 




It was at this time that a multitude of Burmese migrants came to Mae Sot in search 
of their livelihood, as the economic gap between Burma and Thailand widened during 
this period. The series of subsequent tides of migration brought about a demographic 
expansion in Mae Sot. It is estimated that the number of the Burmese reached over 
200,000, whereas that of the Thais is around 100,000, though the population of the 
Burmese has not been exactly counted.6   
Apart from economic migrants, political activists and refugees also flooded into 
the town and its outlying vicinities in search of refuge. Approximately 1,000 Burmese 
political activists are running dozens of offices representing exile interests, while 
around 80,000 refugees are housed in three camps in the vicinity of the town (TBBC 
2005).  
To make matters more complex, the influx of refugees brought quite a few 
international agencies into the town. In the 1990s, dozens of international 
nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) opened their offices in Mae Sot to deliver 
humanitarian assistance and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) opened its field office in 1998. 
Demographic expansion caused by the influx of alien people changed the 
economic and social conditions of the town. In the industrial sector, many factories 
from other provinces relocated to the town to take advantage of cheap foreign labor. 
Around two hundred factories, mostly producing garments, are in operation with over 
30,000 Burmese laborers employed. Other economic sectors saw a great deal of 
economic participation and contribution from them too. It is extremely common to 
                                                 
6 The information on the Thais in Mae Sot was obtained from the Mae Sot District Office whereas the 
number of the Burmese in Mae Sot is estimated from various interviews with people, including civil 
servants and Burmese political activists. I will elaborate on the population of the Burmese and the Thai 




find Burmese being employed in almost every shop in the town. The preponderant 
presence of the Burmese is also observable in the realm of domestic work. 
The presence of a sizeable number of Burmese brought Burmese socio-cultural 
elements into the town: they can watch Burmese television programs on cable 
channels; they maintain their indispensable habits of chewing betel, leaving so many 
“red spots” on many parts of the roads in the town; and they “kill time” by chatting 
and drinking tea in typical Burmese teashops which are found all over the town. 
In the field of education, schools for migrant children were established with the 
help of migrant activists and foreign volunteers. Thousands of Burmese children are 
educated through Burmese school textbooks and they are also taught English by the 
foreigners. To grow up as Burmese became possible in the town by way of education 
in the migrant schools.7     
Migration also diversifies the religious composition of the town. Besides 
Buddhism which is the main religion among the majority of the Thais and the 
Burmese, other religions are also practiced. One can see the prominent presence of 
Muslims in the town. Whereas there already exist Thai Muslims, of recent, Burmese 
Muslim migrants have increased the number of mosques in the town. Christianity is 
also practiced among other Burmese ethnic groups such as the Chin and the Karen. 
For example, those who engage in the KNU’s activities are mostly Christian. Sikhs 
are found among businessmen who are Thai nationals. Apart from the religions 
mentioned above, many migrants still retain animistic belief systems. 
As a result of this considerable increase in alienity and illegality, the mode of 
societal formation had to be changed. “Otherness” is not necessarily something to be 
abhorred, but something that needed to be incorporated into society. And 
                                                 
7 There are some cases of Burmese children in Mae sot who attend government schools in Myawaddy 




encountering modes between us and them also take on different ways. The integration 
of formality/officiality and informality/unoffciality significantly appears in 
administration, economy, education and the cultural affairs of the town. 
In the next section, I will seek to elaborate upon my theoretical claims in terms of 
understanding the town by critiquing some existing theories.   
 
QUEST FOR THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Conventionally, border studies dealing with mainland Southeast Asia have focused 
on hill tribes or ethnic groups (e.g. Keyes et al. 1979; Wijeyewardene et al. 1990; 
Jonsson 2005). The main issues of those studies revolve around the ways in which the 
identities of those peoples living across mainland Southeast Asia were formed in the 
process of interacting with others and how states affect the social systems of those 
ethnic groups involved. These studies were conducted during a time when nation-
building projects stretched to remote border areas. The focus of these studies was on 
the influence of state penetration and the reaction of locals.   
Currently, as globalization and economic integration are becoming major issues in 
this region, the scrutiny of economic opportunities is mainly initiated by the Asian 
Development Bank and economic agencies of individual states in the borderlands of 
this region (ADB 2001; 2004). Some scholarly works have reviewed this border 
project, focusing on its impact on localities and the reaction of local governments 
(Maneepong 2002/2003; 2004; 2005a; 2005b). Others explore the trade regulation of 
borderlands with reference to local traders rather than state project (Walker 1999) and 




The study of the Thailand-Burma borderland epitomizes similar trends. However, 
in this borderland, the sizeable presence of ethnic rebellion groups, conflicts between 
the Burmese government and those groups, and the consequences of these conflicts 
such as forced migration, have drawn the attention of scholars (Rajah 1990; 1994; 
Grundy-Warr 2004; 1993; Grundy-Warr and Wong 2002; Grundy-Warr and Rajah 
1997; Grundy-Warr et al. 1997). In addition, the issue of refugees along this border 
has attracted a large body of research (Lang 2002; 2001; Lee 2001; Chiang 2002; Ng 
2000; Phua 2000). Some academic and NGO reports deal with the lives of migrants in 
the border areas, including Mae Sot (BLSO 2002; Arnold 2004; 2006; World Vision 
2004; Thornton 2006). Though these researches are very informative in making sense 
of the borderland region, they intrinsically confine their focuses on “ethnic groups” or 
hill tribes, “conflicts” and “suffering”. However, in the town where not only 
temporary migrants but also long-settling people are living, and where not only 
conflicts but also stability are observed, the pattern of existing studies is limited in 
providing a holistic understanding of borderlanders’ lives. How can we develop 
alternative perspectives in viewing the town? In the quest for one, some existing 




The situation described in Mae Sot parallels Furnivall’s (1944; 1956) depiction of 
the “plural societies” of Burma and Indonesia, in which a plural society is defined as 
“a society, comprising two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, 
yet without mingling, in one political unit” (1944: 446). People in this type of society 




separately, only meeting in the market-place (1956: 304). It has been a key concept 
for scholars to understand even the current post-colonial societies of the region.  
The “plural society” was brought about by the migration of various ethnic groups – 
Chinese, Indian, Europeans – into the colonies for economic development. According 
to Furnivall, these ethnic groups did not share common social demands on which a 
mature society should be based. Therefore, people in plural societies only pursued 
their own economic gains, without necessarily considering the welfare of society as a 
whole.  
Though different conditions between the colonial and the “modern” period render 
direct comparisons implausible, it should not prevent the concept from being critically 
applied. It seems that what Furnivall had looked at were revisited: diverse 
composition of ethnic groups – Thais, Burman, Karen, Mon, and Europeans – as a 
result of migration was conspicuous and each group seemed to have its own way of 
life, not combining with other ethnic groups. Residential areas are distinct; the types 
of labor are sectionalized; and clothes, food, and pastimes vary according to ethnic 
groups.   
However, we can observe some inadequacies in applying Furnivall’s concept to the 
town’s situations. First, Furnivall’s idea is too static, because he assumed that the 
society never experiences changes. At the outset of migration, the characteristics of 
the plural society such as separate residence, sectional labor and bounded culture 
could be observed, but as time goes on, people are very likely to mix and integrate 
with other people in various ways.  
Second, Furnivall rigidly restricts contact point and social interaction to the 
market-place. Wertheim (1980: 18) indicates that Furnivall denies any social and 




process between immigrant groups was evident in the colonies (ibid). The creolization 
process must have happened in various everyday life fields. To assume that people 
only meet in the market-place is too simplistic. Social and cultural fields must be 
considered in understanding people’s contacts, too. 
Third, Furnivall dismisses the roles of the market itself in building up relationships 
between racial groups. Rex (1980: 98), on the other hand, argues that the market 
draws people together into a single social system, produces new group affiliations and 
gives new meaning to old ones. The market is not just a contact place but also a social 
field where diverse groups mingle and subsequently inter-ethnic relationships are 
produced. 
Last, the problem in an attempt to apply Furnivall’s plural society model is that we 
cannot have a clear understanding of the roles of states in the formation of the society. 
Furnivall does not delve into the role of states in the maintenance of society, apart 
from the role the state plays as an initial cause for the engendering of a plural society 
by bringing various groups of people into society. It seems that colonial states 
maintained status quo with a reluctant attitude to the positive resolution of the plural 
society. However, in the post-colonial period, nation-states through the nation-
building process directly intervene in the affairs of society through policies and state 
apparatus such as the bureaucracy. Especially in border areas, this aspiration of states 
is evidently manifested, regardless of whether it is efficient or not, since borders are 
considered as the utmost markers of state sovereignty. This final point regarding the 
role of states hardly finds a position in Furnivall’s discussion. Thus, we need a 
theoretical framework that positions/accounts for the influence of states in the 







State-society approaches provide viewpoints to explain how state and society 
contest to implement the interests of each other. These approaches challenge both the 
state-centric approaches and community-confined approaches. The state-centric 
approaches presuppose a center-periphery dichotomy and are preoccupied with the 
dominance of center over periphery. In these approaches, peripheries are predestined 
to be incorporated into the centers of political, economic, and cultural areas. 
Modernization theories (e.g. Rostow 1960; Inkeles 1969), dependency theories (e.g. 
Frank 1969) and world systems theories (e.g. Wallerstein 1979) are based on this 
assumption. Not only found in discussions of modern societies, but also in analyses of 
pre-colonial social formation in Southeast Asia, this center-periphery model has been 
prominent (Walker 1999: 6). Phrases such as “mandala” (Wolters 1999) and “galatic 
polity” (Tambiah 1976) presuppose the asymmetrical power relationships and 
radiance effects of influence from centers. Though these state/center-centric 
approaches are informative in understanding the nature of the centers’ power and 
aspects of their influence in peripheries, they oversimplify power relations, whereby 
power inevitably flows from the center, as if by gravity, from the “top” down (Walker 
1999: 8). In addition, they show a lack of interest in the impact of periphery on the 
center (Migdal 1988: xv).    
On the other hand, community-confined approaches tend to assume that 
communities have their own modes of life without much consideration of external 
forces that act upon them. In other words, community-centered researches regard their 
fields as microcosms in the absence of outside influences such as states. As Migdal 
mentions (1988: xvi), these studies, while occasionally referring to state policies and 




In sum, both center-periphery models and community-centered models do not shed 
light on understanding the complexities of the local, which state-society approaches 
attempt to overcome. State-society approaches depict society as a mélange of social 
organizations comprising of two facets; first, groups are heterogeneous both in their 
form and in the rules they apply; second, the distribution of social control in society 
may be diffused among numerous, fairly autonomous groups rather than concentrated 
largely in the state (Migdal 1988: 28). It suggests that “focusing on these struggles 
within society, between states and other social organizations such as clans, tribes, 
language groups, and the like, will give new insights into the processes of social and 
political change” (Migdal 1988: 31). The image coming to my mind, when dealing 
with the approaches, is “a strenuous tug of war” where players are persistent not to 
lose a rope. The two opposing teams in the game are “society” and “state”, while the 
“rope” represents resources. In order to gain more and not to lose an inch of resource, 
the games the teams play tend to be tense. The game image gives vivid understanding 
of each team’s relentless aspiration in securing and acquiring dominance in society.  
In state-society theories, it is assumed that the boundaries between state and 
society are sharply drawn. Though later theoretical developments saw the various 
patterns of relationships between state and society paying particular attention to 
ensuing collaborations (Migdal 1998; 2001; Dauvergne 1998), the inherent and 
essential assumptions of the theories are “conflicts” and “tensions” between two 
extreme forces. Therefore, in this model, patterns of behaviors and relationships such 
as “accommodation,” “negotiation” and “unofficial/informal actions” do not draw 
much attention as compared to conflict-centered ones.  
Besides, since the theories mainly deal with cases within national boundaries, it 




does not attempt to comprehend the impact of external factors such as cross-border 
movements and the presence of illegal society members in borderlands. Especially in 
the case of Mae Sot, where the number of alien people who are mostly illegally 
staying is enormously predominant, rigid application of the theories cannot give 




At this juncture, it seems cliché to introduce debates of globalization on whether 
states are in decline and whether a borderless world has arrived. Whether we agree 
with Ohmae (1990; 1995), who makes a bold claim about the demise of states, or 
whether we are inclined to hear the persistent roles of states in authorizing the 
movements of capital and people (Panitch 1996), we can find the debates revolving 
around “borders” and the degree of their openness. In other words, the issue of 
borders has been the dominant theme in the discourses of globalization regardless of 
theoretical positions. We have seen the debates where the taken-for-grantedness of 
borders as essential markers against neighboring states is problematized and where 
there is something happening in border areas that the traditional understanding of 
space tied to the notions of disconnectedness and boundedness cannot clearly grasp.     
Traditional anthropological notions that dealt with the concept of a certain place as 
discrete, separate and self-reliant have been criticized by advocates of globalization 
theories (e.g. Appadurai 1996; Gupta and Ferguson et al. 1997). Conventional 
anthropological research assumes that the modes of natives’ lives were formed and 
maintained in a particular place. Relationships with and influences from outside were 




incarcerate natives to a particular place (Appadurai 1996), taking for granted the 
isomorphism of peoples, places, and culture (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 34). 
Scholars that interrogate the relevance of this traditional approach suggest that we 
now need to look at the mobile features of people’s modes of life in the era of 
globalization. Therefore, in new approaches, “migrants” and “refugees” are 
considered as normal subjects, showing the very nature of their mobility. Also, 
scholars pay special attention to borderlands, suggesting that “the notion of 
borderlands is a more adequate conceptualization of the ‘normal’ locale of the 
postmodern subject, rather than dismissing them as insignificant, as marginal zones, 
thin slivers of land between stable places” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 48). 
In the anthropological globalization approaches, borderlands also play the role of a 
“node” in interconnecting national boundaries (Hannerz 1996: 17). Hannerz (1996: 
67) notes, 
 
The interconnectedness typically takes the shape of a relatively continuous 
spectrum of interacting meanings and meaningful forms, along which the various 
contributing historical sources of the culture are differentially visible and active. 
The context of center-periphery relationships suggests both the spatial dimension 
and the fact that the creole continuum has a built-in political economy of culture. 
Social power and material resources, as well as prestige, tend to be matched with 
the spectrum of cultural forms. At one end of this continuum there is thus the 
culture of the center, with greater although not always unambiguous prestige, as 
in creolist linguistics the “Standard,” the “superstratum.” At the other end are the 
cultural forms of the farthest periphery, often in greater parochial variety. In 
between are, to put it simply, a variety of mixtures. 
 
In this interconnectedness, borderlands are not considered to be dominated by the 
center as conventional center-periphery approaches argue. Rather, these are the places 




periphery take place. Absolute distinctions between “We” and the distant “They” are 
blurred and “transnational” characteristics can be observed (Kearney 1991: 55).  
Though connectedness and creolization are very informative concepts in 
comprehending current phases occurring in borderlands, we need to ask whether these 
are really “new” traits which have only occurred recently, especially when 
considering the Thailand-Burma borderland. Peoples have been moving and migrating 
for a long time. Even in the wake and development of nation-states and national 
boundaries, the borderland was relatively porous, such that cross-border movements 
were not heavily restricted. Historical factors and geographical features play enduring 
roles which led to the creation of mixtures and the creolization of “society” in the 
borderland. Theories of globalization does not seem to pay due attention to this point. 
Recent development may be a little exaggerated.   
Another point that globalization theorists dismiss is the issue of “power.” Walker 
(1999: 11-12) indicates that connections and flows in borderland areas are not 
haphazardly taking place, but are regulated. He goes on to argue that liberalizing 
initiatives which encourage mobility and passage should not be assumed to be 
initiatives which undermine regulatory power. Rather, these create the conditions for 
a new “mix” of regulatory practices (1999: 15). Here, his interpretation of power in 
reference to borderlands is that of “regulation” which he defines as “the practices 
people employ to initiate and control mobility and interconnection” (1999: 12). He 
does not restrict the agencies that hold the legitimacy in regulating practices to states. 
Private interest groups (border traders in his case) too, according to him, participate in 
various ways to regulate actions (1999: 13).  
However, though he denies the monopoly of regulating practices by the state, the 




conform to regulations laid down by power holders. Therefore, even though he notes 
some collaboration between frontier communities and the state in the operation of 
border trades (1999: 111-112), this suggestion is not quite adequately positioned in 
his key arguments that borders are still controlled by the state. While his attempts to 
counteract triumphant proclamations of borderless worlds or liberalizing borders by 
ultra-globalization theorists are meaningful, these attempts, however, have led him to 
emphasize the notions of state-centric regulation rather than give a balance 
understanding of borderlands. Therefore, though the cases and realities in his book 
captivatingly show various ranges of relationships between the state and border 
communities, including negotiations and collaborations as well as tensions and 
conflicts, we only get ad hoc explanations of such cases within the very strict 
conceptual framework of “regulation.”  
The key question that should be raised is not whether the state is losing or 
maintaining control in borderlands and border societies. This kind of question only 
succeeds in giving tautological answers that validates the presence of the state in 
borderlands. This question is intrinsically limited in understanding the complexities of 
borderlands where the ebb and flow of people are continuously occurring and the 
informal/unofficial is deep rooted. Attempts at understanding the situations in 
borderlands demand a new framework where these features should be incorporated.    
 
TOWARDS A “BORDER SOCIAL SYSTEM” 
 
I seek to understand the border town and the formation of the society with the 




what a “social system” is. Parsons and Giddens are two prominent scholars who have 
sought to define the concept. 8  
Parsons (1991[1951]: 25) mentions,  
 
Since a social system is a system of processes of interaction between actors, it is 
the structure of the relations between the actors as involved in the interactive 
process which is essentially the structure of the social system. The system is a 
network of such relationships. 
 
According to Giddens (1979: 65-66), 
 
Social systems involve regularized relations of interdependence between 
individuals or groups, that typically can be best analysed as recurrent social 
practices. Social systems are systems of social interaction (emphasis original).  
 
The key words in defining the concept are “interaction” and “relations” between 
actors. Also, a social system is not randomly constituted, but based on recurrent 
practices. The concept of a social system can be applied to the study of borderlands. 
Unlike the assumption made in the concept of a plural society, interactions and 
relationships between actors are taking place on a recurrent basis in the border town. 
A social system is definitely observable there.  
What then makes the difference between a conventional understanding of a social 
system and a border social system? In the former, actors are assumed to be formal 
actors whose behavioral attitudes are based on rational choice. In the theory, analyses 
on the influence and impacts of informal or unauthorized actors on society are not 
pursued to their satisfactory end when in fact, in borderlands, informal actors such as 
                                                 




undocumented migrants and refugees are actively involved in re-constituting the 
social system.   
In addition, in a border social system, the constant ebb and flow of actors is a more 
obvious phenomenon. The early functionalists such as Parsons are criticized for 
dismissing the dynamics and changes in the society at the expense of overly focusing 
on “equilibrium” and “stability” (Giddens 1984; Bailey 1994; Leach (1964[1954]). 
Border social systems show vibrant changes that are an intrinsic part of the border 
society. Alvarez (1984: 121) states, “[A] social system or society is built upon 
organized, fluid movement of people through time and space.” He (1984: 121-122) 
goes on to mention,  
 
[R]ather than viewing the frequency of movement and the volume of population 
movements as disturbances to a system and a departure from its rules, fluid 
personnel are the lifeblood of societies. Migration and mobility (flow) are an 
organized part of these social systems……the flow of people through a 
continuing migration (legal, undocumented, temporary, permanent, circular, and 
so on) is build into the fabric of border society.  
 
The patterns of interaction between actors in borderlands are different from normal 
social systems. The presence of unauthorized actors brings about different types of 
interaction that go beyond conventional understanding. Not only are there 
formal/regulated ways of relationships, but informal patterns of interaction are quite 
prominent as well.  
Though a “border social system” may sound like just a literal mixture between 
“border” and “social system”, however, its physical base, the border, gives it a 
refashioned connotation because its unique geographical features produce very 




and the types of interaction that is possible. To reiterate, border social systems 
encompass illegal/undocumented actors, continuous flows of people, and informal 
relationships to a far greater degree than social systems in non-border areas.  
I argue that the understanding of borderlands is not complete without paying 
attention to the integration between the formal and the informal. In proposing the 
necessity of dealing with the informal economy, Hinton (2000: 22-23) gives a dual 
critique of conventional ways of approaching the economy. First, in developing 
countries, the “informal sector” comprises a very large portion of total production. 
Therefore, “to omit it from calculations builds in significant distortions” (2000: 22). 
Second, to make a sharp distinction between the two is invalid because they are 
intertwined in complex ways. He states that in mainland Southeast Asia, much of the 
cross-border trade would fall into the informal sector. He goes on to mention that it is 
not only the trade in heroin and narcotics that take on informal ways, but the activities 
of a myriad of small traders are subsumed under the “black economy” (2000: 23).  
Tannenbaum and Durrenberger (1990: 283) also make similar arguments. They 
mention that the “‘formal’ and ‘informal’ are not economic facts. They are categories 
relevant not to the working of economic systems, but to government measurement 
policies.” Moreover, according to them, “what is formal in one country may be 
informal in another; what is informal at one time may be formal at another. These are 
cultural categories, not economic facts” (ibid).  
Abraham and Van Schendel (2005: 4) problematize the state categorization of the 
legal and the illegal. They suggest that though many transnational movements of 
people, commodities, and ideas are illegal in the state understanding, they are quite 




flows. Thus, it is imperative to take into account these illegal aspects of cross-border 
movement to understand the border economy holistically.   
The need for considering the informal sector is not confined to the economy. It can 
be raised for understanding other sectors. Especially in the case of Mae Sot, where 
Burmese political activists and international relief agencies take prominent residence 
with their political and relief structures, the administration and governance of the 
town take a different form. Alongside the state administrative regime, other regimes 
such as those headed by the political activists are also in operation in the town. 
Governance in the town includes these non-state regimes. Unauthorized Burmese are 
also accommodated in the governance of the town.    
In the education sector of the town, the informal is also evidently observable. The 
fact that there exist more than thirty informal migrant schools encompassing several 
thousand migrant students in Mae Sot vividly shows the strong presence of the 
informal. State education authorities must deal with these informal migrant schools.   
To understand the cultural fields in the town, one requires an integrating approach 
of the formal and informal too. In many elements of culture such as festivals, food, 
languages, and so on, certain levels of creolization or hybridity are found in the town. 
The Burmese in the town, though most of them are illegal residents, actively take part 
in consuming cultural stuffs and celebrating festivals. Thus, to neglect those illegal 
residents just because of the lack of legal status does not provide an adequate 
explanation to understand the cultural aspects of the border town.   
This study investigates how “others”9 are integrated in the border social system in 
Mae Sot and its vicinities. In doing so, I argue that the border social system is based 
                                                 
9 I do not necessarily mean that the Burmese are the only components of “others”. Other ethnic groups 
such as the Chinese and the Muslims are included in “others” too. “Otherness” in my thesis means 
some traits or natures that non-Thai ethnic people construct. Since the Burmese are major others in 




on interactions or relationships among actors including unauthorized people and that 
these interactions take place in a way in which notions of the informal/unofficial and 
the formal/official are integrated; the informal or the illegal is not meant to destroy 
societal formation but should be regarded as a sizeable part in the constitution of the 
society in the town.  
The study seeks to vindicate this argument in the arenas of administration, 




The field research in Mae Sot and its adjacent areas spanned almost six years.  
Several visits were made and my initial encounter with these areas took place in 
December 1999 when I sought to conduct refugee-related research for my Masters 
Thesis. Then, I stayed in Mae La Camp between February and April 2000 with a view 
of dealing with the adaptation and identities of the Karen refugees. While I was 
staying there, I made several refreshing visits to Mae Sot, and catching a few glimpses 
of the situation in the town, though I did not conduct substantial research. I returned 
in December 2003 and spent a couple of weeks mainly in Mae Sot with a visit to the 
refugee Camp. My purpose was to re-contact former informants and make 
arrangements for a later full-scale research for my Doctoral Thesis. During that time, I 
noticed that the interval of over three years brought about many changes to the lives 
of my former informants and the landscape of Mae Sot. Many of them were now 
staying in Mae Sot where the presence of alien people has become more prominent. 
Therefore, I turned my research focus from “genuine” refugees inside refugee camps 




I conducted a full-scale year-around field research from July 2004 to July 2005 as 
Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University. During 
this time, I primarily stayed in Mae Sot. But I made frequent visits to Mae La Camp 
and also went to Umphang District areas, which are located south of Tak Province, to 
provide comparisons with Mae Sot. The final phase of gathering additional data and 
information took place in December 2005. 
During my stay in Mae Sot, the formation of my rapport with the locals began with 
a group of Karen people centering on a church. As some of them are involved in both 
the Karen and inter-ethnic Burmese organizations, they helped me approach these 
organizations for interviews. At the level of grassroots research such as studying the 
living conditions of migrant workers, I was able to gain access to them with the 
assistance of some Karen church members who were also living amongst them. 
Though the Karen people in Mae Sot, especially the Christian Karen, seemed to have 
their own life styles, they were also part of a broad migrant people. Therefore, my 
association with them was an entry point into the lives of other migrant people living 
with and around them. Through them, I was also able to investigate how connections 
between the migrant population and camp refugees were maintained and how cross-
border movements of their relatives and their goods took place.10 In other words, 
though the Karen people were my focal group, it did not restrict me from looking at 
other people’s lives and border issues. Rather, they prompted me to see how migrant 
people live their lives with a close reference to the Karen.  
In the beginning, it was a big challenge to approach government sectors such as the 
district office, the municipal office, the customs office, the immigration office, and 
labor offices because my topic might have been considered as “sensitive” or 
                                                 




detrimental to their administrative practices for the reason that much of my topic 
involves the study of illegal or unauthorized mechanisms that the state apparatuses 
officially do not allow to be present in the town. In this respect, I needed someone that 
guaranteed my status in introducing me to those offices. It was very fortuitous for me 
to rent a house from a landlord – a big businessman who is in very close contact with 
these offices and also a member of the Tak Chamber of Commerce. Throughout my 
one year field research, he consistently helped me contact them for interviews. 
Besides, I was able to acquire a lot of information on the border economy through his 
own experience of cross-border trade. Also, with my informant’s assistance, I was 
able to take part in several meetings, activities and social gatherings organized by 
local businessmen.  
As time went on, I built friendships with some young local businessmen who ran 
shops, operated factories and engaged in border trade in the town and its vicinities. 
Close socialization with them enabled me to look at the economic situations of the 
town not from the official statements but from real experiences on the ground. I also 
established close relationships with other Thai locals by participating in various social 
gatherings such as football competitions, festivals, funerals and wedding ceremonies. 
Through these social relationships I was able to witness how the lives of Thai locals 
were associated with others in mundane everyday lives.  
One interesting point that differentiates the town from other border towns is the 
noticeable presence of international parties, including the UNHCR and INGOs, which 
are mainly concerned with refugees. Though the number of people working there was 
small, they deal with hundreds of thousands of people near the town and their 
influence on the border region was not at all negligible. Therefore, in my research, I 




organizations, I received preponderant assistance from those Karen working in 
INGOs and the UNHCR. It is not uncommon that the Karen, whether they are from 
Burma or Thailand, are majority workers in these organizations due to their ability to 
speak Karen and English, which are necessary in dealing with refugees and foreigners. 
I made frequent visits to some NGOs, and sometimes I followed them to a refugee 
camp to observe their activities. Moreover, my wife’s involvement as special 
education teacher in an NGO gained me a lot of favors in my research: I had easier 
access to a refugee camp; I was able to do an in-depth ethnography on the operations 
of INGOs; and I had many opportunities to take part in the social gatherings of those 
organizations. 
Most of the information that I draw in this study derives from participant 
observation, informal conservations and formal interviews. For the focal groups such 
as a group of Karen Church members and local friends, I used the first two methods, 
whereas I applied the last one when interviewing personnel from government offices 
and ethnic or Burmese political organizations. In the initial phase, I attempted to make 
use of the method of survey distribution to understand the general conditions of 
migrant people. In fact, I employed this method a couple of times. However, I was 
confronted with ethical issues. Some people were very afraid that their details would 
be revealed and end up in the hands of Thai officials. Therefore, I decided not to use 
the method. 
The diversity of members of the border society in the town is also reflected in my 
research. The list of my people I researched on ranges from an illegal migrant who 
was desperate for daily survival to the Head Officer of the District (nay ampoe); from 
a petty tobacco smuggler to a business tycoon; from the Mon, the Karen, the Chin, 




and from members of ethnic rebellion groups to the UNHCR. The complex features 
led me to diversify the people I researched on and to be equipped with holistic 
approaches in understanding the town.  
Though my stance tended to be impartial to whoever I approached, dealing with 
vulnerable people does not necessarily mean “neutral” research. It was a really tough 
job for me to handle their untold but recognizable expectation of material contribution. 
Since I was obligated to them for the gathering of information, it was hard to dismiss 
that expectation. Their attitudes do not necessarily come from the scarcity of 
resources. In fact, it developed from the situations in the town in that more and more 
outside people are bringing the resources in the form of relief agencies and many 
vulnerable people are benefiting from them. To put it differently, the less-privileged 
know how to deal with a naïve researcher. 
Another issue that frustrated me was language. It was not because I did not speak 
native languages fluently, but because some native people, especially those who are 
“smart” at utilizing available resources, prefer not to speak their languages and 
favored “English.” Of course, it should not be generalized to imply the behavior of the 
ordinary people. Many people are not able to speak English. I endeavored to 
communicate with common people by using whatever means, by speaking in their 
languages and employing language translators at times. However, the ability of a 
researcher to speak a certain level of local languages does not guarantee hospitality. 
They welcome English speakers with no ability of their languages rather than those 
who can speak their languages, since English became a very practical means for them 
to get substantial opportunities such as overseas resettlement and jobs in INGOs. 
English favoritism goes hand in hand with the preference for Westerners who bring 




Conventional anthropological studies tend to describe the natives as innocent, pure 
and value holders. However, our field sites of ethnographic enquiry are changing and 
so are the natives themselves. It is evident in my case that they are becoming 
shrewder with the skills and strategies in extracting benefits from given situations. It 
is not about moral issues. Rather, it suggests that natives now do not remain spatially 
incarcerated in the absence of maneuvering skills (Appadurai 1996). Rather, they 
know how to adapt to precarious situations by employing various strategies. 
Anthropologists need to be more realistic in describing natives beyond the traditional 
styles of romanticizing them.  
  
OUTLINE OF THE STUDY  
 
The following chapter deals with the historical development of the border society. 
The development of societal formation in Mae Sot is divided into four periods. The 
first period is between the 13th century when it saw an evidence of people’s existence 
and the 1820s when the British began to engage in (Lower) Burma. In this part, Mae 
Sot’s linking role in commercial activities between the Indian Ocean and mainland 
areas is mentioned. It also deals with sporadic population movement due to warfare 
between the Burmese and Thai kingdoms. The second period is between the 1820s 
and 1962. During this period, the people of Mae Sot developed their own way of life, 
not much intervened by the state though the modernized Thai state attempted to 
influence the town. The third period is between 1962 and 1988. The military 
government of Burma isolated her from the outside world during this period. Mae Sot 
saw a great development, mainly led by the black markets which operated in the 




chapter touches on the recent period starting from 1988. Due to the collapse of the 
Burmese economy in the late 1980s, many Burmese, mostly illegal migrants, crossed 
the border to seek livelihoods. Also, refugees sought sanctuary around the town in this 
period. This chapter deals with how the demographic expansion fundamentally 
transformed the conditions of the town and how the social system of the town which 
includes unauthorized people is different from the previous periods.    
Chapter 3 examines the administrative governance of the town. First, it shows the 
demographical conditions of Mae Sot to explain why Mae Sot is not a typical Thai 
town. Then this chapter deals with the governing regime of the Thai state. In doing 
that, the roles of various state agencies are explained. However, this chapter 
demonstrates that the state regime does not monopolize governance towards “others” 
in the town. Many Burmese and international regimes engage in governing the 
Burmese. Though the Burmese lack proper legal status, they are included in those 
governing regimes. This chapter pays attention to the state aspiration to place the 
town under its control and other people’s response with respect to this. Here this 
chapter shows various tactics that vulnerable people employ. Also, it touches on 
various forms of quasi legal status whereby the Burmese can achieve a certain level of 
legal recognition from state authorities.  
Chapter 4 investigates a town market and border trade. First, this chapter observes 
the operation of the central market and points out that Burmese merchants are 
prominent actors and issues of legality are not central in the operation of the town. 
With regard to border trade, first the chapter deals with unauthorized Burmese traders 
or smugglers along the border. In doing that, the chapter shows that smuggling is a 
rather regular activity unlike the pathological labeling that has been ascribed by the 




midst of state’s actions to dispel them from the border. Then, this chapter explains the 
nature of border trade. The chapter argues that border trade is greatly influenced by 
political development in Burma. This chapter suggests that it is imperative to integrate 
the informal/illegal and the formal/legal to understand the town’s economy and border 
trade in the Thailand-Burma borderland by bringing forth various cases. 
Chapter 5 engages in migrant schools. This chapter pays special attention to them 
because migrant education demonstrates that the Burmese, though they lack proper 
legal status, have their own institution. In explaining how this migrant institution 
came into being, this chapter mentions the roles of various partners such as Burmese 
activists, NGOs and Thai locals. This chapter investigates how these schools operate 
in detail by analyzing the school curriculum and by looking at efforts to cooperate 
with other parties. In examining how the state engages in this migrant institution, this 
chapter shows that the state approaches migrant schools positively, considering them 
as regular education. Here this chapter looks at the integration of migrant schools into 
the state education system.  
Chapter 6 touches on the cultural aspects of Burmese lives in the town. It reveals 
that the Burmese can maintain their own culture by consuming Burmese cultural 
stuffs and associating with peer groups even in foreign soils and in the lack of legality. 
Besides, this chapter describes the influence of other cultures such as Thai and 
international cultures into Burmese lives. This chapter focuses on the roles of festivals 
in breaking the boundary between the Burmese and the Thais. In doing this, this 
chapter takes a close look at how these festivals are celebrated and how the Burmese 
and the Thais associate with each other during these festivals. This chapter suggests 




Chapter 7 investigates the dynamics of the border system. This chapter sheds light 
on the fluidity of the border social system in the town. Constant ebbs and flows of 
people across the border make the border social system very dynamic. Particularly, 
this chapter deals with people’s further movement to other places such as Bangkok. 
This chapter shows that Mae Sot is like a springboard for the Burmese to advance to 
other places which offer more opportunities. Besides, this chapter touches on the 
issues of refugee resettlement programs into third countries. This chapter examines 
how this population drainage impacts at both the individual and organizational levels. 
While people depart the town, Mae Sot witnesses the advancement of capital and the 
implementation of development projects conducted by the state and international 
bodies in order to exploit the town in the name of regional economic cooperation. 
Population movements and various development projects make the border social 
system more dynamic.  
Chapter 8 summarizes the discussions of each chapter and makes a suggestion that 
it is necessary to take into account others in understanding the border town, though 
they are illegal residents. This chapter points out the problems of conventional 
approaches where legality tends to be the prerequisite for social analyses and others 
are in general considered as victims. Unlike these approaches, this chapter suggests 
that illegal parts can constitute the regular and legitimate parts of the society. 
Furthermore, this chapter suggests that it is imperative to integrate legal/formal and 










THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF A BORDER SOCIAL 
SYSTEM IN MAE SOT11 
 
  
This chapter deals with the historical background of Mae Sot. I attempt to account 
for its history in the context of broader regional, political and economic developments. 
Located in between the major polities of Burma and Thailand and also between the 
ocean and the mainland, Mae Sot, throughout history, was destined to act as a buffer 
and a link in terms of the changing conditions of the region. Historically, Mae Sot had 
a strong connection with Lower Burma, notably Martaban. Mae Sot’s geographical 
approximation with Lower Burma structured its historical patterns. In other words, 
Mae Sot had “collective destinies”, influenced by the political and economic 
development of the region. Anthony Reid’s eminent attempts (1988; 1993) to uncover 
“collective destinies” which geography formed commonalities of people’s lives in the 
history of Southeast Asia can be applied to the case of Mae Sot and Lower Burma. 
The changing situations of the Burmese region had a great impact on Mae Sot. 
Political developments in Lower Burma such as pre-modern Thai-Burmese warfare, 
the British colonization and ethnic insurgent movements affected Mae Sot 
enormously. 
In an attempt to investigate the historical development of the border social system, 
this chapter reveals that although Mae Sot was linked to the outside world by trade 
between the ocean and the mainland, whereby refugees and fugitives sought refuge 
during turbulent periods of Thai-Burmese warfare, it did not see a sizeable residence 
until the nineteenth century. As the British began to develop Lower Burma after the 
                                                 
11 This chapter was presented at the ASEAN Graduate Student Forum on Southeast Asian Studies, 28-




first Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826), Mae Sot kept pace with the development by 
accommodating the migration of various types of migrant groups who pursued the 
expanded trading opportunities. People’s migration engendered the social system. 
They developed particularistic local identities when they adapted to the environment 
of Mae Sot. 
At the turn of the century from the 19th to the 20th onwards, Mae Sot experienced 
massive engagement from the state and became administratively a “Thai” town. 
However, due to its geographical remoteness and inconvenient transportation system, 
the people of Mae Sot still continued exclusive ways of life styles.  
Mae Sot witnessed another leap of development between 1962-1988 when the 
Burmese government closed its doors to the outside world and in consequence the 
black markets operated near and in the border region of Mae Sot. During this period, 
Mae Sot’s social system was strongly based on commerce whilst accommodating the 
new wave of migration.  
After 1988, Mae Sot saw a dramatic development as a multitude of aliens came 
into the town and various economic development projects were conducted. Its social 
system became enormously expanded.     
 
THE PRE-DEVELOPMENT OF A SOCIAL SYSTEM: FROM THE 13TH 
CENTURY TO THE 1820S  
 
This section is concerned with the beginning of Mae Sot’s history. I will show that 
Mae Sot was connected to the outside world through commerce, from which we can 
assume the engendering of the town. This section is also concerned with warfare 




affected Mae Sot greatly. Above all, the migration of fugitives and refugees into Mae 
Sot laid the foundation of Mae Sot’s future society formation.    
 
Muang Chot and commercial connections 
 
The first historical record on the existence of Mae Sot occurred in the earlier 
period of Sukhothai. During the reigns of Ramkhamhaeng’s father (around 1270s), a 
ruler of Muang Chot who was called Khun Samchon invaded Sukhothai’s western 
outpost at Tak. Muang Chot is assumed by some scholars to be Mae Sot (Anurak 
1998; Sunait 1990: 274; Wyatt 2004: 41). The forces of Muang Chot were defeated 
by Ramkhamhaeng and it was placed under the rule of Sukhothai. During 
Ramkhamhaeng’s reign, Sukhothai experienced geographical expansion which is 
indicated in the inscription of Ramkhamhaeng. Here, Mae Sot is also included. I 
introduce the interpretation of Terwiel (2002: 12). 
 
The places whose submission he received on the east include Sraluang, Song 
Khwae [Phitsanulok], Lumbacai, both banks of the Mekong up to Vientiane. To 
the south Khanthi, Phrabang [Nakhon Sawan], Phraek [Chainat], Suphanburi, 
Ratchaburi, Phetchaburi and [Nakhon] Si Thammarat as far as the coast of the 
ocean. Westwards, Chot [Mae Sot],…n [Pan near Martaban] and Hangsaphadi 
[Hamsawati, Pegu], ending at the sea. To the north, Phlae [Phrae], Man, 
N…[Nan], Phlua [Pua] and across the Mekong as far as Java [Luang Prabang] 
(emphasis added).  
 
As shown above, the reigning areas of Sukhothai were extended to the coastal 
areas of the Indian Ocean such as Martaban and Pegu where the Mon settlement was 
predominant and with which Mae Sot had commercial connections. This fact was 




visiting the Siamese capital of Sukhothai for trading purposes and had settled in 
Sukhothai through a combination of circumstances not least with the attainment of a 
high position in the palace, as a captain to the guards of King Ramkhamhaeng. Here, 
he commenced a love affair with one of the king’s daughters and persuaded her to 
elope with him. Settling down in Martaban, he took part in a series of intriguing 
incidents against the Burmese governor. Becoming a rebellion leader, he captured 
Martaban and Pegu. By 1287, he had gained control over the entire country south of 
Prome and Toungoo. Wareru placed his new kingdom under the overlordship of 
Sukhothai (Hall 1981: 179; Halliday 1917: 10-11; Harvey 1967: 110-111; Terwiel 
2002: 14).       
Though the name of Mae Sot does not appear in the story, it can be easily assumed 
that Mae Sot was definitely included in the journeys of Wareru between Martaban and 
Sukhothai. Also, the fact that Wareru was once a merchant vindicated commercial 
connections between Martarban and Sukhothai through the passage of Mae Sot. 
Terwiel (2002: 14) mentions, 
 
The information in the Rama Khamhaeng inscription regarding westward 
expanse and the journey of Wareru between Martaban and Sukhothai would 
appear to me to be connected, if we think in politico-commercial terms, in 
particular long-trade connections…The corpus of Sukhothai inscriptions and 
later historical literature produces ample evidence of the importance and regular 
use of this long-distance westward connection.   
 
This connection between Mae Sot and Lower Burma had existed long before the 
Sukhothai period. Hall (1981[1954]: 24) mentions that since the time of Southeast 




Rahaeng (Tak) passes12 where Mae Sot was included. Later on, this route, along with 
a route from Tavoy over the Three Pagoda Pass, was used by the Burmese in their 
military expeditions on Siam during the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Also, in a 
more recent period, it was used by the Japanese to invade Burma during the Second 
World War (ibid). 
Apart from commerce, religion also linked Mae Sot with the mainland and the 
ocean. Monks in Sukhothai made long journeys traveling overland to Martaban where 
they embarked upon the long sea voyage to Sri Lanka (Terwiel 2002: 15; Frasch 
2002: 65f).  
All in all, the historical records show that during the Sukhothai period Mae Sot was 
once populated and played a linking role between the ocean and the mainland for 
commercial and religious activities.   
Reid (1993: 13) mentions that Lower Burma also saw the expansion of maritime 
trade at the outset of the age of commerce in the mid-fifteenth century. Frasch (2002: 
64) traces the expansion of maritime trade in the coastal areas of Burma. According to 
him, the eleventh century saw a kind of “trade revolution” regarding the increase in 
numbers of traders taking part in commerce as well as in terms of the importance of 
trade as a source of state revenue. However, in terms of commercial relations with the 
other parts of Southeast Asia, Lower Burma witnessed a great leap of trade in the 
mid-fifteenth century.13  
                                                 
12 Tak was under the influence of the northern Thai kingdom of Chiangmai in the eighteenth century 
and was known as Rahaeng. When central Thai, Ayutthaya, took over in that century, they substituted 
the even older name, Tak, which could date from as far as the time of Ramkhamhaeng inscription 
(Renard 1980b: 27).  
13 Aung-Thwin (2002) argues that in general, the application of “the age of commerce” in the case of 
Burma is not appropriate since the centers of the Burmese kingdoms were located in Upper Burma 
which had placed more importance on the production of agriculture. However, the case of Lower 
Burma should be dealt with differently from that of Upper Burma. Throughout its history, much of the 




Lieberman also elaborated on this connection between Lower Burma and other 
parts of Southeast Asia. He (1980: 205) explains that the maritime centers in Lower 
Burma like Bassein, Pegu, Martaban, and Ye benefited from the expansion of Indian 
Ocean and Indonesian commerce. Lieberman (ibid) observes that “in the mid-fifteenth 
century not only the volume of trade passing through the Mon ports expand in 
absolute terms, but the relative importance of the Mon area as a link in the Asian trade 
network increased.”  
Commerce in Lower Burma comprises of three principal components (Lieberman 
1980: 206; 1984: 27). First was the trade with the rising center of Malacca and north 
Sumatra. The second line of commerce was with West Asia and India, particularly 
Gujarat, the Coromandel Coast, and Bengal. The third segment was the inland 
commerce line between the eastern ports of Martaban and Siam. It is obvious that 
Mae Sot played a linking role in the case of the third component. 
To accommodate the expansion of trade volume in Lower Burma, the new port of 
Ye (south of Martaban) opened in 1438 (Reid 1993: 13). The shipyards of Martaban 
supplied many of the biggest junks for the merchants from other parts of Southeast 
Asia such as Malacca, Java and even south China, because Martaban was best placed 
for large stands of Burmese teak (Reid 1993: 42).  
The Portuguese capture of Malacca in 1511 further enhanced the commercial 
position of Lower Burma. To escape Portuguese interference, merchants took 
alternative routes to Lower Burma. The ports of Lower Burma increased their 
transpeninsular trade with the Gulf of Siam. And the newly emergent anti-Portuguese 
centers of Aceh and Banten began to provide Lower Burma with Eastern commodities 
to draw the attraction of Indian merchants reluctant to make the long journey to the 




Warfare and its consequences  
 
The economic proliferation of Lower Burma induced confrontations between the 
Burmese and Siamese kingdoms. Mae Sot’s route was used as a linking pass for 
military operations.   
After the great kingdoms – Pagan and Angkor – had collapsed, there were no great 
states in mainland Southeast Asia until the middle of the sixteenth century. The region 
was fragmented into geopolitical zones. These zones ignored, brutalized, and allied 
with one another in a bewildering fashion. At the same time, each zone remained 
internally fragmented (Pamaree 2005a: 71; Lieberman 2003: 123-131). It was against 
this background that Muang Chot appeared and competed against Sukhothai. Though 
Sukhothai and the Mon Kingdom of Pegu influenced the Mae Sot areas and Lower 
Burma, they did not impose imperial rule over local lords (Sunait 2002). 
However, flourishing trade in Lower Burma influenced the geographical expansion 
of Toungoo and Siam, which subsequently resulted in confrontations between the two 
kingdoms. Ayutthaya subjugated Tenasserim in the 1460s and Tavoy in 1488 to 
obtain direct trade opportunities via the Indian Ocean in attempts to overcome the 
limited access to Malacca (Wyatt 2004: 72-73; Sunait 2002: 19-20).  
Tabinshwehti of Toungoo captured Pegu in 1539 and subsequently moved his 
palace there in the hope of engaging in maritime trade. He also conquered Martaban 
in 1541 and subsequently placed Lower Burma, which had been under the influence 
of Ayutthaya with the tributary status, under his control (Harvey 1967: 154-155; 
Lieberman 1984: 29-30; Wyatt 2004: 77).   
Two kingdoms were on the brink of battle. In late 1548, Tabinshwehti mobilized 
all his armies, which included Burmese and Mon soldiers as well as Portuguese 




Burmese armies took the Three Pagoda Pass, starting from Martaban to Taungpaboun 
and then to Kanburi (Kanchanaburi) on the distant periphery of Ayutthaya. However, 
in the later military operation of 1563, the armies passed through the route between 
Martaban and Tak which was called the Rahaeng route or dan Mae Lamao (Mae 
Lamao customs station). From Martaban, the route led to the village of Taphu along a 
river. From there the armies marched overland, crossing the Moei River at Myawaddy 
and Mae Sot until they reached the Mae Ping River opposite Rahaeng village where 
the provincial district of Tak (muang Tak) is situated at the present day. Damrong 
mentions that this was the usual route taken by the people of the northern provinces of 
Siam. In Siamese history it was called “the road to the outpost and duty station of 
Mae Lamao” which is currently one of the villages in Mae Sot District (Damrong 
2001: 15-16; Pamaree 2005a: 79-81). 
As shown above, it is clear that Mae Sot paved the way for the military expedition 
of the Toungoo kingdom against Ayutthaya. In turn, Ayutthaya also used Mae Sot as 
a guard post. As has been illustrated earlier, in the vicinity of Mae Sot, a military base 
which was called “dan Mae Lamao” was established to surveil the movements of 
Burmese armies. The village where the base was located still remains in existence till 
this present day.   
Though Ayutthaya fell and became a vassal state of Toungoo in 1569, it did not 
take long for it to achieve independence. Subsequently by 1600, it claimed again 
Tenasserim and Tavoy for the purpose of regaining direct access to maritime trade 
with the Indian Ocean. However, Toungoo moved its capital from Pegu to Ava in 
1636 and posted governors in Pegu and Martaban. Harvey (1967: 193) mentions that 
this relocation of capital was due to the failures of the attempted coalescence with the 




Toungoo in the 1750s. Alaunghpaya quelled the Mon uprisings and turned his 
attention to Siam. Just like in the earlier days, full scale wars between the two 
kingdoms ensued.  
In this warfare between Konbaung and Siam, the Martaban-Tak route where the 
Mae Sot route was situated was again used for military expeditions. The 1785 
expedition which attacked Bangkok took this route as part of a five-pronged attack.14 
The Burmese armies began their journey from Martaban to Tak most probably by 
passing-through Myawaddy and Mae Sot. Then they marched southward to Bangkok 
(Pamaree 2005b: 19).  
 
Fugitives’ fleeing to Mae Sot      
Perennial battles and rebellions in Lower Burma engendered the displacement of 
people throughout history. In order to regain control of Ayutthaya, a large number of 
the Mon and Thai ethnic war-captives in Lower Burma were forced to join Toungoo’s 
protracted military expeditions. Due to the insufferable condition, Mon and Tai war-
captives repeatedly rose in rebellion and fled away from Lower Burma into adjacent 
areas, notably Siam (Pamaree 2005b: 12-13). Indeed, periodic migrations to Siam due 
to appalling conditions continued up until the British began to colonize Lower Burma 
in 1824 (Harvey 1967: 180). In fact, the present-day refugee incidents take on this 
historically recurrent pattern. 
The 1660s and 1750s-1810s saw a more prominent population influx from Lower 
Burma into Siam. The last emperor of the Ming dynasty, Yung-li fled to Upper Burma 
from Yunnan with his 700 followers in 1658. At first they were disarmed and 
                                                 
14 Bodowphaya led the invasion of Bangkok in 1785. The five directions whereby he remarkably 
stormed Siam are as follows: 1) from Mergui to Chumphon and Chaiya southwardly; 2) From Tavoy to 
Ratburi, Phetburi to meet up with the force at Chumphon; 3) Three Pagoda Pass to Kanchanaburi, then 
directly against Bangkok; 4) from Martaban to Tak and Kamphaengphet; and 5) from Chiang Saen to 




permitted to reside in Sagaing. However, the remnants of the Ming armies, hearing of 
their plight, tried to rescue them. A Burmese army was defeated at Wetwin, and for 
three years Upper Burma was in extreme turmoil, ravaged up to the walls of Ava and 
as far south as Pagan. The Toungoo court ordered the governor of Martaban to 
mobilize Mon levies for the defense of Ava. However, the Mon levies deserted and 
raised a revolt at Martaban. Desertion was punished by burning the absconders alive 
in batches. Fearing further reprisals, thousands of Mon fled into Siam (Hall 1981: 
402-403; Harvey 1967: 196-198).   
The later influx took place during the Konbaung dynasty. Alaunghpaya subjugated 
the Mon rebellions in Martaban which precipitated the collapse of the Toungoo 
dynasty. After that, he and his successive kings waged strenuous wars against Siam. 
In the series of military expeditions, the Mon were continuously summoned as levies. 
The Mon levies who had been mustered against Siam mutinied in 1773. The 
mutineers devastated Rangoon and in a fear of retaliation, migrated to Siam with their 
families (Harvey 1967: 259). In 1814, there was another rebellion by the Mon in 
Martaban, which culminated in refugee influx into Siam (Halliday 1913: 5).  
Lieberman (1978; 1984: 218-219) mentions the Mon were not the sole group 
behind these insurgencies in Lower Burma. Rather, many other ethnic groups, notably 
the Karen, joined the uprisings. In fact, the leader of the 1740 uprising in Martaban, 
Smin Dhaw, was Karen. Along with the Mon, the Karen in Lower Burma were in 
prolonged turmoil between 1740s and 1820s. Most obviously, many Karen 
communities lay along the routes through which the various armies passed. Many 
amongst the Karen were forced to provide provisions, were recruited as guides and 
spies, and were taken as captives (Keyes 1979: 34-35; Renard 1980b: 15). Due to the 




refuge. Since then, Siamese historical records began to deal with the Karen as a 
significant ethnic element (Keyes 1979: 45; Renard 1980a: 131).   
There were three routes by which the fugitives traveled on their way to refuge in 
Siam. Martaban was their major rallying point. From there, they took the northern 
pass via Myawaddy, Mae Sot and Tak; the southern one via Tavoy and Kanchanaburi; 
and a middle one by way of the Three Pagoda Pass. For the first route, they proceeded 
by land through Kawkareik and Myawaddy on the Burmese side and arrived in Mae 
Sot which was the Siamese frontier station to Tak (Halliday 1913: 7; 1917: 15) 
The immigrants were welcomed by Siam. For example, the Mon expressed that 
“the Lord of the golden prasada, the righteous king of Ayutthaya, was the haven of 
the Mon race, and on every occasion saved the lives of the Mon people” (Halliday 
1913: 4; Harvey 1967: 180-181). King Mongkut also considered himself as “King of 
Karens” (Renard 1980b: 23). Siamese kings made use of the immigrants as useful 
laborers and border guards (Wyatt 2004: 113, 135-136; Renard 1980b: 21).  
It is against this background that Mae Sot saw the settlement of people who fled 
from harsh conditions in Burma in search of refuge. As shown before, fugitives took 
the Mae Sot route in search of refuge in Siam. Among them, the Karen were the most 
prominent resettlers in Mae Sot. Keyes (1979: 35-45) notes the millennial movements 
and demographic expansion of the Karen as reasons for migration in addition to 
conflict-driven migration. Caught in the devastating turmoil of warfare between the 
Burman and Siamese kingdoms, their migration may have been stimulated by 
millennial ideas that reached a peak in the 1820s (Stern 1968: 305-306, cited in Keyes 
1979: 45). Hovemyr (1989) also asserts that a main motive behind Karen Christian 




In addition to these political and religious changes, the increase in Karen 
population rendered the traditional modes of upland cultivation in the areas where 
they live, difficult. Therefore, they had to move down to the lowland areas.  
 
MIGRATION AND GROWING OF A SOCIAL SYSTEM: FROM THE 
1820S TO 1962 
 
Not long after the refugees migrated to Mae Sot, it witnessed the migration of 
various other groups of people as commercial activities were growing due to the 
introduction of British colonial rule in Lower Burma. People began to settle down and 
adapt to the particular local environments.  
This period also saw state intervention as the state bureaucracy began to modernize. 
Administratively, Mae Sot was incorporated into the state system. However, the 
people of Mae Sot built up and maintained their own ways of life and culture in 
response to the central penetration.   
 
The British colonization of (Lower) Burma and migration of various groups 
  
British involvement in the development of parts of Lower Burma as a result of the 
Anglo-Burmese war of 1824-1826 resulted in the migration of various groups of 
merchants to Mae Sot. The British gained control of Lower Burma up to Moulmein 
facing the Burmese port of Martaban. Moulmein, which had been a village, was 
developed as a capital for the colonized areas for the purpose of military and economy 
(Furnivall 1991[1939]: 5-6). Under the auspices of the British, Moulmein saw great 




British colonizers made attempts to enhance overland trade by attracting Chinese 
merchants (Renard 1980a: 135-136). This was well recorded in the stories of 
Richard’s missions to Siam. In several of his trips to Chiangmai from Moulmein via 
the overland route, passing through of Myawaddy and Mae Sot, he was persistent to 
attract Chinese merchants in Chiangmai to extend their trade activities to Moulmein 
(Farrington 2004). Also, the British made attempts to construct railway lines linking 
Moulmein and Chiangmai to enhance the speed of the journey (Renard 1980a: 170-
171). Besides, they paid particular attention to teak forests along the Moei River.    
Given the expanded business opportunities in the trade route between Moulmein 
and inland areas, and also in Mae Sot as a result of people resettlement, diverse 
groups of merchants used Mae Sot as a stopover at first, and then as a resident place. 
Following the Karen and the Shan who migrated to Mae Sot in search of refuge in the 
earlier periods, ethnic Chinese from various parts of Burma and Yunnan began to set 
up their residency there in the hope of gaining business opportunities. Also, the 
Burman moved to the frontiers of Mae Sot apart from their periodic back-and-forth 
migrations. After that, a group of northern Thais, notably from Lampang, migrated to 
Mae Sot. Besides, Mae Sot saw the migration of Muslims from Bangladesh through 
Burma and also saw the later resettlement of a group of Sikhs and Hindus (Anurak 
1998). 
The new settlers engaged in trade with Moulmein. The road condition between 
Moulmein and Mae Sot was more convenient than that between Mae Sot and Tak. 
Benefiting from the trade with prosperous Moulmein and due to the rich natural 
resources in Mae Sot, they brought their relatives to Mae Sot. Also, another group of 




settlers, the earlier residents of the Karen moved to other peripheral areas of Mae Sot 
(Anurak 1998: 14-15). 
Bastian’s journey in 1862-1863 (Bastian 2004 [1866]; 2005[1867]) gives some 
glimpses about Mae Sot. He was on the journey to Bangkok from Burma, and passed 
through Myawaddy and crossed the Moei River, staying in Mae Sot in November 
1862 before continuing his journey to Tak and Bangkok.15 According to him, Mae Sot 
was a very lonely place with Karen villages surrounding it. He saw a Chinese caravan 
carrying luxury goods from Burma to Siam. During his jungle journey from Mae Sot 
to Tak, he encountered Siamese traders who, carrying their wares in baskets on their 
backs, were on their way to the border station. He also later met a train of elephants 
that belonged to them (2005: 8-9). From his accounts, it can be assumed that during 
this time, Mae Sot was a small settlement area, though various groups of people began 
to settle down there and it acted as stopover for merchants. In contrast, according to 
his accounts (2005: 11-17), Tak was a lively and bustling town. The Chinese 
constituted a sizeable part of the population and lived mostly in the market quarters.16 
Tak was a rallying point for border trade with Moulmein, and an overland entrepot 
where goods from Chiangmai, Sukhothai, and Laos were gathered. Inconvenient 
transportation and jungle routes still prevented Mae Sot from taking over Tak as a 
major overland trade station, though the importance of Mae Sot continued to grow 
over the years.  
 
                                                 
15 In fact, the name “Mae Sot” does not appear in his story. After crossing the Moei River, he arrived in 
“Maiteta” which according to Anurak (personal dialogue, December 2005) is “Mae Tao” village where 
a border checkpoint is located at the present days. However, Bastian mentioned that he arrived there the 
next day after crossing the Burmese-Siamese border and “Maiteta” was the settlement area where the 
Siamese official was residing (Bastian 2005: 1-2). From that source, “Maiteta” can be assumed to be 
the town area of Mae Sot. He might not have had a clear understanding of geographical names.        
16 The king of Thonburi, Taksin was once a governor of Tak. The Teochiu Chinese trading community 




Patterns of culture and settlement 
 
Migration transformed Mae Sot into a settlement place beyond a mere trading 
stopover. A kind of social system was developed as a result of the immigration of 
various groups of people. However, at first, newly migrating people maintained social 
relationships within their own groups. The features of a plural society were observed 
in those days. For instance, the earlier settlers, especially the Karen, did not integrate 
with the new immigrants. Therefore, as mentioned before, they moved to other 
marginal places when their initial settlement areas were encroached upon by 
subsequent immigrants. It seems that existing Karen life styles which were based on 
agriculture were not compatible with the newly emerging commercial environment 
which was enhanced by commerce-driven immigration.  
However, one of the earlier groups of settlers, the Shan, solidly maintained their 
way of life. They began their settlement around the place where the District Office of 
Mae Sot is located at the present day. As Buddhists, they built their own temple, Wat 
Mae Sot Na Dan, which has been located on the way from the Mae Sot District Office 
to the central area of Mae Sot town, as early as 1857 (Anurak 1998: 79). The Shan 
maintained their settlement in the inner places of Mae Sot town between the 
Intharakhiri Road and the Prasatwithi Road (Anurak 1998: 15). 
The Chinese congregated around the Sriphanit Road, which was the central area of 
Mae Sot in the old days. Their industriousness and skillfulness in doing business led 
to their economic prosperity. They engaged in businesses such as brewery, goldsmith, 
butchery and hotel industries (Anurak 1998: 15). 
Unlike the non-Thai people such as the Shan, the Chinese, and the Burman who set 
up their residence in the central area of Mae Sot town, the northern Thai people did 




outskirts of Mae Sot such as Mae Pa, Mae Ku, Mae Tao, Mae Ka Sa, and Pha Wo 
with some groups settling in the central area of Mae Sot (Anurak 1998: 2, 16).     
As for the Muslims, originally Bangladesh, established their dwellings around the 
Sriphanit Road near the Mae Sot Hospital after migrating from Burma (Anurak 1998: 
20). In fact, a road named, “Thanon Islambamrung,” still remains there, showing that 
they were a dominant group there. They built a mosque along that road. Their main 
economic field was trade. 
As time went on, various ethnic groups gradually molded into “chao Mae Sot” 
(The people of Mae Sot) beyond the pluralistic patterns that characterized initial 
settlement. The processes of adaptation to the local environments and the increase of 
inter-ethnic relationships in their everyday lives were seen although this did not lead 
to the total loss of individual ethnic identities.  
Although the “chao Mae Sot” saw the increasing intervention of the central 
government since the later part of the nineteenth century, geographical remoteness 
made it conducive for them to maintain their own living patterns. The natural 
environment such as the Moei River nurtured a sense of solidarity among the people. 
It was the rendezvous point for the people of Mae Sot to go for picnics. They enjoyed 
bamboo-rafting, fishing, swimming, digging out shellfish, and so on. They also did 
washing and bathing. Their life styles were to a great degree attached to the river 
(Anurak 1998: 23). The river was not a dividing boundary but a place for breeding the 
identity of the particular locality. 
Seasonal festivals such as songkran 17  and New Year’s Day brought people 
together in collective celebration. In those cases, it saw the participation of the 
Burmese from Myawaddy. Especially during songkran festivals, the people of Mae 
                                                 




Sot and the Burmese from Myawaddy enjoyed swimming together in the Moei River 
with Thai and Burmese cultural performances on the river side. Also in sporting 
events, various teams such as the Muslims, the Chinese, the Shan, the hill tribes, and 
the civil servants participated and built up solidarity (Anurak 1998: 26-28).  
Buddhist festivals contributed to the development of inter-ethnic mixtures among 
people such as the Chinese, the Shan, and the northern Thais. They participated in 
various Buddhist activities such as the Buddhist lent and merit-giving (Anurak 1998: 
25). Besides, in various other activities, the people of Mae Sot, regardless of ethnicity 
and religion, were willing to participate.  
Interestingly enough, during those days, there was a modern cultural wave that 
flowed from Burma to Mae Sot. Under the auspices of the British, Burma tasted the 
modern ways of life earlier than Mae Sot. In the eyes of the people of Mae Sot, the 
Burmese appeared to enjoy the privileges of modern things. The style of Burmese 
ladies was so charming that they gained the attraction of the people of Mae Sot. Silent 
films from Burma were also shown in a theater-like building in Mae Sot. The people 
of Mae Sot learned modern life styles such as drinking tea in the afternoon, eating 
cookies and cakes, and playing football. They also went to Burma to take pictures, 
which was not available in Mae Sot during those days. The rich and also the civil 
servants of Mae Sot often made trips to Burma to catch up with the development of 
Burma (Anurak 1998: 29-30).    
 
The making of a national town 
 
While Mae Sot was being populated, the Bangkok regime attempted to stretch its 




threatened by British and French colonialists, Siam was desperate to reform the 
prevailing system of government (Tej 1977: 14). From the second half of the 
nineteenth century, Siam launched a series of reforms in various parts of the state, 
notably the provincial administration. The key to the reform of the provincial 
administration lay in centralization (Tej 1977: 39). 
In the early reforms of the provincial administration, Siam focused on 
strengthening the defense of the threatened areas of the kingdom. The defense 
demanded administrative, judicial and financial changes to the provinces. The 
Bangkok regime employed local noble men as government officials. It also engaged 
in judicial autonomy as well as financial sectors for the purpose of central control. 
Apart from the administrative changes, the government attempted to establish close 
physical contact with the entire country by posting mapping groups headed by 
McCarthy to all parts of Siam. There were major improvements in the field of 
communications during those days (Tej 1977: 61-75; Vandergeest and Peluso 1995: 
397; Thongchai 1994: 119).  
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Bangkok effectively became an 
imperialist power by consolidating the previous tributary states into the direct circle of 
Siam, which can be called “internal territorialization” (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995: 
397; Thongchai 1994: 145-148).  
Bangkok’s intervention became more prominent with Prince Damrong heading the 
Ministry of the Interior in the last decade of the nineteenth under the support of King 
Chulalongkorn. Damrong transformed the Ministry of the North into the modern 
Ministry of the Interior. He made more radical and massive drives to reform the 
provincial administration. He came up with a new administrative system, termed as 




administrative unit (monthon, “circle”) in a similar manner to the royal 
commissionerships established earlier in Chiangmai and Phuket (Wyatt 2004: 194). In 
this system, Tak Province was included in monthon Nakhonsawan which was 
established in 1894 (Tej 1977: 101, 271). The central government also attempted to 
have a firm control at the district, subdistrict, and village levels. Local noblemen were 
transformed into district officers, while below the level of the district, the direct 
masters of serfs were replaced with village heads and subdistrict chiefs (kamnan). The 
Ministry of the Interior directly sent out instructions to provincial and district officials 
to create villages and subdistricts by having the “heads of approximately ten 
households” whose houses were located near each other to elect a village head. 
Villages were in turn clumped into subdistricts (tambon). The village heads were 
instructed to elect among themselves a kamnan (Tej 1977: 111; Vandergeest and 
Peluso 1995: 399).    
Reflecting on the above occurrences, Mae Sot also saw the interventions of 
Bangkok and the subsequent administrative developments at that time. Initially, the 
Karen were assigned to be in charge of border control in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. In 1845 Bangkok extended its rule beyond Mae Sot to Tha Song 
Yang, the northern-most district of Tak Province (Renard 1980b: 21).18  
The administrative change of Mae Sot started from rearranging the guard post. 
During the reign of Rama V, the border post (dan Mae Lamao) which had been 
located in Mae Lamao village was moved to adjacent places of Mae Sot near the Moei 
River with the expansion to four posts: dan Intharakhiri, dan Chai, dan Phon, and dan 
Chiangthong. While the first border post was in Mae Ramat district north of Mae Sot, 
                                                 
18 Before that, Chiangmai had governed Tha Song Yang. Mae Hong Son province had initially included 
Tha Song Yang but when boundaries were redrawn, the district was shifted to Tak Province (Renard 
1980b: 27). Even Tak throughout its history, had changed allegiance on several occasions from 




the others were located inside the district area of Mae Sot. Administratively, all of 
them were initially under muang Tak of monthon Nakhon Sawan. However, in 1898, 
they were dissolved and incorporated into a newly created amphoe Mae Sot, and 
separated from the previous administrative position. And phra Intharakhiri19 who had 
been in charge of dan Mae Ramat and was Karen, became the first nay amphoe (Head 
of District) of Mae Sot (Anurak 1998: 83). 
The state conducted several modern projects in Mae Sot. In 1881 the telegraph line 
was connected from Tak to Moulmein, passing through Mae Sot and Myawaddy 
(Anurak 1998: 3; Thongchai 1994: 118). Mapping and topographical surveys were 
conducted for the purpose of drawing boundaries between Siam and British Burma 
and between provinces. During 1882-1883, a map of the boundary between Tak and 
Chiangmai was created to settle their dispute over woodcutting tax (Thongchai 1994: 
118). During 1890-1891, a mapping of the boundary on the frontier between Siam and 
Burma was conducted (Thongchai 1994: 124). In 1896, a team of Anglo-Thai 
boundary expedition marched to Mae Sot after conducting investigations in the Three 
Pagoda Pass and Umphang areas (Renard 1980a: 191). Mae Sot seemed to gradually 
become a part of the “geo-body” through Siam’s attempts at the turn of the century. 
Throughout the early part of the twentieth century, Mae Sot was on its way to 
becoming a full-fledged administrative district, equipped with state agencies and other 
organizations as seen in the following (Anurak 1998): the first public school was 
opened in 1915; the police station came into existence in 1920; the border checkpoint 
                                                 
19 In fact, the name of Intharakhiri traces back to 1661 when the Siamese force under King Narai 
invaded northern Thailand, capturing many principalities of Karen and Lawa that were under  the 
suzerainty of Chiangmai, including muang Intharakhiri (Damrong 2001: 222). Intharakhiri is Mae 
Ramat today where one of the guard posts was located as mentioned above. Renard mentioned that the 
Karen were in charge of Intharakhiri throughout history. The title of the chief person was awarded and 
passed down in recognition of the place of authority. Therefore, there were a lot of phra Intharakhiri in 
the history. However, most of them were assumed to be Karen (Renard 1980a: 57). Anurak mentions 




was established in 1927; the prison was built in 1938; the thesaban (municipal office) 
was erected in 1939; the customs office was introduced in 1940; the border patrol 
police began to be stationed in 1954; and the Mae Sot Hospital was established in 
1958.  
Also, the field of communications saw some important developments: the Mae Sot 
airport, which was built after the First World War, commenced passenger service in 
1932 though it was interrupted during the Second World War;20 and in 1954, the 
condition of the Mae Sot-Tak road was improved in order to accommodate vehicles 
though it was one-lane without pavement (Anurak 1998).      
The penetration of Bangkok and Mae Sot’s subsequent incorporation into the 
administrative system as laid down by the central government did not necessarily take 
place without resistance from the locals and without witnessing discrepancies between 
state aspiration and actual implementation. A retired governor of Tak encouraged the 
officials who were his relations to resist the new governor who had been sent from 
outside the province, according to Prince Damrong’s report to King Rama V in 1899 
(Tej 1977: 174). And Mae Sot district officials posted by the central government from 
the outside were not able to communicate properly with the local people because their 
languages were different. The officials spoke central Thai, while people in Mae Sot 
spoke northern Thai, mixed with some other ethnic languages in accordance with their 
ethnic groups. Therefore, they had to hire interpreters when approaching the locals. 
Demographically speaking, the population amongst the central Thai was exclusively 
small. Mae Sot’s culture rarely contained elements of central Thai culture. Rather, 
northern Thai or Lanna lifestyles were becoming an integrating model for various 
groups in Mae Sot without the total loss of the elements of each ethnic group. Given 
                                                 
20 During the Second World War, Japanese armies marched to Burma through Mae Sot (Anurak 1998: 




that situation, the introduction of the central elements through official channels was 
very alien to the people of Mae Sot.   
Even so, the people of Mae Sot retained their contact with Burma more than with 
modernized Thailand. Burma continued to be their source of business activities and 
modern ways of life until the 1960s.         
 
BLACK MARKETS AND COMMERCE-DRIVEN SOCIAL SYSTEM: 
FROM 1962 TO1988 
 
During the 1960s, Mae Sot saw ongoing development. Road conditions between 
Mae Sot and Tak were again rehabilitated. After then Prime Minister Thanom 
Kittikachorn visited Mae Sot along that route, he realized the importance of the road 
as a means of connection with Burma, and sought for financial aid from the 
Australian government during his visit to the country. In 1970, with the technological 
and financial assistance of Australia, the road was made convenient and safe, though 
it still is a one-lane path (Anurak 1998: 12-13). 
At that time, the people of Mae Sot witnessed the physical presence of the monarch. 
In 1964, King Bhumibol Adulyadej and the Queen made a visit to Mae Sot for the 
first time. They made another visit to Mae Sot in 1978. Afterwards, several projects, 
such as those on agriculture, were initiated by the palace (Anurak 1998). The tangible 
appearance of the monarch even in the remote town of Mae Sot might have 
precipitated the town into a “national” town by imbuing the core idea of Thai 
nationalism in the minds of the people of Mae Sot.  
Throughout the period, in general, the government attempted to enhance the its 
ability in the affairs of remote areas and in the long run it wanted to increase the 




Though Mae Sot continued to be influenced by the center during those days, such 
influence was very minimal, compared to the impact of the political development of 
Burma and the Thailand-Burma borderland on the fashioning of Mae Sot. In other 
words, the town was more susceptible and indebted to the other side of the border, 
particularly in its economic development. 
 
The Burmese Way to Socialism and the flourishing black markets  
 
Burmese democracy, which was full of detrimental disputes and the mutinies of 
communists and ethnic insurgent groups from the time of her independence, collapsed 
in 1962, allowing the military to seize power through a coup.21 Subsequently, the 
military government projected “the Burmese Way to Socialism” which was hermetic 
and self-isolating. Private sectors and properties were nationalized and confiscated. 
The country’s doors were closed to its neighboring countries and the rest of the world.  
Simultaneously, the KNU lost its territorial occupation in the adjacent areas of 
Rangoon, Toungoo, and Delta region towards 1960 (Lintner 1999: 297). 
Consequently, they moved their military bases to the eastern border areas. However, 
they rehabilitated their military and administrative capacities and maintained a firm 
control in those areas.  
The closed door policy of the military regime resulted in a scarcity of consumer 
goods in the country. The situation gave rise to the engenderment of the black markets 
in the borderland, especially in the adjacent areas near Mae Sot. From 1963, the black 
markets saw a dramatic development, though in the early 1950s customs gates had 
been opened at a number of KNU posts along the border. The first new Karen 
                                                 




customs gate was opened at Phalu, south of Myawaddy, in the 6th brigade area in 1964. 
The following year Bo Mya22 opened another gate at Wangkha in his 7th brigade area 
to the north (Smith 1999a: 283). 
Martin Smith (1999a: 283) documents the proliferation of the black markets as 
follows, 
 
By the 1970s Bo Mya’s main base at Kawmoorah was sometimes producing as 
much as one lakh kyat in a single day’s trading when up to 1,000 cattle would 
splash across the Moei River into Thailand at the end of the long journey across 
the Dawna Range from central Burma. Transported in the other direction were 
radios, watches, high-quality sarongs and other manufactured goods now 
unavailable in Burma. Added to this income was revenue from timber mills and 
tin and antimony mines run jointly with local Thai businessmen. Vast profits 
were generated though opium, which was an important source of income for 
insurgent groups in the Shan State, has always been strictly prohibited. In the 
peak year of 1983 KNU Finance Minister, Pu Ler Wah, estimated incomes at 
500 million kyat (£50m at the official exchange rate), an astonishing figure for 
an otherwise impoverished backwater).   
 
The above paragraph was testified by local informants involved in the operation of 
the black markets. Cattle were voluminously transported from the Burmese side, 
while consumer goods and machineries such as sewing machines came from the Thai 
side.23 Jewelry made up a great portion in that trade too. Whereas gold was very often 
used as a means of payment for Burmese buyers, jade and ruby attracted even 
overseas merchants mostly from Hong Kong. Merchants from Hong Kong used to 
visit and stay in Mae Sot to acquire jade from the Burmese traders. According to 
                                                 
22 He passed away at the age of 79 as recently as 24 December 2006 in Mae Sot. See the reports of 
Bangkok Post (25 December 2006) and the Irrawaddy (24 December 2006; 26 December 2006) on his 
death. 





Chang (2003; 2004), Yunnanese merchants were very active in this jade trade and 
Mae Sot took over from Mae Sai as a central trading place for jade by the 1980s. 
The impact of the black markets on the national economy of Burma during those 
days was enormous. Though exact figures were not attainable, estimates of the illegal 
trade vary from between 50 to 85 per cent of the total official trade in the mid-1980s 
(Myat Thein 2004: 80). According to Khin (1988: 94), about two-thirds of goods in 
the black markets were smuggled in from Thailand, and the total illegal trade was 
thought to have a turnover of up to 50 per cent of official trading.    
The effect of the black markets on Mae Sot was dramatic and tremendous. The 
sleepy outpost of Mae Sot rapidly turned into a bustling new market town and the 
pivotal center of much of this new trade (Smith 1999a: 283). The abundant black 
market operations induced another phase of migration comprising of businessmen 
from Bangkok who were mostly Chinese but occasionally included some Indian Sikhs. 
New immigrants had relatively more capital and resources than the people of Mae Sot. 
They soon dominated the central area of the town and transformed the landscapes of 
that area into a highly commercialized place by establishing their shops and 
welcoming new customers. In consequence, the Shan who had been staying there sold 
their land and moved out of the place (Anurak 1998: 17).  
The lives of the people of Mae Sot were intimately related to the operation of the 
black markets. The number of people involved in the trade was very large; for 
instance, the number of porters engaged in transportation from Mae Sot to Wangkha 
was more than 1,000. Many shopkeepers expanded their businesses in connection 
with Bangkok from which goods were delivered to Mae Sot before entering into the 




replaced by connections with Bangkok as the capital city experienced rapid 
industrialization and subsequently provided the necessary goods for the black markets.  
The black markets equally attracted the massive participation of the Burmese. 
Besides merchants, many Burmese porters took over delivery in Wangkha. Then they 
passed through jungle routes protected by the KNU soldiers all the way up to 
Moulmein. From there, they took the train to Rangoon where the open black market, 
popularly known as St John’s Shopping Center, was in operation for the Burmese to 
consume the goods (Aung Kin 1983, cited in Myat Thein 2004: 81). In this 
commodity moving chain, an incredible number of Burmese as well as Thais were 
involved. Mae Sot became the central position in the circulation of black market 
goods.  
The prolific development of the black markets strengthened the capacity of the 
KNU. Though the military bases became confined to the borderland, the profit 
generated by tax (roughly 7 per cent) on trade enabled the KNU to be equipped with 
weaponry. Significantly, it increased the political clout of Bo Mya who was in charge 
of the areas in the black markets. Based on successful economic and military 
operations, he eventually became president of the KNU in 1976 (Smith 1999a: 284-
285).   
 
The KNU and Mae Sot 
 
In general, the relationships between Mae Sot and the KNU were friendly. 
However, there was a woeful exception. In 15 May 1960, a military band of the KNU 
inflicted horrible damage on Mae Sot. The group burnt down the District Office of 




station, and destroyed communication systems. The people of Mae Sot and district 
officials fled to Mae Pa village. Shortly, the band retreated to the Burmese side. This 
was a big national issue, and thus then Prime Minister Sarit and government officials 
visited Mae Sot to ensure the increase of security. The reasons behind this incident 
were not mentioned in Anurak’s book (1998: 33-34). However, according to Bo Mya 
in his biography (n.d.: 83-88), this was because the leaders of the military band were 
deceived by Thai merchants. The Karen group delivered 300 heads of cattle to the 
Thai merchants who promised to pay for them soon. But the merchants never turned 
up, which provoked the Karen band to retaliate. Bo Mya, who at that time was a 
branch leader in the 7th brigade, came over to Mae Sot to settle the case with Thai 
authorities. He assured them that the KNU would never cause trouble in the future. 
This meeting portrayed Bo Mya as a diplomatic figure to the Thai authorities.  
Despite such an awful incident, the KNU and the Thai authorities maintained 
amicable relationships throughout the years. It was mainly because of the KNU’s 
security roles in the border. Under Bo Mya’s staunchly nationalist leadership, the 
KNU undoubtedly gave the Thai government crucial help in blocking the spread of 
communist insurgency in the region and frustrated the Communist Party of Thailand 
(CPT)’s attempts to link up with the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). Without the 
solid presence of the KNU in the form of “liberated areas” along the border, the CPB 
in Tavoy-Mergui would have been able to forge a link with the CPT in the forests of 
Mae Sariang and Umphang, and the connection would have been further extended to 
the communist parties of China and Malaysia. The KNU’s assistance was not 
confined to the Kawthoolei24 side of the border. They were requested by Thai officers 
                                                 
24 It is the Karen name for the state that the KNU was trying to establish. It roughly covers Karen State 




to cross into Thailand to disarm Karen villagers who had been organized by the CPT 
(Smith 1999a: 299).    
The cordial relationships were reflected in Bo Mya’s statement where the KNU 
was likened to a “Foreign Legion” for Thailand, guarding their borders and 
preventing links between the Burmese communists and the Thai communists (Smith 
1999a: 299). In return for the KNU’s positive roles for Thailand, the Thai authorities 
allowed them to stay on Thai soil and to buy arms, ammunition and other supplies in 
Thailand. Also, the Thais attached special agents who served as observers and 
advisers to the Karen units (Lintner 1999: 299). It is against this background that the 
families of KNU leaders began to settle in Mae Sot in addition to their residence in 
the liberated zones of the border. For example, the 6th brigade commander of the KNU, 
Shwe Hser and his family members sometimes came and stayed in their house in Mae 
Sot.25 The Thai authorities also issued travel permits and provided amenities for rebel 
leaders who wanted to go to Chiangmai or Bangkok under the auspices of Thai 
intelligence agencies. Often the journeys were rallied from Mae Sot.      
 
Commerce-centered social system 
 
I have mentioned that the flourishing black markets induced a new wave of 
migration to Mae Sot. This period witnessed the settlement of many Bangkok 
businessmen in Mae Sot. Though they had business relationships with Bangkok, their 
hectic business dealings forced them to stay in Mae Sot on a permanent basis. 
Moreover, the relatively inconvenient transportation system discouraged them from 
retaining their close relationships with Bangkok. In the beginning, male migration 
                                                 




was the main pattern. However, entire families followed them to Mae Sot in the hope 
that family labor could be used in their expanded business fields, as well as keeping 
their families in close proximity in their new settlements. Throughout the period of 
1962-1988, this group of new domestic migrants became crucial figures in the town’s 
economy and constituted the main components of the Tak Chamber of Commerce till 
the present day. Their identities were also transformed to that of the people of Mae 
Sot as their settlements persisted on a permanent basis. They were not only involved 
in business activities but also in social and cultural arenas.  
In fact, during this period, more aliens flowed into Mae Sot. However, they did not 
pursue permanent residence in Mae Sot unlike domestic migrants. The Burmese 
merchants were staying in Mae Sot for short periods of time during their trade with 
the Mae Sot businessmen. Also, the Burmese porters were mainly involved in 
transportation between Wangkha and Moulmein. As Wangkha and Phalu provided 
tremendous business opportunities for the Burmese regardless of ethnic groups such 
as in the business of running food stalls in addition to delivering jobs, they did not 
feel compelled to seek for jobs in Mae Sot. Though they often made visits to Mae Sot, 
it was temporary.  
The KNU also did not place their military bases in the Thai side despite their 
periodical appearance in Mae Sot. Though they received favorable treatment and had 
a settlement as shown before, they were more desperate to strengthen their liberated 
zones in Kawthoolei. In fact, their military and economic capacity enabled them to 
run those areas as a de facto nation-state with firm administrative apparatuses.   
However, it does not deny the localization of alien people. Inter-ethnic marriages 




people experienced the transformation of their identity to that of the people of Mae 
Sot throughout the years.   
Given that others were not permanently residing in the town, the establishment of 
institutions for alien people in the areas of education and health did not come into 
existence. The tide of alien migration was solely generated by commercial interests, 
not by education or health. The social system of the town was mainly based on 
commerce where interactions between alien people and the people of Mae Sot are 
centered. The division between the illegal and legal or between the informal and 
formal did not contain any meaningful connotation since almost every cross-border 
trade was in the shape of the illegal and informal. Comparisons would only be 
possible under the condition that the formal constitutes a sizeable portion of the whole.  
It was only after the late 1980s that the town witnessed an enormous number of 
alien people in institutional bases within the town’s social system. Also it was after 
the late 1980s that comparisons between the illegal/informal and the legal/formal 
appeared to have increased relevance as the state attempted to engage in the affairs of 
the town.            
 
MASSIVE MIGRATION AND MIGRANT INSTITUTIONS: FROM 1988 
 
The year 1988 witnessed great changes in terms of societal development. Whereas 
Mae Sot expanded gradually in the past, this period saw an abrupt and unexpected 
population increase. This movement was mainly induced by the political development 
in Burma. Also, this period saw the end of the Cold War in the region and a 
subsequent adjustment of geo-political and geo-economical policies in Thailand. Mae 




penetration into the town. Paradoxically, the enormous presence of unauthorized 
migrants and the state’s increased involvement were observed side by side in the town. 
Moreover, the state has to deal with the sizeable existence of migrant institutions 
deeply entrenched within society.  
This section reveals what caused an increase in the migration, how the state 
became more involved in the town, how the society was transformed due to massive 
migration and how the state engaged with the migrants.   
 
Political crisis in Burma and population movement 
 
The Thailand-Burma borderland saw significant geo-political and geo-economical 
changes in the late 1980s, which had a deep impact on Mae Sot. The military regime 
drove the economy of Burma into an abysmal situation. The export volume decreased 
to 2 per cent of GDP in 1987/1988 from 16 per cent of GDP in 1961/1962. The 
country was almost bankrupt as the external public debt rolled into huge amounts; the 
debt/GDP rose from 20 to 40 per cent in 1986 when debt-service obligations equaled 
58.24 per cent of export earnings. Burma was on the brink of bankruptcy. The 
situation compelled the government to seek “Least Developed Country”26 status in the 
United Nations in 1987 in order to reduce interest rates, and to receive new financial 
grants from international organizations like the IMF (Mya Thein 2004: 77-80). The 
Burmese Way to Socialism, which was an idiosyncratic blend of Marxist, Buddhist 
and nationalist ideology, had witnessed Burma’s decline from a country once 
                                                 
26 The status of the “Least Developed Country” has some requirements: the per capita income should 
be below US$200; industry should be less than 10 per cent of GNP; and literacy is also less than 20 per 
cent. Burma was said to have adjusted its state of literacy downwards to qualify for that status (Myat 




considered among the most resource-rich in Asia to one of the world’s ten poorest 
nations (Smith 1999a: 24).  
Burmese lives suffered from the harsh conditions. They had to go through a 
shortage of essential everyday goods and financial insecurity caused by the 
government’s chronic demonetization practices in attempts to normalize the black 
market economy. People ceased to contain their tolerance against the regime. 
Outrageous anti-government demonstrations took place in March 1988 and soon 
rampantly spread to the whole country. People in every sector including students, 
workers, monks, farmers, teachers and government employers took part in the 
uprisings. On the one hand, the government suppressed the demonstrations, while on 
the other hand, it tried to introduce a multi-party political system with the abdication 
of Ne Win who had been the head of the government, and with the introduction of a 
civilian leader, Dr. Maung Maung. However, people’s disgruntlement was not 
mollified in the face of governmental subjugation and ad hoc democratization. 
The political crisis eventually led to the promotion of new faces from the military 
into the government through a coup. They took power in 18 September 1988 and 
subsequently formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).27 The 
new military regime relentlessly trampled democratic uprisings. They operated 
massive suppressions over the whole country. These dreadful oppressions triggered a 
mass exodus to Burma’s border areas, mostly along the Thailand-Burma border. 
Thousands of students and political activists boarded cars and buses, bound for 
Moulmein and Kawkareik and from there trekked through the jungles and over the 
hills to the Thai border near Mae Sot, while others went to the nearby Three Pagoda 
Pass or headed for Victoria Point in the far southeast (Lintner 1999: 353). This exodus 
                                                 
27 The SLORC was officially dissolved and replaced with the State Peace and Development Council 
(SPDC) in November 1997. However, key members of the SLORC retained their positions in the newly 




took similar routes to that the fugitives or refugees had taken in the old days as shown 
earlier in this chapter. It was an atavistic recurrence. 
The SLORC discarded the defunct closed-door economic policy in place of 
massive open-door policies, especially towards neighboring countries. It attempted to 
formalize trading and political relations with neighboring countries by nullifying the 
operations of the black markets. Therefore, it was imperative for the government to 
have firm control in border areas where natural resources were abundant but ethnic 
insurgent groups were prominently present. To achieve this, it sought cease-fire 
agreements with many ethnic militant groups such as the United Wa State Party and 
the Shan State Army (Smith 1999b: 50). However, on the other hand, it operated 
strenuous and massive military expeditions towards non-ceasefire groups, notably the 
KNU. Alongside military operations, the notorious “Four Cuts” campaign 28 
devastated the border areas by the late 1980 (Smith 1999a: 397). Consequently, the 
campaign pushed many people into the other side of the border, while others remained 
internally displaced people till today.    
 
Changing policies of Thailand 
 
While Burma saw a woeful economic decline and social devastation by 1988, 
Thailand enjoyed rapid economic growth, which was 9.5 per cent in 1987 and 13.2 
per cent in 1988. The profile of Thailand’s economy witnessed rapid change; the 
proportion of agriculture in GDP decreased, while the industrial sector’s share 
increased with the demand for trade and markets (Buszynski 1994: 723). In terms of 
                                                 
28  The strategy was officially endorsed in 1968 and was known as pya ley pay in Burmese. 
Fundamentally, the campaign aims to cut the insurgents off from their support system which includes 
food supplies, funding, intelligence and recruits (Lang 2002: 38). It was substantially introduced from 




the geo-political situation, Thailand was released from her obsession with national 
security as the Indochina conflicts came to an end with the demise of the CPT. Thus, 
Thailand’s foreign policy needed adjustments to reflect the changing economic and 
political situations in the region. 
Given the situation, Thailand’s border areas no longer served as buffer zones; 
instead, in the new political and economic context of regional relations, they served as 
gateways for trade and investment (Battersby 1998/1999: 487). Thailand aspired to 
turn “battle fields into trading markets” and opened up economic ties with Thailand’s 
former foes, including Burma playing a central role (Grundy-Warr et al. 1997: 99). 
General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh’s visit to Burma in 1988 symbolically heralded a 
new era in relations between Bangkok and Rangoon. He and a hundred of his 
delegates were the first foreign diplomatic group to recognize the newly formed 
military regime. Among the projects in their discussion were an increase in the 
official trade in teak and, to the alarm of Karen villagers, the construction of hydro-
electric dams along the Moei and Salween rivers in the heart of Kawthoolei to provide 
electricity to both countries, were included. As a result, by early 1989, twenty 
concession areas had been granted along the Thailand-Burma border with a total 
export of 16,000 tons of teak logs and 500,000 tons of other hardwood logs authorized. 
Besides, Thai fishery companies received permission to catch 250,000 tons of fish in 
Burmese waters (Battersby 1998/1999: 477; Lintner 1999: 357-358; Smith 1999a: 
397; Hirsh 1995: 244).  
Now the roles of ethnic insurgent groups which had acted as border guards against 
the threat of communists lost their relevance in the new geo-political and geo-
economical strategy of Thailand. The Thai government wanted to have more 




groups. Formal economic relations with the military government would evidently 
bring more profits. This attitude was reflected in a “constructive engagement” policy 
where economic reasons come before anything else in engagements with Burma 
(Grundy-Warr et al. 1997: 98-99).  
 
Development of Mae Sot and multitude influx of others 
 
As Burma and Thailand began to formalize their political and economic relations 
marked by the increased encroachment of the Burmese troops towards the border, the 
black markets that formerly operated near Mae Sot witnessed a heavy decline by the 
late 1980s. In 1988 the KNU’s income plummeted by 60 per cent (Smith 1999a: 396). 
The Burmese government developed Myawaddy as the official trading outpost in the 
1ate 1980s. Businessmen from Mae Sot began to send their export goods to 
Myawaddy posts, not to the black markets. By 1992, those black markets in Wangkha 
and Phalu had disappeared. 
The disappearance of the black markets, which had a great impact on the economic 
development of Mae Sot, never caused a decline in the economic importance of Mae 
Sot. A large number of the Burmese who had suffered the social and economic 
devastation in Burma now flew into the town in pursuit of economic opportunities. 
Also, those people whose livelihoods had previously relied on the black markets went 
to Mae Sot to sustain their survival.    
Mae Sot saw an enormous influx of “economic migrants” from 1988 onwards. In 
contrast to the gradual increase of alien people in the previous periods, this new wave 
of migration took place suddenly and the size of migration was so enormous that they 




As there was cheap labor available in Mae Sot, factories began to relocate in Mae 
Sot. The relocation of factories was backed by the decentralization policies of the 
Thai government in its attempts to rectify the extreme economic disparity between 
Bangkok and the peripheral areas of the country. In those policies, Mae Sot received 
special attention from the government due to its promising location. And in the 
broader regional perspective, the roles of Mae Sot were regarded as incredibly 
important in promoting regional cooperation through programs such as the Greater 
Mekong Subregion Program (GMS)29 (Maneepong 2002/2003; 2004; 2005a; 2005b; 
ADB 2001). 
Mae Sot also gained from other economic opportunities due to Thailand’s 
economic boom in the 1990s. It has become a tourist destination, a shopping 
attraction as well as the preferred destination for relocated garment industries and 
other labor-intensive industries. Recently, under the GMS program, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) also designated the East-West Corridor,30 which supported 
various infrastructure projects in Mae Sot, acknowledging Mae Sot’s role as part of a 
strategic network (Maneepong 2005a: 266). 
Under the auspices of the government and regional entities such as the United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) and 
the ADB, Mae Sot witnessed considerable infrastructural development. In 1997, the 
Thai-Burma Friendship Bridge, which connects Mae Sot and Myawaddy across the 
Moei River, was completed. Also, the road between Mae Sot and Tak saw massive 
developments with asphalt pavements being built and there was also a substantial 
                                                 
29 It was formed in 1992 under the agreement of six countries including China, Burma, Thailand, Laos, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam.  
30 The Economic Corridor approach was first discussed in late 1998 as a key means of developing 
further cooperation of the GMS. The East-West Economic Corridor stretches across four GMS 
countries from Moulmein in Buma, through Mae Sot in Thailand and Laos, to Da Nang in Vietnam 




increase in road safety due to the financial endowment of the government and other 
regional organizations. The road constituted a part of the Asian Highways. 31 The 
series of developments eventually enabled Mae Sot to surpass the provincial district 
of Tak as the economic center in the province.   
From outside sponsorships, more and more factories were built in Mae Sot. The 
number of factories increased from 118 in 1993 to 218 in 2000 (Maneepong 
2002/2003: 91). Garment factories constituted dominant figures in employment and 
investment (Maneepong 2005a: 280-281). These factories were built in cooperation 
with overseas partners, notably from Hong Kong and Taiwan (BLSO 2002; 
Maneepong 2005a: 282).  
The economic expansion of Mae Sot attracted more alien people throughout the 
1990s, who were not necessarily confined to the factories. It became very common for 
most shops to hire illegal or undocumented Burmese workers. They were mostly hired 
in the form of illegal or undocumented employment. Many of them were even 
employed as domestic workers. Though the government introduced the registration 
scheme in the late 1990s, it was only effective in factories. Other sectors such as 
shops and the domestic arena still continued to engage in plenty of illegal 
employment. 
In tandem with economic migrants, Mae Sot was greatly influenced by the flow of 
refugees. The Burmese government gained more territory with its expanded military 
offensives in the 1990s. A large number of refugees fled to refugee camps near Mae 
Sot. Before the camp consolidation policy32 of the Thai government, many of them 
pursued an economic engagement with Mae Sot with relative ease.  
                                                 
31 For the detailed routes, see the website 
( http://www.unescap.org/TTDW/common/TIS/AH/maps/AHMapApr04.gif). 
32 The Thai government implemented the policy for security and administrative efficiency. At the 




The number of refugees grew throughout the 1990s. When the first sizeable influx 
of refugees took place, their number was 10,000. However, it increased rapidly to 
55,000 in 1993, 80,000 in 1994, 115,000 in 1997, and 158,000 in 2005 (Bowles 1998; 
TBBC 2005). Most dramatically, the KNU lost Manerplaw which had served as a 
head-quarter for long periods in 1995 after the split with the Democratic Buddhist 
Karen Army (DKBA)33 (Lintner 1999: 413-414; 1995). Now, ethnic insurgent groups 
as well as political activists who had retained their physical presence in the KNU-
controlled areas lost almost all of their territorial bases inside Burma.  
Consequently, ethnic insurgent groups such as the KNU and other National 
Democratic Front (NDF) 34  member groups searched for refuge in Mae Sot and 
restructured their military strategy to guerilla warfare. Also, Burmese political 
organizations such as the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the All Burma 
Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) sought sanctuary in the town. Furthermore, sub-
KNU organizations including the Karen Youth Organization (KYO) and the Karen 
Women’s Organization (KWO) came over to Mae Sot and began to be involved in 
activities for Karen refugees. 
The refugee crisis drew the attention of humanitarian relief agencies. The dominant 
presence of refugees in the adjacent areas of Mae Sot led them to open branch offices 
in the town for the convenience of rendering assistance to the needy. Throughout the 
1990s, dozens of INGOs began to run their branches in Mae Sot. Eventually, in 1998, 
the UNHCR also commenced its missions and opened its regional branch in Mae Sot.       
                                                                                                                                            
2005, it further decreased to be ten (Bowles 1998; TBBC 2005).   
33 The DKBA was said to be formed by Buddhist Karen soldiers who were disillusioned with their lack 
of influence within the Christian-dominated KNU leadership. It was also said that this split was 
instigated by the Burmese government. Soon after the split, the DKBA allied itself with the Burmese 
government (Smith: 1999a: 446-450; Lintner 1999: 413-414). 
34 It was organized as an umbrella organization for ethnic insurgent groups in 1976 under the leadership 




Now, Mae Sot seemed to become a town with a preponderant presence of aliens, 
though it saw small numbers of domestic migration of businessmen and factory 
owners from other areas such as Bangkok. While Mae Sot witnessed an enormous 
attention from the government and was endowed with various developmental projects 
in the hope that the government could make use of the town for state purposes, 
paradoxically, the town became increasingly a very different town with a heavy 
reliance on aliens in almost every sector. Furthermore, despite the attempts of the 
government in legalizing or officializing the patterns of aliens’ residence, such as the 
Work Permit scheme, illegal and unofficial parts of the town never disappeared. 
Rather, it saw the increase of an institutionalized presence of the unofficial, for 
example in the areas of education (migrant schools) and health (a migrant clinic).    
 
Expansion of social system and emergence of migrant institutions 
 
The abrupt increase of alien people changed the landscape of Mae Sot. The town 
sprawled with the expansion of migrant ghettos and clusters. Some buildings in the 
town were transformed into dormitories to house factory workers. 
Burmese cultural products were also preponderant: it was not rare to see them 
chew betel and recognize its red spots on the streets; Burmese teashops were served at 
Burmese social gatherings; and there was an increase in the sales of Burmese books 
and songs in the markets. 
Though in the beginning, migrant lives seemed to be constituted haphazardly, as 
time went on, they came to live a relatively normal life, relying on the Burmese 
communities and cultural stuffs. Moreover, some of them built up intimate 




Through these relationships, despite their illegal presence, they were able to avoid the 
authorities.          
It was remarkable in this period to see the development of migrant institutions. It 
made the social system of the town totally different from previous periods. Also, it 
made the town quite different from other border towns. It was prompted by the 
participation of many Burmese, Thai and foreign activists. While these institutions 
helped aliens to cultivate their roots in the town, they also attracted more people from 
the Burmese side. The Cynthia Clinic, known locally as “the migrant hospital,” 
treated over 200-250 migrant patients for around 10 baht for almost every ailment as 
of 2005. One third of the patients among them came from the Burmese side such as 
Myawaddy (Interview with Dr. Cynthia 8 December 2004). Since its establishment in 
1989, it continued to witness the active participation of overseas partners with the 
cooperation of local health authorities.35 
Migrant schools also saw a massive existence throughout the period. They were 
also initiated by the Burmese activists in the beginning. Many political groups such as 
the NLD and the ABSDF began to run migrant schools with overseas aid. The Karen 
in the town operated the school system using the resources and manpower available to 
them from the refugee camps and overseas partners. As of 2005, there were more than 
30 migrant schools with over 3,000 migrant students.  
Whereas the social system of the past was driven by commerce and saw the 
gradual integration of the Burmese in the absence of institutional bases, the social 
system of this time was based on not only commerce but also other economic sectors 
such as factories and strong social and cultural institutions. The expanded capacity of 
the social system increased cross-border flows. Thousands of people made border-
                                                 
35 Dr. Cynthia originally came from Rangoon. She fled from Burma after the 1988 crackdown and 
played a crucial role in establishing the Clinic with the help from other Burmese activists. She was 




crossings on a daily basis to pursue their economic, medical and other practical 
opportunities. Also, it has become trendy for people in the town to venture to other 
Thai cities such as Bangkok in search of better opportunities.  
Though there are no organizations representing Burmese migrants, the roles of 
political activists were notable in the affairs of migrants. While they still continued 
small-scale mobile political movements, they became increasingly involved in the 
welfare of Burmese migrants with the increasing aid from the outside world.         
State agencies did not dismiss the presence of others. They needed to engage with 
the institutions and political activists. Local authorities noted how deeply entrenched 
others were in the town. Therefore, their governance covered those unauthorized 
people and institutions, not necessarily relying on forceful methods. In that sense, 
local authorities’ unofficial ways of dealing with them gained more relevance in the 
current phase of governance styles.   
 
CONCLUSION: SIAM MAPPED? 
  
This chapter has dealt with Mae Sot’s history from as early as the 13th century. 
From its beginning, Mae Sot has always had relationships with other areas, notably 
from the Burmese sides. Mae Sot’s history can be described as the history of 
otherness. The first settlers of the town were the Karen, and other groups such as the 
Shan, the Chinese, the Muslims, and so on filled the town afterwards. 
Although the state began to engage with the town since the late 19th century, its 
otherness never disappeared. Thongchai’s ground-making work (1994) deals with the 
victory of mapping practices at the turn of the 19th century to the 20th century and the 




rhetoric Mae Sot was mapped and became a part of the geo-body, at the level of 
people’s everyday lives Mae Sot was never mapped and never became a “Thai” town. 
Mae Sot’s historical development vindicates this point. During the British colonial 
period of Burma, Mae Sot had more intimate relationships with Burmese sides. Also 
during the period of the Burmese Way to Socialism, Mae Sot had closer connections 
with Burma. Even after 1988, the otherness of the town increased dramatically. 
Focusing on the victory of mapping obfuscates the actual realities of ordinary people 
in the particular locality of the border.  
The development of the town’s social system is strongly based on this otherness. 
The expansion of the town kept pace with the increase of the otherness. The 
engendering of the town was induced by the migration of other people. Also, during 
the period between 1962 and 1988, it witnessed a leap in forging strong commercial 
ties with others. The current period sees the enormous pervasiveness of others too. 
Without those others who sustain the town’s economy, the town’s system would be 
impossible.   
I do not necessarily dismiss the impact of the Thai state on the town. The state 
strengthened its influence throughout history by positioning the state agencies and 
enforcing regulations. However, these practices were never implemented without 
discrepancies. The state cannot dismiss the reality that otherness is essential in 
sustaining the system of the town. In that sense, the governing styles of the state 
needed to be modified to accommodate alien people though illegal or unauthorized 
means. Particularly, the state needs to deal with migrant institutions, not necessarily 
by the use of physical threats. Going beyond a focus on state unilateral influence, 
scholarly attention on the dynamics revolving around the presence of others provides 





STATE IN STATE: THE ADMINISTRATION AND 
GOVERNANCE OF MAE SOT 
 
 
This chapter investigates the particular governance of Mae Sot. Unlike other inner 
places in Thailand, the enormous presence of others, particularly unauthorized others, 
makes the town very unique in matters of governance. In addition, the existence of 
ethnic political groups, democratic movement groups and international relief agencies 
makes the town more distinct from other towns in Thailand. Mae Sot, as a national or 
Thai town, is subjected to the state governing system while the town, as a town of 
others, accommodates other governing regimes at the same time. This chapter deals 
with the interactions of those governing systems and demonstrates how the Burmese 
are integrated in the governance even though they do not have a proper legal status.  
With regard to the governing styles of Mae Sot, I attempt to rethink the notion of 
modern states that are constituted by the isomorphism of territory, sovereignty, and 
citizenship. This common notion is totally incomplete in understanding places such as 
Mae Sot where others, as quasi citizens in the town, constitute an important part of the 
governance of the town. The conventional understanding of the state serves to view 
Mae Sot as a deviant town. But, the town has its own ways of governance which 
mixes and matches the state’s governance. It seems that Mae Sot is itself a small state 
on its own, of which principles and styles of governance are very different from other 
conventional states.  
First, the chapter shows the demographical features of the town. Here, the 
dominant component of others in constituting the population of the town is addressed. 




regime, the migrant regime, the ethnic or democratic political regime and the 
international relief regime. Third, from the point of view of the state, the chapter pays 
attention to the aspiration of the state to place the town under its firm control. Fourth, 
in explaining why non-state regimes continue to exist in Mae Sot, the chapter focuses 
on the strategies of the aliens, the defiant locals, and the localization of the state 
agencies.  
 
DOMINANT ALIEN POPULATION 
 
The land size of Mae Sot District is 1,986.116 km2 or 1,242,322.5 rai with 346,116 
rai of cultivated land, 741,807 rai of forest and 39,692 rai of settlement areas.36 It 
constituted 12.11 per cent of the whole land of Tak Province which is of a size of 
16,406.650 km2. The size of the central area of Mae Sot (tambon Mae Sot) itself is 
1,325,625 rai or 27.2 km2 (Mae Sot District Office 2004; Mae Sot Municipality 2005).  
Mae Sot District (amphoe Mae Sot) is divided into ten sub-districts (tambon). 
Tambon Mae Sot is the center for the District in various sectors such as commerce, 
administration, and education. Tambon Mae Sot is also called muang37 Mae Sot. The 
neighboring four sub-districts of tambon Mae Sot have factories and commercial links 
with it. The other sub-districts are mainly agricultural areas. In Mae Ka Sa, the 
picturesque corn field is stretched, while in Ma Ha Wan near Phop Phra District, rose 
farming takes up a big portion of the landscape. The beautiful scenery of the outskirts 
of Mae Sot was so attractive that it propelled me to visit those areas on my motorbike 
as often as possible.    
                                                 
36 1 rai is equivalent to 0.0016 km2or 1600 m2.  
37 According to Thongchai (1994: 49), the word muang refers broadly to a community, a town, a city, 
even a country – that is, an occupied area under the exercise of a governing power but without 
specification of size, degree or kind of power, or administrative structure. For a detailed discussion on 




As of 2003, the population of Thai locals in Mae Sot District by sub-districts is as 
follows:   
 
Table 3.1 The Population of the Thai Locals in Mae Sot District 
 
Sub-district No. of Village Male Female Total 
No. of 
Household 
Mae Sot 18 14,232 14,322 28,554* 10,799 
Mae Ku 14 4,763 4,763 9,526 2,892 
Tha Sai Luat 10 4,473 4,134 8,607 3,028 
Pha Wo 9 3,196 3,124 6,320 2,007 
Mae Tao 6 3,296 3,122 6,418 20,81 
Mae Ka Sa 15 5,346 5,328 10,674 3,336 
Mae Pa 10 5,532 5,248 10,780 4,004 
Ma Ha Wan 12 6,329 6,537 12,866 3,222 
Dan Mae Lamao 10 3,864 3,723 7,587 1,908 
Phrathat Pha Daeng 6 2,724 2,768 5,492 1,777 
Total 110 53,755 53,069 106,824 33,074 
 
* According to the information of Mae Sot Municipality, the population of tambon Mae Sot 
is 35,449 as of 30 November 2004 (Mae Sot Municipality 2005: 20).  
 
(Source: Adapted from Mae Sot District Office 2004: 15-16) 
 
Among them, three sub-districts of Mae Sot, Mae Ku and Tha Sai Luat have a 
municipal office (thesaban) where an elected mayor (nayok thesamontri) is in charge 
of the administrative matters of the sub-district.38  
It is evident that Mae Sot has a sizeable existence of others. The table below gives 
us a glimpse at figuring out the number of alien people. It indicates the number of 





                                                 




Table 3.2 Registered Burmese in Mae Sot District during the Period of 1 – 31 July 
2004 
 
Sub-district No. of Registered Burmese 
Mae Sot 28,521 
Mae Ku 7,254 
Tha Sai Luat 14,635 
Pha Wo 589 
Mae Tao 6,379 
Mae Ka Sa 4,074 
Mae Pa 10,309 
Ma Ha Wan 6,224 
Dan Mae Lamao 245 
Phrathat Pha Daeng 6,042 
Total 84,272 
 
(Source: Mae Sot District Office 2004: 8) 
 
Registration occurred in the Mae Sot District Office. This registration was initiated 
by the government in its attempts to obtain the overall figure of alien migrants all over 
the country. The registration was meant to grant a kind of amnesty to migrant workers 
for one year. As a result, over the entire country, 1,269,074 people, among whom 
905,881 was Burmese, were registered. In Tak Province, including Mae Sot, 120,636 
people were registered.39 Mae Sot accounted for almost 70 per cent of alien migrants 
in the whole Tak Province which composes of nine districts.40  
However, the registration scheme was different from the Work Permit application. 
Those who wanted to work were required to apply for Work Permits after the 
registration. In Thailand, roughly 500,000 workers registered for Work Permits as of 
late 2004 (Arnold 2004). In Mae Sot, only 41,095 workers were enrolled for Work 
                                                 
39  For detailed information of the registration, see the website (http://www.iom-
seasia.org/index.php?page=stat_th). Also see the website of the Ministry of Labor  
(http://www.mol.go.th). 
40 The nine districts are muang Tak, Wang Chao, Ban Tak, Sam Ngao, Mae Ramat, Tha Song Yang, 
Mae Sot, Phop Phra and Umphang. The first four districts are located in the eastern side of the 




Permits. It showed that less than half of those registered in Mae Sot were legal 
workers.  
 
Table 3.3 Employment Sectors of Migrants in Mae Sot District Registered during the 
Period of 1 June 2004 to 17 January 2005  
 




Factory 9,252 21,944 31,196 
Agriculture 2,446 797 3,243 
Sales in Shops 1,752 1,061 2,813 
Construction 1,948 205 2,153 
Domestic Worker 144 1,298 1,442 
Rice Milling 86 13 99 
Brick Making 41 11 52 
Fishery 33 9 42 
Commerce 30 2 32 
Ice Making 19 4 23 
Total 15,751 25,344 41,095 
 
(Source: Mae Sot Labour Office 2005) 
 
However, it can be easily assumed that all Burmese migrants did not register. In 
fact, a great number of people did not even turn up for the registration. Among the 
migrants I interviewed throughout my fieldwork, it was rare to find those holding 
Work Permits or even registration cards, except factory workers and those who work 
in big agricultural farms. Though an exact figure of the total number of migrants was 
never attainable, it was generally accepted that roughly 200,000 migrants were 
staying in Mae Sot District. Some people like the headman of Mae Sot Municipality 
even made a bold assumption that tambon Mae Sot itself contained 200,000 Burmese. 
However, the general consensus on the estimation of the Burmese in the area of Mae 




Based on the estimations, we can compare the populations between Thai locals and 
the Burmese in both the Mae Sot town area (tambon Mae Sot) and in Mae Sot District 
regardless of legality. This is evident in the table below. 
 
Table 3.4 Estimated Population of Mae Sot Including the Thai Locals and the 
(Estimated) Burmese 
 
Location Thais Burmese Total 
tambon Mae Sot  28,554 100,000 128,554 
Other tambons 78,270 100,000 178,270 
Mae Sot District 106,824 200,000 306,824 
 
 
Though this rough figure gives a general picture of people staying in Mae Sot, we 
also need to take into consideration the constant flows of cross-border movements of 
the Burmese. From an interview with the Superintendent of the Tak Immigration 
Office on 2 December 2004, it was revealed that on a daily basis, the arrival figure of 
the Burmese who made official cross-border movements through the Thai-Burma 
Friendship Bridge and the Immigration checkpoint was on average around 2,000. 
However, interestingly enough, the departure figure was 1,600. Four hundred people 
did not turn up on the departure list of the office. We can easily assume that they 
either remained in Mae Sot or crossed back to Burma by bypassing the Immigration 
checkpoint. In fact, even on arrival to the Thai side, many Burmese do not pass 
through the checkpoint; during the rainy season, they board a boat and during the dry 
season, they just walk through the River. All unaccounted and unauthorized 
movement over time would tremendously expand the potential population of Mae Sot. 
Hence, an exact number of the Burmese crossing the border was never possible. 
Nonetheless, the crude projection in the table above is enough to show that alien 




authenticity of the town as a “Thai” place given that others constitute the majority of 
the population. Also, it raises the problem of governance since the authorities do not 
simply dismiss the dominant presence of others. Here, governance does not 
necessarily connote the practices that dispel others. Given that the town is to a great 
degree dependent on others, accommodating practices are included in the governing 
styles too. The governing styles cross over the dividing domains of the legal and the 
illegal. Since much of the patterns of existence of others take on the unofficial or the 
illegal, it is rather natural to deal with the unofficial domains as well as the official 
domains. In addition, the governing of aliens is not solely in the hands of the Thai 
authorities. Various alien organizations such as ethnic groups, political groups and 




For many years since Fred Riggs’s pioneering study in the mid-1960s, the Thai 
polity was characterized as a “bureaucratic polity,” where the state was dominated by 
a bureaucracy (Riggs 1966). However, as business interests became a great factor in 
the political arenas from the late 1980s, critics such as Anek Laothamatas (1992) 
suggest that the model has lost its relevance in Thai politics because local 
businessmen and their associations began to influence local as well as national politics 
to a great degree. In this new political economy, money began to play a decisive role 
in gaining political power (McVey et al. 2000).   
A massive drive for decentralization throughout the 1990s drew more attention 
from scholars. Scholars attempted to analyze its impact at the local level (e.g. Nelson 




around elections. Though ethnographic observations of election campaigns provide us 
with a deep understanding of local politics (e.g. Arghiros 2001), they are limited in 
understanding local politics on an everyday basis. Moreover, focusing on elections 
dismisses the presence of the non-electorate (migrants), though they are pre-dominant 
components of local politics in places such as Mae Sot. In the end, an election-driven 
study is only about the official and formal aspects of local politics.   
 
The administrative system of the state 
     
Mae Sot’s administrative structure is illustrated in the figure below: 
 
Figure 3.1 Mae Sot’s Administration Structure 
 
 Administration Hierarchy  
 
 





















(Source: Adapted from Arghiros 2001: 26) 
Central Government 
Ministry of Interior 
Tak Province 
(jangwat) 
Mae Sot District 
(amphoe) 






Municipality (thesaban), Tambon 




As shown above, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) takes charge of administration at 
the provincial level and below. The Governor of Tak (phuwarachakan) is posted by 
the MOI, and so is the Chief Officer of Mae Sot District (nay amphoe). The Governor 
supervises the field officials of central ministries that have provincial level branches. 
He also oversees districts which are directly accountable to the provincial 
administration.  
The Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO, or onkan borihan suan 
jangwat) plays the role of a local government at the provincial level. Provincial 
councils were established in 1933, soon after the abolishment of absolute monarchy in 
1932. The Provincial Administrative Act of 1955, which has been superseded by the 
Act of 1997, gave autonomy and control over budgets by creating the Provincial 
Administrative Organization. Prior to changes in 1997, the PAO was chaired by the 
provincial governor. However, now it is chaired by nayok PAO. The executive body 
of the PAO is the provincial council. It is made up of members elected from each 
district. Elections are held every five years. The PAO is in charge of policy 
formulation, supervision of the general administration of the province, passing 
legislation and approving the provincial budget. It is also involved in district level 
administration (Arghiros 2001: 22-23). The general trend of local businessmen being 
dominant figures in PAOs in Thailand (e.g. McVey et al. 2000; Arghiros 2001) is also 
observed in the Tak PAO. Nayok PAO of Tak Province is a businessman running a 
garment factory, using Burmese laborers in Mae Sot.41  
Governance at the district level and below is currently a mixture of bureaucratic 
rule and local democracy. At the moment, there is no local government at the district 
                                                 
41 I had several chances to socialize with him and his family. During the process of data collection at 
the factories, I came to know his wife who was mainly in charge of the garment factory. I was then 
invited to dinner by her and her friends who were members of the Tak Chamber of Commerce. I also 
attended a Buddhist initiation ceremony for his son. There, I saw an MP and other big businessmen of 




level. Mirroring the organization of provincial administration, the district chief (nay 
amphoe) looks after the activities of field representatives of various central ministerial 
departments (Arghiros 2001: 25). As of December 2005, nay amphoe of Mae Sot was 
transferred from Nakhonsawan in January 2005 by the MOI. The term of office is 
normally two to three years. He is the 41st nay amphoe since amphoe Mae Sot was 
established in 1898. 
As mentioned before, Mae Sot has three municipalities (thesaban). Thesaban Mae 
Sot was established in 1937 (Mae Sot Municipality 2005: 17), while the other two 
(Mae Ku and Tha Sai Luat) were upgraded from sukhaphiban (sanitary district) to the 
status of thesaban in 1999.42 At the outset of the foundation of thesaban Mae Sot, it 
covered 480 km2 with 27 mubans (villages). However, for administrative efficiency, it 
was reduced to administer only 27.2 km2 in 1949 (Mae Sot Municipality 2005: 18). 
As mentioned before, those three municipalities are administered by a mayor elected 
from amongst the locals.  
Sub-districts are administered by kamnans who are elected by villagers among the 
sub-district’s incumbent village heads. Residents of a village elect village heads (phu 
yay ban). The position of kamnans and village heads is ambiguous located somewhere 
between that of civil servants and villagers’ representatives. Before the promulgation 
of the TAO Act in 1994, with its actual implementation in 1995, the sub-district 
council was headed by a kamnan. However, the kamnans’ political importance and 
official recognition are lessening because many duties and rights have been replaced 
by the TAO. Kamnans are no longer the members of sub-district councils.43 The TAO 
is composed of two elected representatives from each village in a tambon. It forms an 
executive committee and the council in its own right. The duties of the TAO include 
                                                 
42 Overall in Thailand, the former 984 sanitary districts were upgraded to municipalities in 1999 during 
the process of decentralization (Nelson 2002).  




the construction and maintenance of water and land transport infrastructure; the 
management of public cleansing and the disposal of waste; the prevention and the 
eradication of epidemic diseases; the surveillance of public safety; the promotion of 
education, religion and culture; the promotion of the development of women, children, 
youth, the elderly and people with disabilities; the protection and preservation of the 
environment and natural resources; and assignments from government agencies 
(Chaiyan 2002: 38; Arghiros 2001: 27). 
Apart from the local administrative organizations, there are several state agencies 
which are not under the auspices of the Mae Sot District Office. The Immigration 
Office near the Moei River is under the charge of the Immigration Bureau, a branch of 
the Royal Thai Police which was separate from the MOI and became an independent 
agency under the Prime Minister in 1996. This Office is in charge of the cross-border 
movements of vehicles and people and legal issues pertaining to alien people’s 
residence in Thailand. Therefore, when we talk about “illegally staying people,” it 
means that they break the regulations as laid down by the Office. As of December 
2004, there are thirty one officials attached to the Mae Sot Immigration Office. There 
are three official crossing points along the Moei River. One is on the Thai-Burma 
Friendship Bridge, another is located in the upstream area, and the other in the 
downstream. Whereas all three points are controlled by this Office from the Thai side, 
the counter points on the Burmese side are not necessarily in the hands of the 
Burmese authority. Among them, only the Bridge point and nearby areas are 
controlled by the Burmese authority with the DKBA in control of the upstream point 
and the KNU in charge of the downstream point. It means that the Office needs to 
deal with ethnic political organizations in the matters of cross-border movements of 




The duty of border surveillance, however, is not in the hands of the Immigration 
Office, but in the hands of the army, especially the Third Army among the four 
regional commands.44 The presence of soldiers is most salient around the Immigration 
checkpoint and a border market called “Talat Rim Moei”. Armed soldiers check the 
Burmese who are coming and going through this checkpoint, while others patrol the 
bank of the River and sometimes inside Talat Rim Moei. In addition, some groups of 
soldiers are positioned at a checkpoint located at the eastern entrance of Mae Sot.  
Whereas the Immigration Office controls the cross-border movements of people 
and vehicles, the Mae Sot Customs Office is in charge of the movement of goods. The 
Customs Office is a branch of the Ministry of Finance, not under the control of the 
Mae Sot District Office. The Mae Sot Customs Office covers three Provinces 
including Tak, Kamphengphet and Sukhothai. As of June 2005, thirty five officials 
were working in the Office. This number was still quite short to keep a close vigil on 
the movement of goods. This was vindicated by the statement of the Chief Officer 
that he never knew the amount of unauthorized export and import goods though his 
main goal was to trample down smuggling. The Customs Office is in charge of 
several crossing points. The movement of goods across the Bridge does not provide a 
complete picture of the crossing of goods. Only half of the volume is traded through 
this Bridge. The other half is moved by boat, controlled by the DKBA from the 
Burmese side. The Office also needs to cooperate with the DKBA in matters of 
exporting and importing goods, which will be dealt with in the next chapter.  
Though in general, the Royal Thai Police are not under the control of the MOI any 
longer, district level police are accountable to the provincial administration which is 
directed by the MOI. The policies related to the Police are then passed down to the 
                                                 
44 The First Army is in charge of Bangkok; the Second Army is in charge of the northeastern areas of 
Thailand; the Third Army takes care of the northern and the northwestern parts of the country; and the 




Mae Sot Police from the provincial administration. Also, the implementation 
performance of the policies is checked by the provincial administration. Besides, Mae 
Sot sees the presence of the Tourist Police which was set up to meet the needs of 
tourists. Whereas the Army is mainly in charge of security issues along the border, the 
Mae Sot Police is appropriated to implement a whole range of laws and regulation 
laid down by the state in every nook and cranny of Mae Sot District; for instance, 
ensuring that motorcyclists wear a helmet; checking Burmese migrants for legal 
documents and arresting illegal residents; and raiding factories hiring illegal workers. 
Besides, Mae Sot accommodates several provincial branch offices. These branch 
offices are located here due to the relatively long distance to Tak. Above all, Mae 
Sot’s expansion and central position in the western Tak Province which comprises 
five districts require much of the provincial administrative matters to be conducted in 
Mae Sot rather than in the provincial Tak District. This recently gave rise to the 
movement of upgrading of the western Tak province to the level of an independent 
province, with Mae Sot playing a role as a provincial district. It was initiated by nayok 
thesamontri of Mae Sot Municipality.45  
The Mae Sot Labor Office takes the form of a “One-Stop Service” where four 
different departments (employment, labor protection, welfare, and skill development) 
are positioned simultaneously to serve the needs of Burmese migrants as well as Thai 
locals in relation to labor matters. Among the departments, the employment 
department issues Work Permits for migrants. Also, this department introduces 
                                                 
45 This information was obtained from the interview with him on 8 July 2005. The size of five amphoes, 
which is equivalent to 10,714 km2, can be entitled to the status of the Province. This size is similar to 
that of Phitsanulik. The size is ranked among the top 20 from 76 provinces. However, in terms of 
population, the current number of 290,000 in those ampoes is not considered enough to constitute a 
province. This number is ranked 68th among all provinces. However, the geographical distance between 
the eastern areas and the western areas of Tak Province, different social, economic, and cultural 
conditions between two regions and the expansion of border economy provide convincing reasons for 




Burmese employees to Thai employers. The labor protection department is involved 
in settling disputes between Burmese employees and Thai employers, while the 
welfare and skill development unit provides the social security and enhance the 
capacity of laborers respectively, although this is mostly for the benefit of Thai locals 
at the moment.46  
In addition, the Provincial Court, the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office, and the 
Provincial Education Office are based in Mae Sot, demonstrating the importance of 
Mae Sot beyond the district level capacity. 
In the case of refugee camps, the MOI has direct control through the provincial and 
district administrative apparatus. Administratively amphoe Mae Sot is not involved in 
refugee camps. Amphoe Tha Song Yang engages in Mae La Camp, while amphoe 
Umphang is involved in Um Phiem Mai Camp and Noh Poe Camp. The Assistant 
Chief of the District Office (palat) is positioned as Camp Commander to the Camps.47 
However, the existence of many international relief agencies into Mae Sot and the 
flowing of refugees into Mae Sot led Mae Sot-based state agencies to be involved in 
refugee issues too.  
These various local, provincial and national agencies I have dealt with so far 
constitute the governing regime of the state. They have a regular coordinating meeting 
held every month and irregular ones which are held from time to time in the Mae Sot 
District Office. They moderate various administrative and governing actions through 
these meetings. Their main job is to implement the regulations and policies from the 
center in the absence of policy-making rights at the local government level. Though 
certain degrees of decentralization have been conducted since the mid-1990s at the 
provincial and sub-district levels, meaningful autonomous governance at the local 
                                                 
46 Interviews with labor officials (17 June 2005 and 14 December 2005). 




level is limited because the governor and the district chief are appointed by the central 
government rather than elected by the people. In that sense, policy-making at the 
national-level without the true representation of the locals through the local 
autonomous apparatus of administration does not reflect the particularities of the local. 
State agencies in Mae Sot cannot dismiss the alien people in their governing 
activities just because they are not Thai citizens. Given the fact that various sectors of 
the town are heavily dependent on them, the duty of the agencies has to include 
largely the affairs of alien people. This does not necessarily imply the use of coercive 
means. The statement of nayok of Mae Sot Municipality that “We need to deal with 
hidden people because they are also residents of Mae Sot” is derived from this 
context.48 Simply speaking, the Thai governing regime engages in the matters of non-
Thai people. It seems to evoke the colonial polity that a small number of people rule 
the majority of the population. However, unlike classical cases of colonial powers 
coming from the outside to rule the indigenous people, the case of Mae Sot proposes 
that a small number of indigenous people control the majority of alien people. It 
raises doubts over the authenticity of Mae Sot as “our national town” in the sense that 
others are a central component of the governing regime in the town. 
 
Other regimes  
 
It needs to be stressed that the state agencies do not totally monopolize the ruling 
of the town, especially the alien people. Many Burmese, Thais and international 
organizations, to a certain extent, take part in governance.   
                                                 




Though an administrative system for the migrants does not explicitly exist, there is 
an implicit administrative system for them. The migrants do not haphazardly stay in 
the town. They usually live in migrant residential compounds where many households 
get together within a particular area. These compounds are observed all over Mae Sot 
District, even in the nearby downtown area and rural parts. The size of these 
compounds varies from a small one holding ten households to a big one holding forty 
households.  
Some compounds are exposed so blatantly that one can easily recognize them, 
while some compounds are masqueraded and thus it is hard to locate its entrance. It is 
interesting to see that Muslim migrants live among themselves within their own 
residential compounds. These phenomena are most conspicuous around the places of 
the UNHCR building. Some of the Karen also live in their own residential compounds. 
However, this case only applies to those Karen who are involved in political and 
social activities for the Karen. In other words, people in Karen organizations get 
together in certain areas of Mae Sot. For example, several Karen groups such as the 
KYO and the Karen Education Department (KED) of the KNU are based in Mae Pa. 
However, other Karen who migrated from Burma for economic reasons live in 
integrated settlements in Mae Sot with other Burmese regardless of ethnicity. 
Some compounds constituted of people who migrated from the same districts in 
Burma. For instance, I found out that migrants from Thaton in Mon State lived 
together and those from Kawkareik in Karen State also formed a compound.   
Migrant residential compounds nurture social ties among people in particular 
compounds. They can at least retain the village-like life styles even in unstable and 




the experiences of escaping from police raids from time to time strengthened their 
solidarity in times of hardship. 
These compounds do not only provide physical bases for the migrant residents. 
They are also forms of quasi-administrative units. The developing of the compounds 
into a system of administration was mainly initiated by migrant schools which are 
usually based in these compounds. The children of the compounds have basic 
Burmese style education. Also, the schools as an administrative center play a role in 
organizing people and in disseminating information. My entry point to investigate the 
migrants was through these schools. I was able to visit their houses and interview 
them with the help of school headmasters and teachers. 
 
 













These migrant compounds are organized under the umbrella organization of the 
Burmese Migrant Workers Education Committee (BMWEC). The committee was 
initially headed by Dr. Cynthia but as of 2005, the headmaster of a Karen migrant 
school, Hsa Thoo Lei, took over the job. 49  The organization oversees the 
administration of over thirty migrant schools, though financial support comes from 
different sources.   
The leadership of each school in a particular compound is mostly in the hands of 
political activists who were involved in political movements inside Burma or along 
the border before moving to Mae Sot. Most of all, the roles of the members of the 
ABSDF and the NLD are prominent in running some of the schools. These activists 
operate the migrant schools in connection with international partners, most notably 
                                                 





with INGOs, as I will deal with this in detail in Chapter 5. The roles of political 
activists are not confined to education matters. In general, they are involved in 
promoting the welfare of the migrants in the compounds as the political activists too 
live together with the migrants. As almost twenty years have passed since its 
establishment in 1988, their roles now as middle-aged leaders have expanded from 
political movements to general social welfare activities which include education, 
health and labor issues in Mae Sot. 
In fact, some Burmese NGOs in Mae Sot which are concerned with labor issues 
such as the Burma Labour Solidarity Organization (BLSO) and the Yaung Chi Oo 
Workers Association are led by ex-student activists. These groups, in cooperation 
with Thai and international NGOs, are actively engaged in promoting the welfare of 
the Burmese laborers in particular and the migrants in general. 
I do not necessarily mean that Burmese migrants are firmly organized under the 
schools and its leaders. Though many of them are living in migrant compounds, there 
are still quite a number of people who take up different forms of residence in Mae Sot. 
Domestic workers and shop workers usually stay in the houses of their owners. Some 
people rent rooms with their own money, while factory workers stay in dormitories 
provided for by the factory owners. And some Burmese seem to really live in 
unknown and undetected places nobody knows. However, I was surprised to see that 
even though they live in “hidden” places, they can be instantly mobilized. My Korean 
friend was preparing to move to Chiangmai from Mae Sot and needed a group of 
people who could help him. He managed to contact a moving agency which instantly 
brought a group of Burmese in the moving work from elsewhere in Mae Sot. It 
seemed that a network for information dissemination and mobilization existed among 




hundred people as daily workers in a short while. He went on to say that even people 
from Myawaddy could be summoned shortly at a call from Mae Sot. This shows that 
regardless of whether they are “regulated” within the compounds, an implicit structure 
that “regulates” their patterns of social interaction, without a formal hierarchy or 
bureaucratic apparatus, exists within the town and across the border.   
We have seen that the migrants come under a quasi administrative system formed 
by the migrant schools and a network of migrant people. Now I will explain how 
ethnic political groups and democratic movement groups retain their structure in Mae 
Sot. 
After the fall of the strongholds of Manerplaw and Kawmoora to the Burmese 
military in the mid-1990s, the KNU and other political groups did not continue to 
retain tangible territorial bases inside Burma, though mobile and guerilla military 
operations still went on. Subsequently those political groups sought sanctuary in Mae 
Sot and its vicinity. Many great political figures, including the president of the KNU 
and the chairman other members of the NDF, began to stay in Mae Sot. In the town, 
these groups reestablished contact points and offices which ran as headquarters in 
exile. 
Initially, the umbrella organizations of ethnic or general opposition groups 
encompassing both non-Burman and Burman groups had been formed in the 
Thailand-Burma borderland before they moved to Mae Sot. For example, as shown in 
Chapter 2, the NDF which included non-Burman ethnic opposition groups under the 
leadership of the KNU was founded in May 1976. The Democratic Alliance of Burma 
(DAB) was established on 18 November 1988 to incorporate Burman political groups 
such as the ABSDF which was formed on 5 November 1988 in the borderlands too. In 




September 1992 as the highest umbrella organization which includes the NLD LA 
(Liberated Area) founded on 14 February 1991, and the MPU (Members of 
Parliament Union)50 formed on 15 June 1996 as well as the NDF and the DAB.51   
The organization structure of the NCUB is illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 The Organizational Structure of the NCUB 
 
 
(Source: Adapted from the website of the NCUB: http://www.ncub.net) 
 
The above structure is maintained without much fracture in Mae Sot. Though they 
do not explicitly engage in political missions in Mae Sot, Mae Sot provides them with 
the necessary bases for communication and strategy-making. The KNU leaderships in 
these united fronts continue to be prominent. As of December 2005, the Chairman of 
the NCUB was Tamla Baw who was also chairing the DAB on top of being the chief 
military commander of the KNU. The NDF was also headed by the KNU President, 
                                                 
50 It comprises representatives elected in the 1990 election who have not been recognized by the 
Burmese government. MPU Congress is the Parliament of the National Coalition Government of the 
Union of Burma (NCGUB) which was also formed in the borderland in 18 December 1990 by those 
MPs  who fled to the borderland (see http://www. ncgub.net).  
51 For details on their united fronts and their member groups, see Smith (1999a: 420-453; 1999b: 25-
























Ba Thin. By 2004, Bo Mya, who had been a great figure in both the KNU and these 
umbrella organizations, retired from his official positions due to health problems.52 
Both Tamla Baw and Ba Thin are staying in Mae Sot and they sometimes go into 
Burma for political missions such as attending congress meetings.53    
Apart from providing leadership in those united fronts, the KNU is still playing a 
role of government in exile in Mae Sot. It is vindicated by the fact that many KNU-
related organizations are based there. The General Secretary of the KNU, Pado Mahn 
Sha told me that they are playing a leading role in the borderland though the NLD is 
conspicuous within Burma. He went on to mention that the KNU, therefore, receives 
special attention and treatment from local authorities.54   
Many Karen groups, which had been formed before coming to Mae Sot, maintain 
their activities, while the Karen Student Network Group (KSNG) was formed in 1996 
and the Karen University Students Group (KUSG) in 2003. Though the KNU is not 
responsible for overseeing the refugee population in refugee camps, being the domain 
of the Karen Refugee Committee (KRC), it was revealed that the KRC asks for advice 
from the senior groups of the KNU.55 Especially in terms of education, the KED, a 
department of the KNU which is involved in the educational matters of the refugee 
camps, shows an overlapping of roles of the KNU in dealing with the refugees.   
Among other ethnic opposition groups, the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) and the 
Chin National Front (CNF) have their bases in Mae Sot. A representative of the ALP 
in Mae Sot is actively involved in the umbrella organizations. Khaing Soe Naing 
Aung, who has been staying in the Thailand-Burma borderland since 1973 as a 
                                                 
52 He continued to turn up at official functions after his retirement until he passed away. 
53 I met Ba thin at some religious ceremonies at a refugee camp and a Thai-Karen village.  
54 Interview with Pado Mahn Sha (24 June 2005). I contacted him through a Karen church member who 
is his nephew.  
55 Interview with the Vice Chairman of the KRC (20 June 2005). The General Secretary of the KNU 
also said that the KNU sometimes gave some advices to the KRC in dealing with the refugees though 




representative of the ALP, is playing the roles of the Vice Chairman for both the NDF 
and the NCUB in Mae Sot.56 
The ABSDF and the NLD have been mentioned with regard to their promotion of 
social welfare for the migrants above. However, their main mission is to develop 
democracy in Burma. This mission is retained in Mae Sot. Around fifty members of 
the NLD are based in Mae Sot itself, while another 200 members are in the borderland. 
In this region, they seek to promote national reconciliation, the restoration of 
democracy and Human Rights, and the promulgation of a new constitution. For this 
reason, they cooperate with other political groups such as the ABSDF and other ethnic 
groups. The NLD opened a branch in Mae Sot in 1999 after moving to the jungles in 
1995 and then to Mae Hong Son in 1997 due to the fall of Manerplaw in 1995. 
Though recently, this organization was shattered due to the resettlement of many 
members into other countries such as the USA and Sweden, they still continued to 
engage in political movements by tapping into the strategic and geographical 
advantages that Mae Sot offers.57 The ABSDF also retains 800 members in the border 
area, including Mae Sot.58 Like many political groups, recent resettlement programs 
lessened the capacity and size of the organization, even though their influences on 
political engagement in the border areas are still effective.       
I have mentioned that there are many relief agencies for refugees in Mae Sot. What 
is important is that they take the form of a relief regime, by which I mean that their 
activities are coordinated under an umbrella entity, the Coordinating Committee for 
Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT). Almost every relief agency is a 
member of the CCSDPT. This organization is divided into three main sectors in 
                                                 
56 Interview with him (19 April 2005). He had been the General Secretary of the NDF from 1987 to 
2002 before becoming Vice Chairman.  
57 Interview with a person in charge of Foreign Relations and Youth of the NLD (21 June 2005).  




accordance with the kinds of activities they have for refugees: health sub-committee, 
education sub-committee and a sector of food, shelter and relief. Its structure is 
illustrated in Figure 3.3.  
 
Figure 3.3 The Structure of the CCSDPT 
 
 
ADRA – Adventist Development and Relief Agency 
AMI – Aide Medicale Internationale 
COERR – Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees 
HI – Handicap International 
ICS – International Child Support 
IRC – International Rescue Committee 
JRS – Jesuit Refugee Service 
MI – Malteser International 
MSF – Medecins Sans Frontiers 
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TBBC – Thailand Burma Border Consortium 
TOPS – Taipei Overseas Peace Service 
WEAVE – Women’s Education for Advancement and Empowerment 
WE/C – World Education/Consortium 
ZOA – Zuid Oost Azie Refugee Care  
 
(Source: Adapted from TBBC 2005: 52) 
 
 
In fact, this committee was established to serve Cambodian refugees during the 
Vietnam War in the 1970s. To engage with Karen refugees, it formed a sub-
committee, the CCSDPT Karen Subcommittee in April 1984. With the influx of 
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refugees from other Burmese ethnic groups as well as the Karen, the CCSDPT Karen 
Subcommittee was changed to the CCSDPT Burma Subcommittee in November 1990. 
In the absence of the Indochinese refugees from the eastern border of Thailand, the 
CCSDPT was restructured in 1997. The CCSDPT is now principally engaged with 
Burmese refugees, while the Burma Subcommittee has become redundant and 
obsolete (TBBC 2005: 50-51).  
The UNHCR maintains close relationships with the CCSDPT. Representatives of 
the UNHCR participated in the monthly meetings of the Committee. 59  From the 
meetings, NGOs and the UNHCR share information about refugee situations and 
evaluate their previous activities, and draw up future plans. Whereas the UNHCR is 
responsible for administrative matters such as registration and camp relocation, NGOs 
are in charge of practical assistances such as food, education and health as shown 
above.  
Though the CCSDPPT is based in Bangkok, actual cooperation among its 
members took place mostly in Mae Sot since most NGOs have branches there. They 
deal with over 80,000 refugees out of a total of 158,000 refugees along the Thailand-
Burma borderland in cooperation with the UNHCR Mae Sot Field Office. 60  For 
NGOs and the UNHCR, Mae Sot is considered as the center in the implementation of 
their missions. The fact that some NGOs like ZOA locate their headquarters in Mae 
                                                 
59 I participated in the meetings in May and June of 2005. The meetings were held in the British Club in 
Bangkok. They were usually held on Tuesday and Wednesday of the second week of each month. On 
Tuesday, directors of the NGOs conducted their own meeting at 2:00 pm. A meeting that was open to 
everyone was held on Wednesday, 9:00am. From 1:00pm to 3:30pm on the same day, the Health Sub-
Committee and Education Sub-Committee meetings were also held. As I was familiar to the 
participants of the NGOs from Mae Sot, I was welcomed to these open sessions and even the Education 
Sub-Committee meeting.  
60 The Head of the UNHCR Mae Sot Field Office also expressed cordial relationships between the 
UNHCR and NGOs (Interview with the Head of the UNHCR Mae Sot Field Office 12 April 2005). The 
relationships go beyond their official works for refugees. It has developed into social relationships 
where frequent social gathering like parties were held. There were so many parties taking place among 




Sot and not in Bangkok shows the importance that Mae Sot plays in leading an 
international refugee regime.    
So far, in this section, I have mentioned that there are other regimes apart from the 
Thai national regime in Mae Sot. Besides, Mae Sot has many other organizations in 
various sectors too. There is a town-based local NGO known as the Mae Sot Civil 
Society.61 It was formed in 1998 to enhance social welfare in the town. Membership 
is open to the people of Mae Sot, although its active members comprise local Chinese 
businessmen who have been staying there for a long time. 62  Recently, it raised 
different opinions to the government’s plan of developing Mae Sot as a Special 
Economic Zone63 where Mae Sot would be a center for commerce, industry, and 
tourism. It did not want Mae Sot to be an industrial center due to the environmental 
problems that would be incurred such as water and air pollutions. Mae Sot Civil 
Society is a main actor in initiating cross-border cooperation with partners from 
Myawaddy. Its main activity is an annual “Thai-Myanmar Bicycle Project”64 which 
began in 2000 in collaboration with the Chamber of Commerce in Myawaddy.  
Its stance towards Burmese migrants is ambiguous in that on the one hand, it feels 
that they are an important component of Mae Sot deserving of fair treatment on a 
humanitarian basis, while on the other hand, the organization accused them of 
degrading the environmental and sanitary situation in Mae Sot. Towards INGOs, its 
stance is very critical. It claims that INGOs describe Mae Sot as a horrible place 
where only bad things happen. It went on to claim that INGOs did not ask the 
                                                 
61 Interview with Ajarn Ploenjai (26 January 2005).  
62 It shares an office with the Tak Chamber of Commerce. 
63 I will deal with Special Economic Zone in detail in Chapter 7.  
64 I took part in the project held on 13 February 2005. Approximately 1,000 people participated in the 
project from Mae Sot. I rode my bicycle with them at 7:30am from a playground near Mae Sot 
Municipality. At approximately 9:00am, I arrived at the Immigration checkpoint near the Moei River. 
From there I crossed the Bridge and arrived in Myawaddy. From Myawaddy, around 100 people joined 
the Thai group. I cycled around Myawaddy until 2:00pm. Bangkok Post also reported this occasion (14 




opinions of the locals, much less consult the Mae Sot Civil Society, in dealing with 
the issue of the Burmese. Instead, INGOs only appeal to so-called international law 
and regulations. From this criticism, it can be assumed that the Mae Sot Civil Society 
attempted to have a responsible stake in local affairs through its position as a local 
NGO, though its organizing capacity was still weak and without strong memberships. 
Mae Sot attracts NGOs from both the national and regional levels such as the Law 
Society of Thailand and Forum-Asia. These groups in cooperation with Burmese 
NGOs in Mae Sot are mainly involved in humanitarian issues with regard to migrants 
including factory laborers. National and regional NGOs cooperate with them more 
substantially, providing both legal and financial assistance and making numerous 
visits to Mae Sot from Bangkok. 
Many guest visitors from various international groups such as labor organizations, 
Christian groups, journalists, and so on flocked to Mae Sot. It witnessed a huge 
number of individual volunteers too. Some of them make their contacts with Mae Sot 
regularly, while some visits are temporary. Vulnerable people in Mae Sot can make 
use of these contacts to survive. While I was there, I noticed many cases of 
individuals making connections with foreigners and overseas organizations. But these 
connections were so arbitrary and uncoordinated that benefits were not evenly 
distributed to the innocent migrants with a small number of “smart” Burmese 
appropriating the resources. At any rate, these connections made between individual 
Burmese and these foreign partners are important factors in constituting governance 
for migrant people.  
In this section, I have dealt with various regimes apart from the Thai state system. 
Those regimes or governing systems engage in the everyday lives of the alien people 




juxtaposition of these regimes onto the state system. It is apparent that tensions and 
conflicts between them are inherent, especially given that the border is the symbol of 
state territorial integrity. However, I attempt to show that the state does not 
monopolize the governance of the town despite its aspirations. The next section 
touches on the state’s attempts to subsume the town under its control.  
    
STATE PENETRATION65 
 
The state is not a nonchalant actor at all. Especially given that the border is a mark 
of state sovereignty that must be defended, whether it is rhetorical or otherwise, the 
engagement of the state in the town in attempts to place Mae Sot under its control is 
obviously recognized. This section investigates why the state attempts to engage in 
controlling the town and what means the state uses in doing so.  
 
Reasons and goals behind state engagement  
 
Why does the Thai state attempt to control the border town? What does it want to 
achieve? Here, my argument is very much inspired by Barry Buzan (1991).  
According to him (1991: 65-66), the state has three components: idea, institution, and 
physical base. The Thai state judges that the considerable presence of alien people 
endangers its ontological foundations. The issue of security is the very reason it 
attempts to control the town. If the idea of the state establishing its legitimacy is 
shaken in the minds of its people, it may be viewed by its citizens as incapable of 
controlling the situation in the town. Nationalism, the ideological base of the state, 
                                                 




which exclusively differentiates its citizens from alien people, became problematic 
due to the outnumbering presence of the Burmese migrants. In terms of the security of 
state institutions, the Thai state could be in administrative disarray if it fails to control 
the immigrants, or, on the other extreme, its institutions could be overturned and 
controlled by these people. Meanwhile, the physical bases of the Thai state, which are 
population and territory, was encroached upon by the Burmese. The porous borderline 
between Thailand and Burma stimulated this encroachment. In the eyes of the state, 
the sovereignty-less alien state with the physical bases of its own population 
(Burmese migrants) and its residential areas (migrant compounds) might compete 
with and overwhelm the “authentic” state in Mae Sot. These problematic situations 
led the state to want to exert full control over the town in order to protect and secure 
the raison d’etre of the state.   
The threats faced by the state are divided into five types, according to Buzan 
(1991: 112-145): military, political, societal, economic, and ecological. Though the 
Thai state does not experience any tangible threat from the migrants militarily, it is 
legitimate concern that the existence of the “army” of Burmese political exiles and 
ethnic minorities might pose a threat for internal security. Therefore, in the political 
arena of the town, institutions implementing regulations and policies could be in 
jeopardy with the possible military activities of those Burmese political exiles and 
ethnic groups. With regard to the societal sector, more often than not the Thai 
government mentions that the Burmese bring incurable diseases into Thailand, 
causing sanitary problems. Also it claims that the migrants are involved in criminal 
activities such as drug dealings and human trafficking. All in all, the state accuses the 
migrants of hurting the integrity of Thai society. The economic problem is, according 




an excuse to expel the migrants, especially during the economic crisis in 1997. 
However, nowadays the attitude of the government in dealing with the threat in the 
economic sector is ambivalent, because in reality, they contribute to the economy of 
the town rather than pose economic threats. In terms of ecology, it is claimed that 
overpopulation caused a scarcity in water supply; the air is being polluted by the 
migrant-hiring factories; and mountains are deforested by the migrants.     
While the issue of security is a passive reason for the state’s engagement in the 
town, geo-political issues are positive factors that explain the aspiration of the state in 
wanting to control the area. Since the late 1980s, the Thai state has tried to transform 
the border areas from “battle fields” into “trading markets” by building up cordial 
relationships with Burma unlike its previous approaches of disengagement that left 
the border areas as a buffer as shown in Chapter 2. In doing so, it was imperative for 
the state to establish a firm control in the areas for the purpose of economic 
development. Since the state considers Mae Sot to be a strategic point in achieving 
this goal, it seeks to regulate the town economically under the auspices of the central 
government.   
 
Means of controlling practices 
 
How and by what means does the state control the area? At the ideological and 
psychological levels, the state produces and disseminates specific discourses in 
problematizing the alien people. Here we can use Foucault’s theory (1979) to 
understand the state: how the practices of power divide and label what is “normal” 
and “abnormal”, and what is deemed “true” and “false”. The state has the means of 




these means, it amplifies and circulates the negative images of the aliens. Furthermore, 
their state-defined criminal activities along the border region such as drugs and human 
trafficking have cast a spotlight on them throughout the whole country. Sometimes 
the aliens are scapegoated by the state to escape the consequences of its 
mismanagement as seen in the deportation of migrant workers by the state during the 
economic crisis in 1997.     
The state has many agencies to control alien activities in a particular place. In Mae 
Sot and its vicinity, for example, the military, the police, the Immigration Office, and 
the District Office carry out the orders from the central government. As local 
governments are not empowered yet in terms of immigration and labor issues, they 
are under the directives of the central government when it comes to these matters. 
Among those government agencies, the military and the police are the most prominent 
organizations in shouldering the burden of the state in conducting its mission. To the 
extent that the two agencies can use physical force, they will force the people to 
follow the principles of the state. 
In legal aspects, the Thai government has tried to register the migrants since the 
early 1990s. In 1992, the government made its first attempt to register the migrant 
labor force. This policy was implemented in Tak as well as other Thailand-Burma 
border provinces such as Ranong and Kanchanaburi. However, this was unsuccessful 
because the registration fee was set at what was seen as a high five thousand baht and 
hence the employers did not find it necessary to register their workers (Pim 2001: 
161). In 1996, the government proposed more tangible policies in an attempt not only 
to resolve the labor shortage problem, but also to enforce controls on the illegal 
migrant workers, including the prevention of news arrival. Registration was 




for the Control of Foreign Workers, acted as a central authority, with immigration 
officers facilitating the processes of “self-support.” However, many employers and 
migrant workers did not take part in the process as they saw no significance in it and 
they believed that the work permit offered no benefits to them (Pim 2001: 162). The 
policies of registering or regulating the migrant workers have been changed nearly 
every year to keep them in tune with the real situations and in an effort to garner a 
higher rate of migrant turn-up. For example, the processes were divided into the 
issuing a residence permit and the applying for a work permit which has three kinds 
of duration – three months, six months, and one year, while the registration fee has 
also been decreased.66  
Migrants encounter physical threats from the state in their everyday lives. The 
police often raid the residential compounds of the migrants. Whenever that happens, 
the migrants flee to other places and hide themselves until the police leave. If they 
encounter the police without time to hide, they were often physically abused and 
extorted. Their livelihoods were so fragile and vulnerable due to devastating actions 
of the state.   
A news report shows an example of how migrants were treated by the state 
agencies, 
 
Security forces stormed a temple in Mae Sot district yesterday and arrested 320 
Burmese workers at a garment factory who had been on strike since last 
Thursday. All lost their work permits, became illegal immigrants and were 
deported to Burma. About 50 labor officials, border patrol and local police were 
involved in the raid. (Bangkok Post 18 December 2003)   
 
                                                 
66 In the process of registration, the initial check up costs 600 baht and the health insurance costs 1,300 
baht. The total paid is 2,450 baht for a three month work permit, 2,900 baht for a six month one, and 
3,800 baht for a one year permit. Under the old registration scheme the yearly fee was 4,450 baht 




Another statement describes the adverse circumstance that the migrants face,67 
 
Murders, rapes, abductions, torture and other abuses of Burmese migrant 
workers in Thailand have occurred with alarming regularity for many years, 
particularly in the Mae Sot district of Tak Province, but for a long time only 
cases of extreme brutality were ever made public. In January 2002, for instance, 
the bodies of at least 21 persons were found in the Mae Lamao stream. No one 
has ever been brought to account for that atrocity…In the past year, abuses have 
increased, as impunity has spread in Thailand with new government policies 
favoring extra-judicial killing [in the war on drugs..], and because migrant 
worker’s rights have been further curtailed.  
 
The first full-scale deportation of the Burmese migrants occurred during the 
economic crisis in an attempt to resolve rising unemployment among Thai workers. 
This provided the legitimacy for the arrest and repatriation of migrant workers (Pim 
2001: 163). Since then, regularly or intermittently, massive as well as small-scale 
deportations have taken place. In June 2003, Thailand and Burma signed a 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOU) a term of which stipulates that every month, 
Thailand is required to deport 400 Burmese nationals to a holding center in 
Myawaddy, through the Thai-Burma Friendship Bridge. The Thai government 
formally sends back 400 Burmese every month through the Immigration checkpoint. 
However, informally, approximately 10,000 Burmese who are arrested in other parts 
of Thailand, mostly from Bangkok are deported monthly by boat through unofficial 
border-crossing points along the Moei River.68  
The everyday lives of individual migrants are heavily influenced by the 
government’s deportation practices. Most of my interviewees have been checked by 
                                                 
67 This was a statement written by the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC) which was sent to the 
United Nations Secretary-General on 29 January 2004 (Arnold 2004: 29). 




the police and deported to Burma. One of them sarcastically called the police “the 
migrant-haunting ghost”. In their day-to-day lives, the migrants have to survive the 
chasing of this ghost.   
Given the fragile and vulnerable conditions elaborated above, a question still 
remains to be answered. Why is it that even though the state practices migrant-
expelling policies, other regimes are still operating and have not been dismantled by 
the state? Why can the state not exercise full power over the town?  
 
RESPONSE TO THE STATE PENETRATION  
 
The previous section has dealt with the state’s aspiration to control the town. In 
this section, first, I delve into the concrete ways in which others confront or evade 
state forces. Second, I deal with the Thai locals’ defiance against the state. Last, I pay 
a close attention to the ethnographic behaviors of local state agencies. The objective 
of this section is to understand the persistence of the unofficial or the illegal despite 
the state’s practices to impose legality in the town.   
 
Weapons of the illegal migrants69 
 
The registration scheme and Work Permit issuance enforced by the state do not 
monopolize legitimate forms which allow aliens to stay in Mae Sot. In other words, 
there are other kinds of quasi legal identity (ID) cards whereby they are able to 
acquire a certain kind of legality and recognition from the local authorities. Also, 
                                                 




migrants come up with various kinds of methods to avoid the intimidation of state 
forces in their everyday lives.   
Of course, in general, migrant people are eager to acquire Work Permits for the 
purpose of stability and security devoid of state intimidation. In principle, with this 
Permit, they are allowed to secure equal health rights as Thai nationals under the 
thirty baht scheme where almost every kind of treatment is covered. However, despite 
the coercive attempts of the state, they are very reluctant to turn up and apply for the 
Work Permits because the cost is beyond their financial capacity. Single-staying 
individuals could afford to bear the cost of a Work Permit for one-year, which 
amounts to 3,800 baht, with their monthly earnings of between 2,500 and 3,000 baht. 
However, if there are more than two family members with children to look after, the 
cost exceeds the levels that they could manage. The cost of Work Permits for both 
husband and wife is doubled. And if they have grown-up sons and daughters who 
want to work, financial burden increases. Moreover, many of their jobs, especially 
those working in small-scale construction, are temporary with an inconsistent income 
level. Hence, it is very risky to spend large sums of money on acquiring Work Permits. 
When I visited migrant compounds, I found that few migrant residents held Work 
Permits, with many citing the financial burden as the main reason.   
Those who do not possess Work Permits are susceptible to police arrest. In fact, as 
shown before, the scenes whereby these unregistered people are arrested and deported 
take place frequently in the town. I often saw arrested people in a police car, the back 
of which was covered with iron bars. They were subsequently deported to the 
Burmese side, and interrogated by Burmese authorities once they got there. However, 
from what they said, I felt that they were not treated seriously by the authorities as a 




then released without much delay. But again, they crossed back into Mae Sot. There is 
a joke often heard in Mae Sot, “The deported Burmese will come back to Mae Sot 
earlier than the police deporting them.” Some Thai authorities that I knew of also 
confessed that deportation was useless given the fact that the deported can cross back 
into the border easily. As many of them have already rooted much of their livelihoods 
in Mae Sot, the town came to be a meaningful part of their lives. In other words, Mae 
Sot is to them their own town even if their residence took an illegal form. Therefore, 
coming back to Mae Sot is like coming back to their home, family members, friends, 
workplaces and schools. As Flynn (1997: 312) mentions in the case of the Benin-
Nigeria Border, Burmese people in the border town too have “a local sense of deep 
placement instead of displacement, deep territorialization instead of 
deterritorialization, which forges strong feelings of rootedness in the borderland itself 
and creates a border identity” despite their illegal status in the town.      
Migrants’ persistent attempts to live in Mae Sot engender various tactics of 
evading state forces rather than just falling to arrest and deportation. They are aware 
of the checkups of the police. They know the salient places of the police and do not 
pass these places. One of my Burmese informants never rode his bicycle along the 
Intharakhiri Road which passes through the central areas of Mae Sot for the reason 
that police checkups took place very often on the Road. He usually took unnoticeable 
paths when going around Mae Sot. In the case that he noticed the police from a 
distance, he stopped proceeding forward, and instead, turned back as naturally and as 
shrewdly as possible so as not to be detected. When he unexpectedly encountered 
them, he did not show an intimidated posture but acted like an innocent person. 
Likewise, though not explicitly recognizable, unauthorized people always play “hide-




When migrant people face police checkups, some of them are not arrested and put 
into jail or detention centers. If they have money, they will bribe the police. The 
amount of money individuals give to the police officers varies between 500 and 1,000 
baht. Even if they have this amount of money, they are hesitant in giving away this 
money to the police. It is because this amount of money is considerable for them and 
they subsequently encounter financial problems with the loss of this money. But in the 
instance that they do not want to be arrested and deported, which is very troublesome 
and contains more possible harassments in the process from both the Thai and 
Burmese authorities, they are willing to pay this money as bribe. Here, we need to 
reconsider the moral issues of bribes and corruption (cf. Scott 1972). From the point 
of view of people who are vulnerable to physical threats, it is a way in which they can 
avoid more possible dangers in the future. Also, corruption needs to be treated with 
comparative approaches. I heard some migrants state, “The Thai police are at least 
better and more humane than the Burmese police. They take a part of what we have, 
but the Burmese police take everything we have and even kill us.” And a political 
activist mentioned, “If there is no corruption and bribery, only with transparent and 
legal enforcement, we cannot stay here. We would be deported to Burma with 
subsequently more harsh sufferings from the Burmese authorities.” I do not claim that 
corruption should be justified. What I mean is that a moralistic approach to this issue 
is incomplete in understanding the ways in which corruption is somehow conducive to 
the endurance of Burmese migrants’ lives in Mae Sot. Otherwise they would face 
more horrible treatment from the Burmese side.  
In Mae Sot, there are various kinds of quasi “passports” which are accepted as 
quasi legal documents by local state agencies apart from the Work Permit and the 




related to the governing regimes dealt with before. These regimes issue their own 
identity cards for their subjects. For example, the KNU card is acknowledged by the 
local Thai authorities. If people hold this card, they do not easily fall to arrest and 
deportation. Those Karen working in Karen organizations such as the KYO and the 
KWO resorted to the card whenever they face interrogations on legality by the local 
authorities. Some Karen who are not involved in Karen organizations even tried to 
have this card for themselves so that they could go around town without the fear of 
possible arrest.  
The Cynthia Clinic also issues the Clinic card for medics and people involved in 
Clinic’s activities. At first, Dr. Cynthia made them acquire Work Permits. But the cost 
was tremendous and non-renewable. After some years the Clinic stopped acquiring 
Work Permits, and instead, issued the Clinic card which is recognized by the local 
authorities as a kind of passport whereby people of the Clinic can go around Mae Sot 
without heavy restrictions. 
There were some cases whereby people in these groups were arrested by the police 
even if they held the cards. In fact, some Karen informants in Karen organizations 
told me about their arrests. In these cases, the responsible people of their 
organizations will contact the police directly and bring them back after paying bribes.   
Interestingly enough, some people attempted to make use of the UNHCR in their 
survival strategies. When I was in Mae Sot, it was a huge trend for the Burmese to 
apply for a UNHCR interview in the hope of attaining entry into the foreign 
resettlement program. According to the head of Mae Sot Field Office of the UNHCR, 
as of April 2005, there were 2,600 applications since early 2004. She mentioned that 
most of them misunderstood that this application was for resettlement. The 




for the status of the Persons of Concern (POC).70 After recognition as a POC, the 
process of resettlement ensues. Regardless of whether they misunderstood, many 
Burmese attempted to exploit the UNHCR for survival. I observed many cases where 
the Burmese came to Mae Sot from Rangoon and other parts of Burma just to apply 
regardless of whether they were actually involved in political activities. Even innocent 
Karen and Burmese migrants in Mae Sot applied for the interview. Once they applied 
for this interview, they were given a registration form issued by the UNHCR. Many 
applicants considered this form as a document that can be shown to the police during 
inspections. Though the police did not recognize the legitimacy of this form, the 
applicants tended to rely on it. One of my informants had no other forms except for 
this and always kept it with him in case of police checkups.   
Reliance on the UNHCR was also observable in the case of refugees who engaged 
in economic activities in Mae Sot outside of their refugee camps. Whenever they were 
arrested by the police for illegal work, they relied on the UNHCR to be released. In 
fact, on a daily basis, the UNHCR went to the police station to bring back refugees. 
Even though the UNHCR strongly warned refugees that it would never be involved in 
those cases and that the police would treat them in their own right, arrests of refugees 
and the resultant recourse to the UNHCR continued to take place. It means that for 
refugees in general, not only for those in refugee camps, but also for those in Mae Sot, 
the UNHCR is considered as a governing organization.71   
                                                 
70 Since the Thai government is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees and 1967 
Protocol, asylum seekers in Thailand are technically regarded as “illegal immigrants” under the 
national law. However, the government often referred to the Burmese refugees as “displaced persons” 
(phu opphayop) (Lang 2002: 92-93). In particular, those who fled into Thailand for political reasons 
and stay in the urban areas are designated as “the Persons of Concern.” 
71 The cases of Karen refugees, however, are different from that of the Shan refugees in Mae Hong Son 
areas who can adapt to the Thai society relatively easily due to their cultural and language similarities 
with the Thai. Refugee camps for the Shan are absent and thus the involvement of international 




Though quasi legal documents such as the KNU card and the Cynthia Clinic card 
are accepted in Mae Sot and reliance on organizations such as the UNHCR guarantees 
their presence in Mae Sot to a certain degree, the ultimate goal in their perennial 
confrontation with state forces is to gain complete legal recognition from the 
authorities. Thus, some of them attempt to acquire Thai citizenship. This case is 
prominently observed among the Burmese Karen more than the people of other ethnic 
groups because they make use of ethnic connections with the Thai Karen who are 
living along the border. The prominent method of applying for citizenship cards is 
through “adoption.” The Burmese Karen enter into the family trees of the Thai Karen 
after being adopted by the Thai Karen. In this process, there must be cooperation with 
the local officials and village heads or brokers. For this reason, the Burmese Karen 
need to have between 30,000 baht to 50,000 baht as a payment or bribe for these 
citizenship cards.   
As we have seen so far, alien people in Mae Sot employ various kinds of methods 
to evade state forces. Beyond common discourses of suffering, it is observed that they, 
as positive actors, come up with strategies even in precarious situations, though some 
conform to state legal regulations. In addition, it is shown that non-state governing 




The roles of the Thai locals should not be neglected in understanding the 
endurance of aliens’ lives in Mae Sot. I do not necessarily mean that the attitudes of 
the Thai locals towards the Burmese are cordial. While I was in Mae Sot, I noticed 




peers, “khon pama” (Burmese) often connotes a pejorative meaning. Some simple 
Burmese expressions such as “nekaungla” (How are you?) and “tamin sabibila” 
(Have you eaten?) were mocked at. Sometimes those who are non-Burmese of Asian 
origin were misunderstood as Burmese and received unpleasant treatment from the 
Thai locals. One day my Korean friend who has a dark complexion went to a bus 
station to buy a ticket and spoke in Thai. During the conversation, my friend was 
mumbling, not understanding what the seller said. Instantly, the seller looked down on 
her and said fiercely, “Why did you come to Thailand from Burma, not speaking Thai 
fluently? Better go back home now!” In the end the seller apologized after knowing 
she was not Burmese. This kind of treatment and perception was prevalent in Mae Sot. 
Though I did not look typically Burmese, but when I did not speak and understand 
some Thai expressions very well, I often heard the phrase, “khon pama ru plaaw” 
(Are you Burmese or not?). One day after eating lunch with my wife, I scratched the 
back of a parked car belonging to a Thai local with my motorbike when I reversed it 
unconsciously. Instantly a driver and his wife came out of the car and inspected the 
scratched spot. He stared at me and asked furiously, “khon arai na” (What 
national/race are you?), assuming that I was Burmese. Then he threatened to call the 
police and wanted to send me to the police station. After realizing my nationality, and 
after my Thai friend mediated compensation (2,000 baht), his attitude was more 
amicable. Of course, I was not taken to the police station.  
As shown above, Thai locals tend to despise the Burmese. Nonetheless, it does not 
prohibit them from mixing with the Burmese. This is because without the Burmese, 
they cannot make a living. At the practical level, they rely on the Burmese to a great 
degree. On the other hand, affectionate expressions such as “The Burmese are our 




harmony” are often heard too. Therefore, with regard to the state’s treatment of the 
Burmese, more sympathy was shown to the Burmese than to the state, since state 
engagement disrupted their livelihoods which are intimately linked to the contribution 
of the Burmese. This amicable attitude was markedly observed among local market 
merchants. Thai merchants in the central market saw a dramatic plummeting of sales 
whenever police checkups took place, since the Burmese stayed away from the 
market. Therefore, they protested against these inspections and requested that the 
checkups not be done inside and around the market place. The request was accepted 
and in fact, I hardly saw any inspections taking place there. Given the fact that the 
contributions of the Burmese as customers are much higher than that of Thai locals, 
the presence of the police in the market is never welcomed by the Thai merchants, let 
alone the Burmese themselves.  
The defiant attitude of the locals against the state was noticed in matters of Work 
Permit application. In principle, they are required to help the Burmese acquire Work 
Permits by bringing them to the registration place and filling out the stipulated form in 
Thai and English (few Burmese applicants have readable access to it).72 In general, 
factory owners seemed to conform to this regulation since the state paid special 
attention to them due to the relatively large number of Burmese workers employed 
there. However, apart from them, normal shopkeepers did not feel it obligatory. 
Rather, they criticized that this scheme as only benefiting the government, in a way 
that the government kin (eats) the money from the registration fee. There are several 
other reasons why they dislike this regulation. First, they have to pay the cost for 
having their employees acquire the Work Permit since the Burmese employees do not 
have enough money. Even though they could deduct the cost incurred from the salary 
                                                 




of their employees, it definitely decreases the motivation of the employees’ work 
ethic. Second, as there are many cases of the employees’ sudden return to Burma or 
movement to other places of Thailand such as Bangkok, it is risky to spend money on 
these “unpredictable” employees. If such cases are to happen, they will have lost the 
opportunity to deduct the cost they have incurred from the salary of their employees. 
In fact, many factory owners and shopkeepers that I knew experienced these cases and 
as a result, they never encouraged their new employees to acquire Work Permits. 
Third, for people who are “well-acquainted” with the local authorities, they could 
bring their employees who were caught by the police back to their shops without 
much difficulty. Whenever these employees are arrested by the police, the names of 
their hirers warrant easy release.   
Throughout my stay in Mae Sot I felt the anti-government sentiments of the locals. 
During the campaign period of the general election in February 2005, I went to my 
local friend’s house where a group of football regulars got together to watch a “big” 
match, Manchester United versus Liverpool. They asked me which team I supported. 
When I replied that I was a fan of Manchester United, they were divided into two 
groups; one group of people hugged me and offered me a beverage while the other 
group jeered at me. During the halftime break, their conversation topics changed from 
football matters to election affairs. They asked me again, “Sang Kook, do you like the 
Thai Rak Thai Party?” No sooner had I said, “I don’t like the Thai Rak Thai,” than 
almost all of the locals shouted loudly and hugged me. Suddenly I became very 
emotionally close to them and also felt a certain kind of bond with them. I sensed 
these anti-government sentiments among other people in Mae Sot too. It was 
vindicated by the result of the election. Thaksin visited Mae Sot on 29 January 2005 




Party was dominantly heard all over the town with the Party’s canvassers draped in 
the white color uniform marching along the roads of the town throughout the 
campaign period. But the locals’ choice was not the Thai Rak Thai candidate. The 
incumbent MP of the Democrat Party retained the seat in a constituency where Mae 
Sot was included, even though the Thai Rak Thai swept most of the seats in 
Thailand.73    
When I revisited Mae Sot in December 2005 for my follow-up research, I was 
invited to a welcoming and early Christmas party by a group of local friends most of 
whom were businessmen. The chill of the December night filled the house. A 
particular lady came to the party late, wearing the white jumper of the Thai Rak Thai. 
Others made fun of her, saying “You are a member of the Party.” She denied her 
connections with the party by saying that this was just a piece of cloth. But she took 
off the jumper and put it into her bag. She might have decided to endure the chilly 
weather rather than to be shamed in the warmth of the white jumper.  
 The locals’ anti-government sentiment was not only confined to personal levels. 
The sentiment developed into a collective social action. I have mentioned before that 
local businessmen, including factory owners and shopkeepers, were very critical 
towards the government labor policy. They lost Burmese workers not only because 
the workers left for other places without notice, but because the labor office of Tak 
Province sent them to other provinces where cheap labor is in demand. Factory 
owners assumed that the governor of Tak Province must have received a brokerage 
fee for the transference of the workers. Moreover, this transfer propelled innocent 
workers to go to Bangkok in search of higher wages, which caused Mae Sot’s 
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factories to lose a growing number of workers. In the end, on 29 August 2005, five 
hundred locals who were mostly factory owners, assembled at the District office, 
protesting against the policy of labor transference. Although on the surface, it was a 
demonstration against the policy, however, the complaints had piled up for a long 
time, induced by various government regulations. These accumulated disgruntlements 
finally erupted at that point. As a result of the protest, labor transference ceased. 
All in all, as shown above, the critical stance of the Thai locals against the state 
partly explains why Mae Sot is not a town controlled by the state’s aspirations.       
 
Demystifying the state agencies 
 
The state does not directly engage in establishing its regulations in any particular 
area. It needs the agencies through which it carries out its vision. In the process of 
implementing its policies from the central to the local, a certain degree of deflection 
from its original intention inevitably takes place. As long as the political system of the 
state is centralized and regulations are devised and ordered by the central, the 
difference between the initial aspirations of the state and its actual performance in the 
local setting will continue to exist.    
The state agencies, including the local government sectors, are located between the 
central and the local. While on the one hand, they have duties to fulfill as the 
representatives of the state, on the other hand, their everyday lives are rooted in the 
conditions of the particular place, and therefore, they cannot help but mingle with the 
local people. The agencies cannot transparently complete the policies of the state 
because it might cause relationship problems with the local people who they have 




residents might engage in illegal but locally acceptable practices such as the 
employment of illegal migrants. Therefore, they might be negatively influenced by 
the rigid implementation of state policies. It is here that the tentacles of the state 
become blunt. 
Obviously, they shoulder the missions of the state and use coercive means often, 
especially in dealing with unauthorized residents. However, when they are not on 
their official duties, they are no longer serious deliverers of state projects.  
In terms of social relationships, some local agencies are under the influence of 
local big men. As the agencies are engaged in social activities apart from their job-
related ones, they are involved in many informal social organizations such as those 
representing the Chinese community as well as sports clubs. It is not rare that local 
tycoons are in charge of the expenses in organizing these social activities and tend to 
promote the well-being of their members by means of their financial power. In doing 
so, local agencies are obligated to the big men and are trapped in so-called “patron-
client” relationships. I happened to join a jogging club. Members of the club got 
together everyday to exercise. Though its membership was opened to anyone, local 
big businessmen and members of the upper-class such as lawyers and doctors were 
the main members of the club. Interestingly enough, I encountered some policemen 
with whom I was acquainted and some immigration officials as well taking part in the 
club’s activities on a regular basis. I paid close attention to the micro power 
relationships among the members as well as scrutinize the expenses that were used in 
running the club. It was observed that in the social group, people in state 
organizations were under the influence of local big businessmen, since money spent 
in running the club and special activities such as dinner meetings was mostly from 




businessmen was joking with an immigration official, “This guy, though working in 
the Immigration Office, does not know about immigration matters at all.” The official 
just grinned at him. This low profile disposition affects their job performance. It was 
likely that among the members of the club, some of them were hiring unregistered 
Burmese workers. But it would be very difficult for the policemen and immigration 
officials in the club to engage in preventing those unauthorized employment. To do 
that would damage their social network and cause relationship problems.   
Unlike their low profile in comparison to the local big men, local state agencies are 
enormously powerful when faced with alien people. The asymmetrical relationships 
between them and the alien people, however, do not necessarily signify that they 
implement the policies of the state without discrepancy through the use of force. 
Rather, they tended to use their power not for the state but for their personal well-
being. In the eyes of state agencies, Mae Sot is full of resources that could be 
extracted from dealings with unauthorized people. State agencies could manipulate 
the missions that the state assigns them, such as inspection on illegal people and 
raiding migrant compounds, as opportunities to advance their personal interests. As 
shown before, migrants usually give a bribe of 500 to 1,000 baht to be released from 
inspecting policemen. I often heard cases from my informants that some policemen 
blatantly asked for “tea money” from the migrants. It seems that the corruption in 
Mae Sot signifies a marked equilibrium between migrants who pay to avoid potential 
dangers, and the policemen who consider it as rent-seeking and maintaining the 
status-quo.74  
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gambling dens, 1.5-1.8 billion baht from alien workers, 500 million baht from massage parlours, 1.8 
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Beyond the relatively small cases, some people in local agencies were said to be 
involved in bigger-scale affairs such as human trafficking. In fact, it was reported that 
the deputy chairwoman of tambon Tha Sai Luat and her husband were arrested and 
charged with smuggling and sheltering illegal immigrants.75 While I was in Mae Sot, 
there was a rumor that the police were involved in transferring migrants from Mae Sot 
to the inner places. The migrants are able to pass the checkpoints by paying out bribes 
to the police.    
The local authorities extorted not only from the migrants but also from ethnic 
political groups and democratic movement groups, including migrant institutions. A 
migrant school paid 3,000 baht for “security” reasons; otherwise, according to the 
headmaster of the school, “The police will tease her and disrupt the running of the 
school.” Karen organizations also, for the same reason, paid some money to the 
authorities. Besides, these organizations had to placate the police by giving money in 
return for their continued stay in Mae Sot. Corruption was not necessarily considered 
as negative for some people in these organizations. An NLD member said, “Because 
of corruption, we can stay here. Otherwise we will face much more difficulties.” In 
fact, local state authorities allow political activists to stay in Mae Sot not just for the 
material gain. But they gather intelligent information from these political activists on 
the political situations of the border areas. At any rate, just as the case of the 
vulnerable migrants, the discourse on corruption among these groups is related to 
security-securing strategies in precarious situations rather than centering around moral 
issues.   
Though corruption comprises a sizeable part of the interaction patterns between the 
local agencies and those groups, there exist intimate patterns of relationships between 
                                                 




them that have developed throughout history. The reason the KNU receives special 
attention from the local agencies is not least because the KNU has had a long history 
of relationships with them. We have seen in the previous chapter that as early as the 
1960s, dialogue had been established between the local agencies and the KNU. The 
role of Bo Mya in these relationships was tremendous. Although now the role of the 
KNU as a guardian of buffer zones against the spread of the communists is non-
existent and the Thai government is more interested in developing relationships with 
the Burmese government, the legacy of cordial relationships between Thai authorities 
and the KNU remains to a certain degree. For instance, the intelligent service and 
local authorities provide transportation for important KNU members to Chiangmai or 
Bangkok. In this light, the identity card that the KNU issues is acknowledged as a 
kind of passport by the local authorities. Also, the KNU was able to organize its own 
activities within Mae Sot through the relationships they have established. On 10 
January 2005, the KNU organized a Karen New Year Day celebration, which is an 
annual occasion. I was fascinated that the celebration involved many people dressed 
in the Karen costume. The participants (estimated to be five hundred people) were 
singing Karen traditional songs, including the Karen anthem, and politicians were 
delivering speeches which harshly criticized the Burmese government. It was like a 
liberated area. Without the positive cooperation of local authorities, whether they 
were bribed or not, it would have been impossible to have such a political occasion in 
foreign soils. The NLD also organized an occasion to celebrate Aung San Suu Kyi’s 
60th birthday with three hundred participants in a Buddhist monastery in Mae Sot on 
19 June 2005, most probably with the permission of the local authorities. 
In these cordial relationships between the local authorities and those groups, 




important factor. Many Thai Karen are working in the state agencies, including in the 
local administrative apparatus. Some of these Karen officials have close relatives in 
both the Karen organizations and the refugee camps. There were some cases whereby 
the Burmese Karen from Karen State sent their children to the Thai side even before 
they became refugees. These children grew up receiving a Thai education and were 
bestowed Thai citizenships and took up positions in the government sectors. Some of 
them played mediating roles between the Karen organizations and the Thai authorities. 
Especially when it comes to refugee matters, Thai Karen are in demand due to their 
language abilities and cross-cultural understanding. Sometimes they do not implement 
what the central government commands, so as to favor the well-being of the refugees. 
For example, refugees are not allowed to get out of the camp, which is a regulation 
laid down by the state. But when I was with a Thai Karen official of the MOI in a 
refugee camp, and upon seeing some refugees leave the camp and go up to a mountain 
with a sickle, I asked him, “Why you let them go?” He answered, “They are also 
human. The provision they get inside the camp is not enough. I just let them go on a 
humanitarian basis.” They favor refugees more than the ordinary Thais do.  
There are instances of marriage between the state officials and the migrants or the 
refugees. I heard from my informant about love affairs between the Thai policemen 
and the Burmese women. I also heard marriage cases between the security soldiers of 
a refugee camp and refugee women. It would be misleading to assume that the two 
groups – Thai authorities and the vulnerable groups – are always antagonistic to each 
other, only on a formal basis, without taking into account the emotional interactions 
between them. For those Thai authorities who are married to unauthorized people, it 
might be considered as inhumane to exercise harsh practices towards the family 




sense, the marriage can be a factor that explains the low performance level of local 
agencies in accomplishing the state project.  
I have attempted to show in this section that state agencies are not always loyal to 
the center. The issue that I want to point out is not about their work ethic or deviance. 
Rather, I seek to understand their ethnographic behavior which takes the informal and 
unofficial beyond the official and formal discussion on their performance. It explains 
the particularities of Mae Sot in terms of the patterns of relationships between the 
state agencies and other groups and the ways in which other regimes are maintained. 
It could be argued that the disloyal behaviors of state agencies are found not just in 
Mae Sot but in many parts of Thailand and even many other countries. However, in 
other places, those behaviors are not connected to the operation of other regimes of 
which their presence is rare. But in Mae Sot where non-state regimes and the sizeable 
presence of unauthorized people that I have dealt in this Chapter are accommodated, 
the endurance of those regimes and unauthorized people’s lives is very much related 
to the behaviors of state agencies which are not always loyal to the state. It very much 
differentiates Mae Sot from even other border towns in Thailand which do not have 
such kinds of enormous presence of others.76  
  
CONCLUSION: MAE SOT, ANOTHER STATE  
 
In this chapter, I have dealt with how the state system and other non-state systems 
operate and how these interact in Mae Sot. It is revealed that the presence of “others” 
is not haphazardly constituted, but based on certain governing regimes in their own 
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like the present times in Mae Sot. However, their presence in those places became either obsolete or 




right. It is also shown that the state strives to control the town in accordance with 
certain regulations and through physical force. But state engagement in the town does 
not bring about outcomes that the state initially anticipates. Despite illegal forms of 
residence, alien people have their own ways of survival, though not explicit, to avoid 
the regulating practices of the state. Also the defiant or evasive stance of the locals 
towards the state makes it difficult for Mae Sot to be placed under the total control of 
the state. More over, the chapter pays close attention to the ethnographic behaviors of 
the local state agencies that are deviant in the eyes of the state, but adaptive in the 
eyes of the local. 
The case of Mae Sot problematizes the conventional notion of the state. Weber’s 
notion that a state is “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1991: 78, 
emphasis original) has been used as a canon in understanding the modern state for 
most scholars. Power is very much laden in Weber’s understanding of the state. Thus, 
the state as a power holder has legitimacy for using physical force and politics means 
striving to share power or to engage in the distribution of power, either among states 
or among groups within a state. However, this view is very center-oriented. The 
aspiration of the state or the center is not transplanted in the local without discrepancy. 
The local does not conform to the regulating practices of the state because the way in 
which the local society is constituted conflicts with the regulations that do not reflect 
the particularities of the local. Ultimately, in Weberian understanding, what the state 
accomplishes through the monopoly of the use of physical force seems to be the 
monopoly of governance as the single and utmost representing organization within a 
given territory. However, the case of Mae Sot shows that the governing of the town is 




The fundamental reason why the ideal Weberian understanding of the state is not 
applicable to Mae Sot, I claim, is that it presupposed that a nation-state has a single 
“type” of citizen in an exclusively confined territory. However, when it comes to a 
town in the borderland, the very component of the Weberian concept, the phrase 
“within a given territory,” is problematized because a territory is easily encroached 
upon by others that constitute the border society as legitimate members and quasi 
citizens though they are illegal and non-citizens in the state’s right. In the Mae Sot 
borderland region, as other non-state regimes participate in governing others, the state 
does not have a monopoly over governance. We must integrate others to achieve a full 









THE TOWN MARKET, BORDER TRADE AND OTHERS 
 
 
I have shown through the history of Mae Sot that the development of the town was 
greatly attributed to trade. This is still pervasive in the current development of Mae 
Sot today. It might be assumed that the hectic black markets which once operated in 
the borderland were totally obsolete, and only “transparent” economic actions are now 
the contributory factors to the current development of Mae Sot’s economy. In other 
words, it could be presumed that official and formal ways are firmly established as the 
modus operandi in the border economy in the wake of weakening ethnic political 
groups and rising state powers in regulating the economic activities of borderlanders. 
However, my findings suggest that the obsoleteness of the black markets does not 
necessarily mean the introduction of the “white” market. Rather, the black markets 
once located outside the town in the borderland is explicitly observed in the very 
central area of the town with so many alien participants there. Town markets, which 
are not necessarily in the form of “white” markets, have replaced the roles of the 
black markets in exchanging goods between the Thai locals, the Burmese and the 
ethnic people. Informality or illegality is markedly observed in the operational 
patterns of the markets. It is ironic that the place where goods had been exchanged in 
the form of the black markets outside the town in the past has encroached into the 
physical space of the town center with much more participation of others.   
Cross-border movement of goods also reflects the informal trading patterns beyond 
the formal contract between the two states across the border. The Thai-Burma 




movement of goods. A great deal of trade is performed at other crossing-points along 
the border, escaping the gaze of the state.  
As informality is an intrinsic component of Mae Sot’s economy, the overlooking of 
this point leads to an incomplete understanding of the town’s economy. The common 
assumption of modernization paradigms is that modern economic operations based on 
rationality and formality will prevail even in remote areas. This notion is linked to the 
discourse of marginalization of traditional patterns of economic pursuits. In the 
Southeast Asian context, Boeke (1953) and Geertz (1963) dealt with the 
marginalization and impoverishment of traditional sectors of economy in the wake of 
modern industrial capitalism in Indonesia. Though traditional sectors refer to 
agriculture in their cases, the connotation of tradition in the economic sphere may not 
be confined to the agricultural sector but extended to the ways in which people retain 
long-existing habits in their economic actions. And traditional ways are very much 
associated with informal and unofficial practices of people, because people in the past 
did not experience much state intervention in their local economies. All in all, the 
scholars observed that traditional economic patterns were not integrated into the 
newly emerging political economy of Indonesia. The case of Mae Sot provides a 
contrast in understanding traditional aspects of the economy. In Mae Sot, informal 
ways of economic pursuits have been resiliently alive even in the face of the state’s 
attempts to formalize economic operations in the town and across the border.  
This chapter seeks to excavate how the economy of the town is based on 
components of informality or illegality and how others, regardless of legal status, 





THE CENTRAL MARKET 
 
Locational position of the market 
 
No other places in Mae Sot have more intense economic activities than central 
market place and its vicinities. From around 8 am till 6 pm the place is packed with 
people. The market is composed of two areas. The first area is called “Talat Simoei 
(Simoei Market),” while the other area is named “Talat Phajaroen (Phajaroen 
Market).” The former is located near a central road, the Prasatwithi Road, whereas the 
latter is situated near the Chitlom Road. Two sub-areas are connected and roughly 
called “Talat Mae Sot (Mae Sot Market).”77 Some people simply call it “the Burmese 
market” because they are the dominant participants and the aroma of Burmese 
products is prominent. 
Around the market, especially along the Prasatwithi Road, one can sense the 
significance of commerce by the presence of banks, jewelry shops, a big shopping 
mart, mobile phone shops, Siam Hotel, and so on. A jewelry shopkeeper told me that 
a hundred jewelry shops are located in this area. It is common to see many Burmese 
jewelry merchants wear longyi and chew betel, anxiously observing Thai jewelry 
appraisers valuing gems that they brought from Burma, especially from Kachin State. 
In front of Automated Teller Machines (ATM) just outside the banks, people, 
including those in longyi, are stretched out in a long queue. Noodles and chicken rice 
stall-holders serve Burmese customers with dishes worth twenty baht. It was a big joy 
for me to hang around the place. I felt as if I were in Burma. The signboard indicating 
“Siam Hotel” sounds sarcastic and ironical. It is like a solitary indication to make an 
                                                 




unrealistic claim that the place is the territory of Thailand against the preponderant 
presence of the Burmese. The signifier does not match the signified.       
“Hong Long Mini Mart,” located just next to the entrance of the market, is the 
biggest and most modernized shopping mall in the town. The two-story shop boasts 
various kinds of items and fancy displays. The main customers of the shop are 
Burmese. Burmese clerks are in charge of payment and attending to Thai and 
Burmese customers. For Burmese newcomers to Mae Sot from Myawaddy and 
refugee camps, the shop allows them to at least get a sense of modern ways of 
consumerism. 
The opposite side of the Mart is filled with shops dealing with computers and 
Internet services, mobile shops, DVD shops, and a big book store. These shops reflect 
the rapidly changing landscape of the central area with the introduction of shops 
carrying modern technologies. It is common for the Burmese to be the main 
customers of these shops. They have access to Thai mobile phone networks and can 
watch newly-released movies. Some of them are very familiar with the use of the 
Internet and keep pace with the changing world. 
The central market is positioned around the most advanced landscape in Mae Sot 
as shown above. When one turns into the market, one can see petty street Thai 
merchants selling a range of vegetables, foods and lottery. When one goes down 
farther, one encounters clothing and fishery stores. Up to this point, in general, the 
majority of merchants seem to be Thai locals. But from this point, the Burmese 
merchants appear more prevalent and the aroma of Burmese products is becoming 
thicker: Burmese songs are heard from music shops; Burmese book shops attract 
customers with giant-sized pictures of Burmese pop stars and football magazines; and 




Burmese merchants become the dominant figure. The main items of Talat Phajaroen 




The types of customers in the market are divided into three prominent categories, 
according to a Thai shop owner who has been running a clothing shop for more than 
seven years. Though there are other minor customer groups, his categorization of 
substantial customers is noteworthy. The first group consists of the Burmese laborers 
residing in Mae Sot and its vicinities. They buy goods from this market after receiving 
their monthly wages. It is interesting to notice a trend whereby from the end of a 
month till the first week of next month sales are at its peak because after being paid 
their wages around the 25th of every month they spend their money in the market. But 
as time draws nearer to the 20th of each month, the sales go down since their available 
money is running out.  
The second group comprises Thai locals, mostly farmers living in the vicinity of 
the town. During the harvest seasons they engage in agricultural production and save 
money. At the end of the season, they come over to the market to spend their hard-
earned money.  
The third group comprises Burmese sojourners who arrive in Mae Sot on a daily 
basis. The group is sub-divided into the common Burmese and Burmese wholesalers 
or retailers who bring out goods from Mae Sot to Burmese sides to sell them in their 
own shops in Burma.78 In the previous chapter, I mentioned that on a daily basis, 
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around 2,000 Burmese cross the Bridge, and many of them head for Mae Sot. In front 
of the Immigration checkpoint, dozens of songthaew (pickup truck) stand in a row to 
provide transportation for them. These trucks send them into the central area of the 
town near the market for twenty baht. In the late afternoon, these trucks bring them 
back to the border side, although some cars head for other border-crossing points 
where the Burmese cross the Moei River by boat to evade the immigration officers. 
Other than these groups, some minor groups such as refugees are consumers too. 
Burmese such as political activists and people from ethnic political groups who do not 
work in economic sectors also patronize these shops. However, in terms of 
conspicuous consumption, those three groups are the most discernable actors.  
Above all, a comparison of the number of consumers between the Thais and the 
Burmese shows that the Burmese are the predominant customers. According to the 
assumption of many shopkeepers and my investigation, the Burmese customers make 
up more than ninety per cent of the total number of customers in the market. Given 
that the market is sustained by the contribution of the Burmese customers, the issue of 
legality is hardly important to the Thai merchants. As mentioned in the last chapter, 
the police inspection disturbs the operation of the market and inflicts them with a loss 
of income, which prompts protests against the authorities.  
The attitude of Thai merchants towards Burmese customers is rather amicable, 
though it is probably due to the practical reasons of money making. Ethnic 
discrimination hardly takes place, at least in the market place. Some merchants 
develop intimate relationships with certain Burmese customers as a result of frequent 
encounters. Most Thai shopkeepers are able to speak some basic Burmese expressions. 
They call Burmese customers akaw (elder brother or sister) or nyi (younger brother or 




the Burmese. They are human beings like us. Most of my customers are the Burmese. 




It is misleading to assume that the merchants are only Thais because the Burmese 
might not be allowed to trade in Thai territory without proper legal status. On the 
contrary, Burmese merchants are rather dominant. Thai merchants are only visible 
from the entrance to the Prasatwithi Road up to the middle point of Talat Simoei; the 
rest of the market area is dominated by Burmese merchants. In this section I take a 
closer look at these two groups of merchants. 
 
Thai merchants 
Anan has been running a clothing shop since 1997. He was born and grew up in 
Mae Sot until he finished his secondary school education (mathayom). He studied in a 
university in Bangkok, majoring in economics and after that worked in a research 
institute as a researcher analyzing economic trends for two years. However, he was 
fed up with what he saw as superficial economic analysis as time went on and decided 
to do some business. At that time, his hometown, Mae Sot, witnessed massive 
demographic expansion due to the perennial influx of the Burmese migrants and 
refugees. His sister who had opened a clothing shop in the market in the mid-1990s 
was enjoying a dramatic increase in income as a result of the influx. She suggested 
that he open a textile shop beside her. Eventually Anan came back to Mae Sot and 




He recollected that when he began his business in 1997 he was extremely busy and 
made a lot of profit from Burmese migrants. At that time, there were not as many 
shops as there are today. Presently, however, many textile shops have opened in the 
hope of benefiting from the enormous presence of the Burmese in the town. Anan’s 
income level has decreased, though he still manages to make a considerable profit 
from the business.  
Once a month, he goes to Bangkok to purchase the items from wholesalers from 
the Bobe market which is the main provider of garments for the whole country. He 
pays a keen attention to the latest fashion trends. He told me that the Burmese are also 
sensitive to the changing fashion trends with the increasing influence of TV. He 
added: “We tend to think that the main criteria of the Burmese here in choosing a 
cloth would be a price, but they are also interested in the design and the latest trend.” 
To cater to the Burmese customers, he is hiring a Burmese Karen woman as a clerk. 
She stands in front of the shop and attends to the Burmese customers. She and 
potential Burmese customers negotiate a price, and once she gets the approval from 
Anan, she proceeds in selling the cloth. She speaks Burmese with Burmese customers 
and Thai with Anan. She spoke Karen to me once she knew I was learning Karen. 
Since the middle of the 1990s, she has been staying in Thailand, and happened to 
work in his shop through referrals. She does not have a Work Permit. Anan seemed to 
think that it was not quite necessary and to spend money in acquiring it could be 
useless if she were to leave for various reasons. He mentioned that most Burmese 
clerks in this market did not have Work Permits.   
While Anan’s customers are mostly Burmese individuals in Mae Sot and from 
Myawaddy, his sister’s main customers are Burmese wholesalers and retailers from 




market in Bangkok. It seems that Mae Sot is a distribution center with a mediating 
role between Bangkok and the Burmese border areas.  
She also mentioned that her income level was not as high as in the past because of 
the increase in market competition due to the number of textile shops. The population 
expansion of Mae Sot induced many people from other places, especially Bangkok, to 
make their way to Mae Sot. When I talked with other shopkeepers who recently 
opened their shops in the central areas of the town, I realized that many of them had 
stayed in Bangkok but the expansion of Mae Sot attracted them over to do business, 
utilizing their existing social networks with their relatives and friends who had 
already settled in Mae Sot. The items that they sell include such “modern” items as 
DVDs, mobile phones, and computers. 
Her shop is bigger than Anan’s with a total of nine employees. Most of them are 
Karen. While they assist with selling at her shop, they also engage in domestic work 
at her house. Regarding how the workers ended up in the shop, she answered that an 
employee brought her friends and relatives to her shop from Burma. For the Burmese 
to have work opportunities, personal connection is probably the most salient factor. It 
means that the Burmese do not haphazardly engage in border-crossings but have pre-
existing personal social relationships before they “migrate” over to work in the town.  
When I asked why the Karen are very popular as clerks, she said: “First, they speak 
three languages such as Burmese, Karen and Thai – and thus they can attend to more 
customers than the Burman employees who speak only Burman and Thai. Second, 
they have a good work ethic. They do not attempt to deceive their owners. They work 
hard regardless of the presence of the owners.” This preference in favor of the Karen 
is also shared by the other locals. The Karen are preferred in the domestic sphere too. 




hard work. In contrast, some Thai locals do not like to hire the Mon on the grounds 
that they are insidious and shrewd. A Thai friend of mine used to hire a Mon worker. 
There were several times when he suddenly left my friend’s work place without 
notice. Finally, he decided not to come back and is thought to have found a new job 
related to the exchange of money somewhere in town with his friends. In a way, the 
Mon are more mobile than others, which at times is interpreted as being unfaithful 
and deceptive by employers.  
Anan and his sister make more money from the first and last week of each month 
for the reasons mentioned above. However, the most dramatic upsurge in sales is 
generated during the holiday week of the songkran festival. During this period they 
never rest, attending to the Burmese who spend a large of their money at that time. 
However, previously they suffered from plummeting sales when the police made 
inspections in search of illegal Burmese occupiers. Thus they hate the presence of the 
police in the market. Burmese contribution to their profit does not lead Anan and his 
sister to question the legality of the Burmese. They are good sources of income 
regardless of their legal status.   
 
Burmese merchants 
Anan’s shop is in the middle of Talat Simoei. This place is filled with textile shops 
and dozens of Thai street merchants selling vegetables and foods. South of this 
location, the presence of Thai merchants becomes scarce, with Burmese merchants 
gaining more recognition.  
Sei Kaung, a Buddhist Burman, runs a bookshop beside the main lane of Talat 
Simoei. He came to Mae Sot in 1997. He had worked in a garment factory for five 




he managed to save money by living a thrifty life style which led to him being able to 
open his current shop. He holds a Work Permit. But according to the regulations of 
the Work Permit Scheme, its holders are not allowed to engage in business, but are 
only permitted to work as an employee. However, he wants to do business under more 
secure conditions with a legal status, otherwise his business would be disrupted due to 
potential deportation. Above all, it is affordable for him to spend money in acquiring a 
Work Permit. Many other Burmese merchants in the market have legal status too 
largely due to security considerations and financial ability.  
He maintains a cordial relationship with a Thai landowner who allows him to do 
business there and who helped him acquire a Work Permit. Officially, he is supposed 
to be employed under the landowner, and pays 2,500 baht as rent to him. In addition, 
he pays ten baht per day to tax collectors who seemingly are from tax authorities of 
the District or the Municipality. He also gives some tea money, of around fifty baht, 
to policemen when they happen to approach him.   
His business has been going well, and recently his wife opened a new bookshop in 
the market. Like his shop, it seems that small scale bookshops enjoy the frequent 
visits of Burmese customers. The bookshop caters to the needs of various kinds of 
Burmese customers. The items include school textbooks, novels, magazines, and 
music tapes/CDs. The migrant schools acquire the Burmese textbooks from 
bookshops in the town, including Sei Kaung’s shop. I also bought Burmese language 
text books from a bookshop in the town for my own study and a big map of Burma 
from his shop. From another shop, I even acquired a book written by a famous 
Burmese historian, Than Tun, on Buddhist art and architecture written in English.  
Once a month, he goes to Rangoon to purchase new books. He does not cross the 




cannot cross the Bridge. But it seems that he makes the unofficial border-crossings 
because the “smuggling” of the books through the Bridge would reveal his business to 
the Thai authorities, which would harm his business. For his journey to Rangoon, 
after crossing the Moei River by boat, he gets on a bus at a bus station in Myawaddy 
for Pa-an. Then he changes a bus for Rangoon at Pa-an. Like him, many people going 
to Rangoon takes this route. He said that the total expense incurred in his round trip to 
Rangoon was 40,000 to 50,000 kyat. Due to this transportation cost, the price of 
Burmese books in Mae Sot is higher than in Rangoon. 
Sei Kaung was an eloquent speaker with a concise analysis of Burmese economic 
and political situations. In the face of situations that “smart” Burmese in Mae Sot like 
him tended to approach the UNHCR in an attempt to take the chances of overseas 
resettlement programs as shown in Chapter 3 and 7, I asked him whether he intended 
to rely on the UNHCR. He answered: “I did not apply for the programs of the 
UNHCR. Since I often go to Burma, to do that would endanger my business and even 
my life. The Burmese police would arrest me if I were related to the UNHCR. I am 
quite satisfied to run my business in Mae Sot even though many of my friends already 
left for foreign countries through resettlement programs.” 
Dan Dee sells seasonal mushrooms. She does not reside in Mae Sot. Instead, 
everyday she commutes between Myawaddy and Mae Sot. Her main selling item is 
mushroom. As long as she can sell mushrooms, every harvesting season, she 
continues to come to Mae Sot. She holds a Border Pass with which she pays each side 
of the immigration office ten baht to pass through the checkpoints everyday. Like her, 
many vegetable sellers cross the border on a daily basis, holding the Border Pass. 
Mostly they deal with the vegetables produced from the Burmese side. Besides 




comparison to the same vegetables produced in the Thai side, the prices of the 
Burmese ones are lower. It is mainly because of the quality of the agricultural 
products. For example, the price of Burmese onions ranges between twelve baht and 
fifteen baht per kg, while that of Thai onion is around eighteen baht per kg. A 
Burmese onion is relatively small and its surface is purplish, whereas a Thai onion is 
big and white-colored.  
While Dan Dee carries her selling items by herself from Myawaddy, some grocery 
sellers that deal specifically with onions and garlic take their portion from the 
Burmese merchants of the riverbank of the Moei River whom I will deal with in detail 
later in this Chapter. The riverbank merchants are the main providers for these two 
items sold in the town market.  
Dan Dee was able to acquire a small selling space which is located in front of a 
shop owned by a Thai. The Thai shop owner allows her to sell mushrooms. In return, 
Dan Dee gives the owner twenty baht per day as a token of her gratitude. Dan Dee 
makes roughly 100 baht per day.  
Dan Dee is a Muslim. Muslim merchants dominate the market. Lar Lay and her 
two sisters are also Muslims selling various kinds of fish from Moulmein and 
Rangoon. They purchase their fish from a wholesaler in the market. While their 
mother operates other shops selling chicken and vegetables in other parts of the 
market, they are positioned beside the main lane of Talat Phajaroen. They used to pay 
2,500 baht to rent the selling place. But they told me that recently, their mother 
bought the spot for 60,000 baht. I was wondering how that could be since foreigners 
are not allowed to purchase land. According to them, their mother obtained a Thai 
citizenship card. Thus, she was able to buy the spot from the landowner. It seemed 




allowed her to obtain the citizenship card through various means which eventually 
enabled her to buy the spot. Lar Lay and her sisters hold Work Permits. As I have said, 
many Burmese merchants have legal documents. This is different from the cases of 
other Burmese such as salespersons, domestic workers and daily laborers. Financial 
capability is the main factor differentiating these groups.  
While some merchants place themselves along market lanes, other merchants 
locate their shops within big market buildings. The latter stall-holders engage in 
selling electronic goods and longyi, running food stalls and sewing fabric textiles. 
Win Kai is a Muslim merchant who sells electronic goods and watches. It is 
interesting to note that he has overseas experience. He had worked for several years in 
Malaysia. Then he went back to Burma and ended up coming to Mae Sot to do 
business. I met some other Muslim men who had worked in Malaysia. Upon returning 
to Burma, many were not satisfied with the living conditions in Burma. But it was not 
easy for them to go abroad again. Therefore, as an alternative, they came over to Mae 
Sot and started their own businesses.    
Despite Muslim dominance, there were merchants from other Burmese groups. For 
example, Kor Naw is Pwo Karen.79 She sells mohinga, a common Burmese noodle 
cooked with a kind of catfish and stew stalk of banana. She has been living in the 
town for fifteen years and running the stall for three years. She got married to a Thai 
Karen man. It seemed that her husband helped her run the stall even though she did 
not have legal status to trade. Now, she is staying in the town with a Work Permit. 
When it comes to comparisons between the Pwo Karen and the Sgaw Karen in terms 
                                                 
79 The Pwo Karen are one of major sub-Karen ethnic groups. Besides, the Sgaw, the Pa-O and the 
Kayah are dominant Karen groups. In the census of 1931, the most recent reliable source of the number 
of the Karen, there were 1,340,000 speakers of Karen languages.  Among them, about 500,000 were 
Sgaw, 473,000 Pwo, 223,000 Pa-O, and 32,000 Kayah. The Pwo are largely plain dwellers and 
concentrated in the Irrawaddy delta and northern Tenasserim while the Sgaw are more widely and 
evenly distributed, throughout the Irrawaddy delta area, Tenasserim, the Pegu range between the 




of their participations in different sectors of the economy, the former is more 
conspicuous in the market and as employees in the commercial sectors than the latter. 
Members of a Karen Church in Mae Sot are mostly Sgaw Karen. But they seldom 
engage in business as employees. Most of them pursue work in non-profit 
organizations such as NGOs and KNU-related organizations. My Sgaw Karen 
informant explained that the Pwo Karen are more aggressive and outgoing compared 
to the Sgaw Karen, since they have to compete against the Mon or the Burman to 
make a living in the lowlands of Karen State while the latter tend to stay together 
within their communities in remote villages. According to him, these different living 
environments somehow developed different kinds of behaviors among the two groups, 
which result in differences in their livelihoods even in Mae Sot.   
 
Marked points of the market 
 
The various stories which I have introduced with regard to the central market lead 
us to some important points. First, the Burmese are largely integrated into the central 
market of the town. They are the dominant actors not only as customers but also as 
merchants. Their participation plays a great role in ensuring the operating of the 
market. Compared to the past, the present time sees the integration of others taking 
place in the very central area of the town. Previously the black markets outside Mae 
Sot in the border area provided places for the Thais and the Burmese to exchange 
goods and engage in trade. Therefore, others were not the main participants inside the 
markets of the town. However, nowadays the Burmese are flowing into the central 




Second, the central market improves the relationships between the Burmese and 
the Thais. In Chapter 1, I introduced Rex’s critic of Furnivall. As Rex (1980: 98) 
mentions, the market draws various kinds of people into a single social system and 
creates intimate relationships beyond the sterile contact place as Furnivall had argued. 
As vindicated in the cases of Sei Kaung and Kor Naw who acquired selling spots and 
Work Permits through the help of the Thai locals, deep relationships with the Thai 
locals enabled them to engage in market trading.  
Third, legality is circumvented in the market. Police inspection is hampered by the 
local merchants. Most Burmese clerks in the market do not have Work Permits. 
Though the Burmese merchants appear to conform to the legal scheme and hold Work 
Permits, they also manipulate the system in doing their own businesses as shown in 
the cases of Sei Kaung, Lar Lay, and Kor Naw. These cases demonstrate the 
incompleteness of state penetration through regulatory practices such as Work Permits 
in the market, because people circumvent them in their pursuits of everyday 
livelihood.  
Last, Mae Sot has a certain geographical significance. The town is centered along 
the border from which borderlanders from either side engage in their economic 
activities. The town is a distribution center of goods for the Burmese and the Thais in 
the borderland. Also goods from Bangkok and Rangoon are exchanged in the town. 
Anan’s cloth from Bangkok and Sei Kaung’s books from Rangoon cater to the needs 
of people. Their trade has been going on for long periods as indigenous forms of trade. 
This small-scale and indigenous form of trading serves mostly the needs of the 
borderlanders. However, state-sponsored economic sectors do not have close 
attachment to the particular needs of the local, which I will deal with in detail in 




trading patterns and exogenous state projects. The case of the central market shows 
that the Burmese comprise a large sector of this indigenous economy.  
 














AT THE BORDER: SMUGGLERS, CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT OF 
GOODS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BORDER TRADE 
 
We need to approach flows of goods and people as visible manifestations of 
power configurations that weave in and out of legality, in and out of states, 
and in and out of individual’s lives, as socially embedded, sometimes long-
term processes of production, exchange, consumption, and representation 
(Abraham and Van Schendel 2005: 9). 
 
“Sometimes behind the scene or under the table, but other times in front of the 
scene or over the table, border trade operates” (Ekamon, a Thai trader). 
 
One day, my Thai informant, Somsak, who was a committee member of the Tak 
Chamber of Commerce, informed me that some officials from the Bank of Thailand 
(BOT) coming from Bangkok would give a presentation about some significant issues 
regarding border trade at the Mae Sot Hill Hotel, the most luxurious hotel in Mae Sot. 
He suggested that I attend the talk with him, because this would be a good opportunity 




morning, I rode my motorbike to the Hotel and went into a spacious convention hall. 
Many local businessmen were already present. I searched for Somsak and sat beside 
him. The officials of the BOT in neat dresses delivered their presentation on border 
trade, mostly mentioning figures and statistics with colorful slides. During the 
presentation, Somsak turned to me and whispered, “It is very superficial. They 
attempt to explain the complex facets of border trade only with the numbers. It would 
be much nicer for local researchers to do research on that with the amount of money 
the BOT has spent.”  
During the break, I met Ekamon who was also a businessman engaging with 
border trading activities since the 1970s. I enquired about his thoughts on the 
presentation. He said bluntly, 
 
They are wasting money in useless things. They just spend this money because 
otherwise their next year budget will decrease. Outside people do not know the 
situations of border trade. This presentation only covers twenty five percent of it. 
Border trade is complex. Sometimes behind the scene or under the table, but 
other times in front of the scene or over the table, border trade operates. Outside 
people cannot see these complexities. 
 
Ekamon’s critic continued, this time about state control: “What the government 
needs to do is to let local people trade in their own ways. When we need help, then 
they can assist us. But now the center tries to control us. It only disturbs us.” 
Comforted in the ambience of the high-class hotel and indulging in coffee and 
cookies, I was present until the end of the presentation despite the seemingly cynical 
stance of the local participants. But their bold criticism against the BOT’s 
presentation impressed me and lingered in my thoughts for some time afterwards. 




table” and its integration with “in front of the scene” and “over the table” in 
understanding border trade.   
 









Smugglers or free traders: Burmese vendors of the riverbank 
 
A Snapshot of the riverbank at the border 
“Phi, supburi ao mai” (Brother, do you want tobacco?), “Whiskey ao mai” (Do you 
want whiskey?) Whenever I went to the river bank of the Moei River, a band of 
Burmese vendors approached and surrounded my motorbike, enticing me to buy 
contraband items, especially cigarettes and liquors. It took much energy and time to 
get away from them. These vendors are stationed under the Thai-Burma Friendship 
Bridge and wait for passers-by. Interestingly and paradoxically enough, border patrol 
soldiers are also stationed amongst them. The soldiers do not seem to care about those 
unauthorized merchants selling smuggled goods at all. In that vicinity, one can see the 
formal border market named “Talat Rim Moei (Moei Market).” The landscape of the 
river bank dramatically shows the ironical but stable juxtaposition between the 
smugglers, the soldiers and the formal market.  
If one successfully keeps away from the band of Burmese merchants and goes 
farther along the river bank to the north, one is overwhelmed by more unauthorized 
merchants. The landscape of the border is dominated by these merchants and other 
people such as beggars, scavengers, Thai soldiers, domestic tourists, Western tourists, 
and so on. Especially on weekends, this area is full of people not only from Mae Sot, 
but from all parts of Thailand. Items that the unauthorized merchants sell include 
garlic, chili, onion, crab, shrimp, dried fish, sunglasses, souvenir items, and so forth, 
while Talat Rim Moei displays electronic goods, confectionary, wood souvenirs, 
guitars, gems, and clothes.  
It is not uncommon for resting soldiers to just nonchalantly observe these Burmese 




the mundane inertia of the soldiers at the riverbank, some special mission groups 
make sporadic visits to the place. One afternoon when I went to the riverbank, I saw a 
group of high-ranking military officers and civil servants in uniform get off their 
deluxe cars to make an on-site inspection of the riverbank. Among the hundreds of 
tourists and shoppers constituting the ethnoscape of the place, this group of people 
was an intimidating sight to the rest of the people there, especially the unauthorized 
Burmese traders. I observed what they would do with them. Would they arrest and 
expel the merchants to the Burmese side? No, they just walked along the riverbank 
without taking any action and left in no time.  
After that, I approached some Burmese merchants and asked, “Why do you think 
the Thai officers came here?” “Ma thiyaw (an excursion)” she said. For the merchants, 
the inspection was considered as “an excursion,” nothing serious. They were not 
threatened by the appearance of those high-ranking state officers. Then I happened to 
talk to a Thai soldier who was positioned in Tak Provincial district. He was off duty 
and was spending his holiday on the border. He did not seem to regard the landscape 
of the border as encroached upon by the others. For him, the presence of the 
unauthorized traders was natural and accepted rather than problematic. He did not 
have a sharp idea of a territorial sovereignty which must be protected at the border.  
 
Withi chiwit (way of life) 
What does the Customs Office think of the unauthorized merchants? I was 
compelled to discover the reaction of the Office, whose main mission is to prohibit 
smuggling and arrest those selling smuggled goods. The office is on the way to the 
border beside the Asian Highway. The big board indicating the monthly export-import 




certain general and specific issues regarding border trade. Among these, I enquired 
about the presence of the riverbank traders. I asked him whether he imposed taxes on 
them and why he did not expel them. He replied: “They do not pay any tax and even 
rent to us. If we take action against them, they just run away. When we leave they 
come back. We cannot capture them. They are free traders engaging in trade in the so-
called free trade area of the river bank.” 
During my follow-up research in December 2005, I went to the Customs Office 
again to collect some data about border trade. This time the Chief Officer was absent 
due to his trip to China with other important officials such as nay amphoe and the 
chairman of the Tak Chamber of Commerce.80 I met the Vice Chief Officer instead. I 
raised similar questions regarding the riverbank merchants. He replied: “It is withi 
chiwit (way of life). It is also like a traditional thing. We just allow them to do that 
because this is minimal and crucial for their life. What we do at the moment is for the 
number of these merchants to not increase.” 
Description of them as “free traders” and their activities as withi chiwit 
problematizes the conventional view of them as violators of state law and illegal 
encroachers of the state border. Rather, they are real free traders who do not pay taxes 
and cross the border freely without much intervention from the state, sometimes 
subverting state control. The state is unable to place them under control, because their 
mobility nullifies the state’s authoritative practices.   
Withi chiwit, in other words, signifies that their activities are rather “indigenous” 
and are deeply embedded in the place. Smuggling is a normal and legitimate 
                                                 
80 While I was in Mae Sot, delegates of Dehong city in Yunnan Province of China visited and stayed in 
Mae Sot on 14-15 June 2005 in order to negotiate an sister-city agreement between Mae Sot and 
Dehong. I was invited to the dinner reception. In December 2005, delegates of Mae Sot led by the Tak 




economic activity in its own right. They do not agree with the dividing criteria 
between legal import and smuggling which the state imposes.  
As Donnan and Wilson (1999: 88) mentions with regard to smuggling, prostitution 
and undocumented migration,   
 
They ignore, contest and subvert state power. They challenge state attempts to 
control the behaviour of its citizens and subjects, to impose a morality, to 
regulate the movement of people and flow of comities, and to define what are 
and what are not marketable goods. They sometimes force the state to rethink 
and change its policies. Though doubly peripheralised by being on the margins 
of the economy as well as on the edges of the state, border prostitution, 
undocumented migration and smuggling strike at the centre of political power, 
flouting state authority and even threatening to undermine it. 
 
Donnan and Wilson (ibid) go on to mention that at the same time, they are rarely 
revolutionary and they do not seek to overthrow the state because “in some sense their 
existence depends upon it and, in particular, on the borders which the state seeks to 
establish and uphold.” They could not be sustained without these borders. We could 
say that the border and the smugglers exist in a symbiotic relationship. Withi chiwit is 
grounded in the intimate and symbiotic relationships between the unauthorized 
Burmese merchants and the border. An attempt to shed light on their commercial 
activities only with the measure of state-sanctioned legality hardly gives a deep 
understanding of these intimate and symbiotic relationships between borderlanders 








Embodiment of the border 
At first, they were stationed in the islet of the Moei River. 81  The process of 
building the wall to prevent floods along the Thai side of the riverbank began in early 
April 2005 when I was conducting field research. I was upset with the concrete wall 
in the initial building process because it seemingly appeared to block the Burmese 
vendors on the pretext of blocking floods. Moreover, the ferroconcrete building which 
stretched in the early building stage along the riverbank totally mismatches the 
landscape of the border, reflecting an abuse of the environment by the state. I 
wondered how the vendors would survive in the face of this blocking wall. I rode my 
motorbike to the border as often as possible to see the vendors’ reaction to the wall in 
the final stages of my field research. The wall was being raised step by step but it was 
still possible to climb over the wall to reach them in the islet. By the time I left Mae 
Sot in July, there were still people crossing over the knee-high wall to purchase 
products. Some vendors also crossed over the wall and encountered customers on the 
Thai side. While I was absent in Mae Sot, I was curious about the riverbank situations.  
When I revisited Mae Sot in December 2005, I hastily went to the border. I was 
relieved to see that the complete form of the wall was not as inharmonious with the 
landscape of the border as I had expected. People conveniently strolled along the path 
on the wall equipped with benches and lamps. What struck me most was the new 
formation in the grouping patterns of the vendors. Now they were positioned beside 
the path along the wall. They built their new stalls with wood along the path to meet 
the height of the wall. Some of them were positioned inside the path. They resiliently 
appropriated the new building for themselves. The border was packed with many 
                                                 
81 Initially the islet was in the middle of the River without any land connection to either side of the 
riverbank. However, during the process of building the Friendship Bridge, the islet became contiguous 
with the Thai side of the riverbank. Subsequently, the Burmese people exploited the land for cultivating 
crops and setting up vending stalls (Maung 2002: 113; Bangkok Post 11 April 2005). Some Burmese 




people and the Burmese vendors enjoyed more tourists and customers than in the past. 
They cling to the border no matter how the state attempts to change the landscape of 
the border. As Flynn mentions (1997: 319) in the case of the Shabe border residents of 
West Africa who claim that “We are the border!” to maintain their freedom of 
movement and economic opportunities through smuggling against the controlling 
practices of the state, the Burmese vendors embody the border, subverting the external 
force’s detaching practices imposed between them and the border. Their deep 
placement with the border over time enables them to transcend imminent projects 
such as the wall which blocks them from the border. As Van Schendel (2005b: 61) 
mentions, “Their power is based on a detailed knowledge of topography, social fields, 
and overlapping scales that allows objects and persons to navigate the border safely.”         
 
Smuggled goods and smugglers as part of the border economy  
The number of riverbank merchants is estimated to be around a hundred.82 They 
arrive in the Thai side as early as 6 am and go back to Myawaddy around 6 pm. Their 
border-crossing is not standardized: some people cross via the Bridge, while others 
cross by boat. Though they do not pay any tax to Thai authorities, they pay some 
taxes on the Burmese side. According to them, they usually pay 100 kyat per person 
and 150 to 200 kyat separately for goods, depending on the size. In addition, in the 
riverbank, I observed that they paid twenty baht to rent a big sun-blocking parasol 
from the Thais. As the price of the parasol is over 500 baht, they cannot afford to buy 
it. Some shrewd Thai locals benefit from this parasol rental business.  
Goods that they deal with are from various areas in Burma: fresh and dried fishes 
are from Moulmein; dried chilies, tobaccos and alcohols are from Rangoon; fresh 
                                                 
82 This figure is from my own observation and various talks with riverbank merchants. However, a 




vegetables are from Myawaddy; and sunglasses and rings are made in China but 
arrive through Rangoon.     
These goods are not only traded at the riverbank but also in inner parts of the town. 
The riverbank market is firmly integrated into Mae Sot’s economy. It is like a 
springboard for Burmese goods. From the riverbank, Burmese goods move to town 
markets, notably the central market. Many Burmese agricultural products and dried 
fishes at the central market come from the riverbank merchants. There exist trading 
chains between the riverbank and the town markets. Smuggled goods, not unlike 
normal goods, advance and spread into the very center as well as other parts of the 
town. 
Some individual Thai locals, though not merchants, are loyal customers. They ride 
to the border to buy goods at cheap prices. For example, here the price of onion per kg 
is around ten baht, which is cheaper by two to five baht than in the central market. 
The prices of other goods per kg in the riverbank market are as follows: twenty five 
baht for garlic; one hundred baht for dried shrimps; one hundred baht for crabs; and 
318 baht for king prawns. My wife and I also sometimes bought fresh crabs and 
prawns from them. Many of my local Thai informants frequently went to the border to 
acquire what they need. When local friends prepared a farewell party for us, we 
enjoyed lavish dishes of crab acquired from the riverbank market.  
My frequent visits to the riverbank and subsequent efforts to approach them led to 
the development of cordial relationships between us. They were never insidious 
smugglers that the state labeled them as. Rather, they are “normal” merchants 
constituting the economic landscape of the town and the borderland. I heard some 
personal stories when I built up personal relationships with them. Most of the 




years, and had worked in Malaysia before. He wanted to go to Malaysia again but has 
decided to stay here because he does not want to separate from his wife and three 
children. Hlaing Zaw had worked in a factory in Nakhonsawan for four years before 
he began to sell sunglasses, rings, and other kinds of souvenirs here seven years ago. 
His mother is staying in Um Phiem Mai Camp but he does not want to stay there due 
to the limited freedom of movement. Many of them have their family members in 
Myawaddy though they are originally from various places such as Rangoon, Arakan 
and Moulmein. The fact that they are Muslims gives a glimpse into their intimate 
relationships with Burmese merchants in the town markets. In practice, Ali often 
makes visits to the central market of the town for various commercial or personal 
reasons. 
When I asked the riverbank merchants about the intervention of the authorities, 
they told me that they did not have serious problems. What worries them more is the 
amount of money they get rather than threats from Thai authorities. In other words, to 
them, matters of economic gain come before rhetorical intimidation. Beyond the 
discourse of state intervention, the border is their living environment where they 
pursue their livelihoods. It explains their stable and persistent presence along the 















































Border-crossing of goods 
 
What perplexed me in terms of the border-crossing of goods at the initial stage of 
my field research was that the movement of goods by boat was considered normal and 
part of the trading patterns in Mae Sot, unlike my assumption that the Bridge was the 
sole medium whereby bilateral trade was generated and continued. This led me to 
raise a question: why does this pattern, which existed during the period of black 
market operation, continue at the present time given that the two states of Thailand 





There are several reasons that account for the unofficial cross-border movements. 
They are mainly related to the Burmese government’s policies and management of 
trade and border politics amid long-existing people’s way of life which is rooted 
within a close and autonomous relationship to the border.   
In the late 1980s, the Burmese government initiated the open door policy and 
subsequently developed Myawaddy as a point for bilateral trade with Thailand in an 
attempt to officiate trading patterns by replacing the black markets along the border. 
The Thai-Burma Friendship Bridge, which was built in 1997, was an offspring of 
these endeavors. Indeed, the Bridge has been used as an important passing point since 
then.  
However, the government policy was not a full-scale open door policy. As an 
underdeveloped country, Burma needed to protect some industrial sectors for their 
own development. Thus, it was imperative to restrict some imported items. At the 
same time, Burma was sanctioned, on the ground of the violation of human rights, by 
other countries, notably by the USA. Based on these sanctions, the export of goods 
from these countries to Burma is restricted.  
These circumstances led to the scarcity of some goods which ordinary Burmese 
need in their daily lives. Those items include seasoning powder (ajinomoto), 
beverages (notably coca-cola), biscuits, chewing gum, cakes, wafers, chocolates, 
canned food, rice noodles, liquor, beer, tobacco, fresh fruits, plastic products, and 
other restricted items.83 These goods enter into Burma, not passing through the Bridge 
but passing through boat piers. Interesting enough, the export of these items from the 
Thai side is well recorded and legalized by the Mae Sot Customs Office, while the 
import of these items is unofficial and is not legalized by Burmese customs authorities. 
                                                 




Here we see the ironic integration between the legal/official in the Thai side and the 
illegal/unofficial in the Burmese side. 
As a result, it witnessed a parallel development in trade patterns: while on the one 
hand the Bridge has become an important passage-way, on the other hand border-
crossing by boat has sustained a substantial portion of trading volume. In addition, 
people who are engaging in border trade do not want customs officials to be involved 
in their trading activities. It is mainly because they do not want to bear taxes on 
trading items. Ordinary borderlanders used to retain autonomous trading methods, and 
even now they want to continue their withi chiwit against the Burmese state 
authorities. 
In general, it is estimated by many local traders and Customs officials that more 
than sixty percent of the export volume goes to the Burmese side by boat, and around 
fifty percent of import volume comes to the Thai side by boat too.   
It is impossible for the Mae Sot Customs Office to fully regulate the cross-border 
movement of goods, given the geographical formation of the porous border and the 
limited capacity of the Office where only thirty five officials are in charge of three 
provinces – Tak, Kamphengphet and Sukhothai. However, the export volume from 
Thailand to Burma is relatively well recorded because exported items are not taxed so 
as to promote export. Thus, Thai exporters in general appear to conform to the 
checking activities of the Office. Therefore, most of the items that are moved from the 
piers of the Moei River on the Thai side are well tracked in the records of the Office. 
In contrast, the Customs Office imposes taxes on imported items – thirty percent of 
Customs tax and seven percent of VAT, depending on the types of product. It is said 
that the Thai importers are very reluctant to record those items, and the Customs 




Moreover, the actions of the Customs Office are not consistent, as the following 
incident shows. According to a report by the Irrawaddy (10 August 2004), officials of 
the Mae Sot Customs Office seized 309 sacks of Burmese rice that were smuggled 
into the Thai side. Sometimes, Burmese rice traders on the border pay off Thai 
officials to allow contraband rice to enter the country. Thai traders then carry the 
contraband grain to the interior provinces. The report delivers a statement of a 
Burmese trader: “But sometimes they [customs officials] don’t take our money and 
seize our rice instead.” He goes on to complain that Thai authorities often seize 
Burmese rice at the river as it enters the country, but then allow Thai traders to 
transport the rice to the inner places of the country without any problems. According 
to him, “It is just to show that Customs is preventing the smuggling of Burmese rice 
into Thailand.” The incident demonstrates that the Customs Office’s actions of 
prohibiting smuggling are discursive and ritualistic. Also, it shows that categorization 
of “smuggled items” are negotiable and not very strict and that through this 
negotiation between traders and Customs officials these items can be integrated into 
the entire circulation system. Abraham and Van Schendel (2005: 8) make similar 
arguments that “state definitions of what is illicit are situational” and that “states 
themselves often find it hard to pinpoint the exact cutoff point between licit and illicit 
state trade.”  
The Customs Office has been strengthening its engagement in border trade, though 
its actions are often inconsistent and at odds with local traders. When I interviewed 
the head officer of the Customs Office, he boasted that one of his main 
accomplishments was to build thirteen warehouses along the border to cater to the 




controlling the movement of items by building these warehouses. Local traders feel 
that this kind of engagement disturbs their autonomous trading methods.   
 














































































 (Source: Mae Sot Customs Office) 
 
Even though export and import records are not all about border trade, it is 
necessary to have a general understanding of the trade. Below, accounts of trading 














Year Export Import 
2000 3,979,185,004.72 677,666,652.29 
2001 3,155,117,602.21 1,664,686,375.62 
2002 2,763,612,084.74 540,037,735.83 
2003 5,733,374,016.73 473,640,618.76 
2004 11,736,342,217.34 644,854,079.48 
2005* 11,371,358,776.44 675,058,029.32 
* From January to November of 2005 
(Source: Mae Sot Customs Office 2006a) 
 
As shown above, export volumes are much higher than import ones. It clearly 
vindicates the advancement made by the Thai industry. But it could be also 
interpreted that imported items are so evasive that the authorities cannot keep track of 
them.      
In terms of the export volume from Mae Sot, recent years have seen a massive 
increase compared to the year 2000. However, with regard to imports into Mae Sot, 
though it has been growing since 2003, it does not show a considerable improvement 
compared to a few years before.   
Mae Sot’s central position in border trade with Burma when compared with other 
border towns was enormous. The total amount of Thai-Burmese border trade was 
worth 20 billion baht per year, with about half generated from the Mae Sot checkpoint 
and the rest from border-crossing points from Chiang Rai and Ranong Provinces, 
according to a report by Bangkok Post (20 October 2004). The table below shows 






Table 4.2 Comparison between Mae Sot and Other Border Towns in Northern 
Thailand in 2004 
(Unit: million baht) 
Town Export Import 
Mae Sot 11,736.3 644.9 
Mae Sariang 257.6 315.9 
Mae Hong Son 25.1 190.4 
Mae Sai 2,039.6 628.4 
(Source: Bank of Thailand 2004: 10-11) 
  
In terms of export, Mae Sot’s position is conspicuous in comparison with other 
towns, while with regard to import, Mae Sai is close to Mae Sot. Previously Mae Sai 
used to be a major exporting place, together with Mae Sot.84 But now the gap between 
Mae Sai and Mae Sot has widened tremendously.  
Items mainly traded through Mae Sot are shown in the two tables below. 
 
Table 4.3 Major Export Items through the Mae Sot Customs Office (October 2004 – 
September 2005) 
 
Item Unit Amount (baht) 
Seasoning powder   21,869.39 ton 1,003,068,519.68 
Cooking oil 26,894.89 ton 694,747,324.72 
Polyethylene for covering wire 12,102.08 ton 522,433,578.87 
Cotton cloth 10,101,581,13 yard 303,915,854.38 
Plastic powder 6,951.24 ton 278,361,725.93 
Pure polyethylene 7,481.79 ton 269,773,317.41 
Plastic pills/tablets 5,180.69 ton 252,339,687.09 
Condensed milk 6,066.26 ton 234,449,262.42 
Medicine 2,552,061 box 207,693,462.61 
TV 40,150 set 188,650,379.00 
(Source: Mae Sot Customs Office 2006b) 
Table 4.4 Major Import Items through the Mae Sot Customs Office (October 2004 – 
September 2005) 
                                                 
84 In 1994, export through Chiang Rai Province was 1,696.9 million baht while that passing through 
Tak Province was 2,057.9 million baht (UNESCAB 1997: 116). Chiang Rai Province has been 
witnessing a slow increase since then, whereas Tak Province has been surging in the export sector due 





Item Unit Amount (baht) 
Fresh crab 5,213.82 ton 202,212,440.43 
Live cow 36,630 head 146,520,000.00 
Fish 5,203.93 ton 115,346,780.31 
Live buffalo 14,841 head 59,364,000.00 
Dried fish maw 88.12 ton 43,685,927.00 
Dried chili 1,025.88 ton 20,485,904.62 
Bamboo 10,092.40 ton 19,766,584.00 
Fresh shrimp 101.53 ton 19,032,489.66 
Manufactured 
wood items  
(except teak)  
2,146.72 ton 17,691,708.58 
Powdered 
shellfish feed 
842.40 ton 16,848,000.00 
(Source: Mae Sot Customs Office 2006b) 
 
The two tables above show some contrast between export and import items. The 
exported items include mainly consumer goods and industrial goods. In contrast, raw 
agricultural products and fishes are main items that Thailand imports from Burma. 
Interestingly enough, though seasoning powder is not allowed into Burma by the 
Burmese government, it comprises the largest portion among the imported items into 
Burma through Mae Sot. Plastic products banned by the Burmese government are 
ranked as major items too. Ironical though it may seem, this constitutes the actual 
operation of cross-border trade around Mae Sot. While these products are 
illicit/illegitimate import items on the Burmese side, these are seen as licit/legitimate 
export items from the Thai side. Passing-through by boat mediates the trading of these 
products. As mentioned before, we see integration of the official/legal in the Thai side 
and the unofficial/illegal in the Burmese side in border trade.       





It is interesting to see that ethnic politics and the political development of Burma 
are very much involved in border trade. In the previous section, I mentioned that the 
policies and the management of the Burmese government are intimately related to 
border trade. What is more intriguing is that the government uses it as a “carrot” for 
ethnic groups, especially the DKBA, to sign ceasefire agreements. In return for 
collaborating with the government, the DKBA was allowed to be in charge of 
controlling some border-crossing points and extract some revenue from the taxation 
of goods and people. Among several piers they control, the nearest is several minutes’ 
walking distance from the Bridge. People crossing the Moei River through the piers 
have to pay around five hundred kyat. In addition to the movement of people, many 
imported and exported goods pass through these points.  
The patron-client relationship between the DKBA and the Burmese government 
was initiated and strengthened during the time of former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt 
until he was ousted as a result of power struggles in October 2004. When he was in 
power, the DKBA received huge benefits from delivering Japanese used cars through 
its crossing points along the border. It was the sole party in charge of transporting 
those cars. Therefore, individuals and business partners who wanted to engage in the 
second-hand car business had to contact the DKBA and maintain good relationships 
with the group. One of my informants who was from Moulmein admitted that while 
she was doing the car business in Moulmein and the Three Pagoda Pass, it was 
impossible to run the business without contacting the DKBA.  
The delivery operation scale of the used car by the DKBA was enormous. Thus, 
according to many local traders’ witnesses, during the heyday, huge numbers of cars 




the Three Pagoda Pass was a major point of entry for cars making their way into 
Burma.  
The DKBA was allowed to do other businesses as well. It makes money from 
logging, cattle and through collecting taxes from villagers. It is also assumed that the 
DKBA is involved in the drug trade (Thornton 2006: 72). All of these businesses were 
backed by the Burmese government. Major General of the DKBA Maung Chit Htoo 
admitted in Thornton’s book (2006: 72), “We get support from the SPDC, they let us 
do business and use the roads for our bus services, boats, and tax gates.”   
Thai local exporters are aware of the political development on the other side of the 
border. They send their goods through the DKBA checkpoints. After going through 
the checking processes at the Mae Sot Customs Office, they bring their items to a boat 
pier. Then, the DKBA moves them to the Burmese side. After that, Burmese 
importers are taxed for the imported items and these goods are then carried into the 
inner areas of Burma. What struck me was that for the Thai local exporters, the 
DKBA was a normal partner in charge of some parts in their business affairs, 
especially in the shipment sector. The inclusion of the DKBA as a normal border 
trading partner problematizes the conventional image of the DKBA portrayed as a 
dangerous armed band that is always trying to instigate splits among the Karen. At the 
border, the DKBA is one of main collaborators that keep border trade active.     
Even for the Mae Sot Customs Office, the DKBA is a regular partner too. The 
Office cannot avoid interactions with the group. My interview with the head officer of 
the Office revealed that the DKBA involvement constitutes a common landscape of 
border trade. It seemed that the building of warehouses, which he plays a very active 















Plate 4.9 Movement of Goods at a Boat Pier 
 
 

















Plate 4.10 Movement of Goods at a Boat Pier 
 
 
(Source: Mae Sot Customs Office) 
 
Plate 4.11 Movement of Goods at a Boat Pier 
 
 




Plate 4.12 Movement of Goods through a DKBA Point 
 
 
(Source: Mae Sot Customs Office) 
 
Plate 4.13 Movement of Goods through a DKBA Point 
 
 





However, the ousting of Khin Nyunt on 19 October 2004 had a great impact on the 
border situations. I heard the news from an NGO worker that night. The next day, the 
Burmese in Mae Sot were excited and were talking about the incident. People’s 
sentiments were divided. A Karen informant of mine expressed that he was happy 
since at least something had been changed at the top level of politics and that it would 
lead to splits within the military itself, which could eventually bring about democracy. 
The Thai locals were also very aware of this happening. My local Thai friends were 
passionate in their political analyses with discussions taking place at football fields 
and in their homes. Then Prime Minister Thaksin, who was in Mae Sot on 19 October 
2004, cancelled his plan to visit Myawaddy and headed back to Bangkok. NGOs in 
Mae Sot held emergency meetings and calculated the foreseeable outcomes in relation 
to the refugees. For several days after the incident, the people of Mae Sot exchanged 
many rumors, prospects and analyses.  
On 20 October 2004, I rode my motorbike to the border to see if there were any 
restrictions on the movement of people. There, I met a Burmese tour guide near the 
immigration check point who had guided me on my visit to Myawaddy a couple of 
months ago. I asked him if he was allowed to cross the Bridge after the incident. He 
replied bluntly, “No problem. No change even after the sacking of Khin Nyunt. 
People can cross the border as usual.” As he mentioned, at the surface level, the 
border situations seemed to be normal. Unauthorized Burmese merchants were still 
selling contraband liquor and tobaccos and I did not get any sense of strengthening 
security. Small scale movement of goods and people was not affected.  
However, the political impact on the overall border trade itself was noticeable, 
especially for the DKBA. It lost its business opportunities, notably the transportation 




that one of the reasons for ousting him was the corruption which he was involved in 
(Bangkok Post 20 October 2004). While he was in power, especially whilst he was in 
charge of the Military Intelligence Service, like the case of the DKBA, he and his 
staff used border trade to implement policies against ethnic political groups such as 
the United Wa State Army. While he attempted to make ceasefire agreements with 
those ethnic political groups, he granted various business opportunities to them in 
return for these agreements. He and his men were accused of corruption in doing this 
mission. Many of Khin Nyunt’s former staff and aides were arrested and put into 
custody not only in the Thailand-Burma border but also in the China-Burma border.85  
The scene of cars passing through the DKBA check points was no longer observed 
after that. Although the DKBA was still in charge of passing points, its revenue from 
border trade decreased heavily.  
The removal of Khin Nyunt influenced the volume of export from Mae Sot. It is 
indicated in the below table.  
  
Table 4.5 Monthly Export Volumes through the Mae Sot Customs Office from 
January 2004 to November 2005 
 
(Unit: baht) 
Month 2005 2004 
January 1,197,743,381.04 748,778,599.65 
February 1,466,015,733.35 811,954,235.71 
March 1,368,204,295.84 983,303,899.01 
April 1,022,498,947.49 874,571,824.36 
May 966,688,009.80 1,060,129,740.02 
June 1,023,909,205.25 1,061,915,690.97 
July 726,271,761.61 1,052,872,974.68 
August 697,691,974.09 1,164,748,712.99 
September 864,300,646.60 1,120,671,745.87 
                                                 




October 993,252,369.80 861,672,954.04 
November 1,044,782,451.57 843,066,276.88 
December  1,152,655,563.16 





























































































(Source: Mae Sot Customs Office 2006a) 
 
Before the incident, the export volume stabilized at the level of over 1 billion baht 
between May and September 2004. But in October and November, the volume saw a 
sudden decrease, most probably due to the unstable political situation in Burma.  
The export volume recovered from December 2004 and increased until the early 
part of 2005. It might be interpreted that even though Burma saw a reshuffling of the 
cabinet, the basic open door policy continued. However, one can clearly recognize the 
abrupt fall of the volume during the third quarter of 2005, especially in August. At 
that time I was in Singapore and was initially unaware of the development. But on 30 
August, I contacted my local Thai friend who engaged in exporting consumer goods 
to Burma through online chat programs. He revealed to me that his export volume 
was suffering because Burmese authorities checked all the cars and contents at three 
checkpoints on the way from Pa-an to Rangoon. After the downfall of Khin Nyunt, 
the Burmese government carried out anti-corruption campaigns intermittently with a 




Burma. The decrease in export volume from Thailand was due to this massive 
operation. After the operation, the volume began to recover.  
In 2006, these campaigns were also conducted from time to time. On top of the 
ongoing anti-corruption campaigns against the customs-related matters, this year the 
Burmese government tightened import and export regulations to deal with rising 
inflation mainly due to the salary increase of government officers and soaring diesel 
prices. In these campaigns, at least twenty Burmese merchants, including the 
president of the Myawaddy Chamber of Commerce,86 were reported to be arrested by 
Burmese officials. Consequently, export volume from May to July, according to news 
reports, slumped to 700 million baht a month.87 
What is the impact of political developments on the import volume? Compared to 
the export volume, the Khin Nyunt incident did not affect the import volume. 
However, the sluggish trend after the second quarter of 2005 explains the influence of 
the government’s anti-corruption practices vividly.  
 
Table 4.6 Monthly Import Volumes through the Mae Sot Customs Office from 
January 2004 to November 2005 
 
(Unit: baht) 
Month 2005 2004 
January 64,552,805.70 47,444,191.35 
February 58,823,046.67 42,389,200.48 
March 72,807,172.84 42,358,458.08 
April 53,849,437.65 37,539,184.07 
May 82,912,964.98 46,751,741.52 
June 74,367,840.96 51,878,856.94 
July 51,423,085.83 46,690,865.32 
August 47,893,953.37 69,305,539.87 
                                                 
86 I met her occasionally in Mae Sot during my fieldwork. I also met her in Myawaddy when I took part 
in the Thai-Myanmar Bicycle Project. 




September 53,910,627.92 60,737,851.14 
October 59,408,549.61 62,975,950.65 
November 55,108,543.79 57,896,237.01 
December  78,886,003.05 






























































































(Source: Mae Sot Customs Office 2006a) 
 
On the one hand, the change in trading volume seems to demonstrate the power of 
the state in engaging in border trade. However, on the other hand, the fluctuation of 
the trade shows that the Burmese state has yet to achieve strong control on a 
permanent basis to place border trade under its reign. Whether it is the case of the 
former or the latter, it reflects the correlation between border trade and political 
developments. Thus, this incident suggests that a fuller understanding of border trade 
requires a consideration of the politics of the state.  
However, this consideration should not play down the local autonomy of border 
trade. The arrest of the Burmese merchants and the restrictions on trade are nothing 
new. A Thai trader told me that his customers had often been arrested but they were 
released after bribing the Burmese local authorities. At the individual level, they can 
carry on their business by evading the regulating actions of the state through various 
means.  
Moreover, the fact that the import volume has not been affected much by these 




level consumption maintain stable transactions, aside from the fact that import volume 
is too negligible to be affected in comparison to the more voluminous exports.  
 
Understanding the border and border trade 
 
The stories of unauthorized riverbank Burmese merchants, cross-border movement 
of goods and the relations between politics and border trade that this section has dealt 
with demonstrate a fuller picture of the border and border trade. It goes beyond the 
official notion of the border where security issues are dominant, and also beyond the 
conventional notion of border trade where the focuses are on the official bilateral 
transactions between states and on various kinds of statistics. The border in the 
vicinity of Mae Sot contains the paradoxical coexistence of the informal/illegal and 
the formal/legal, which constitutes the socio-political landscape of the area. On the 
one hand, borderlanders root their lives in deep and mobile relationships with the 
border, while on the other hand the state imposes symbolic meanings on the border as 
the marker of state sovereignty by stationing state agencies. The border contains these 
two patterns of engagement. The cognitive map of the border as imagined by the 
borderlanders does not correspond to the physical map that the state draws (Van 
Schendel 2005a: 375-377; 2005b: 55). Thus, it might be expected that there could be 
many kinds of tensions between borderlanders and the state in appropriating the 
border for their own purposes. In fact, the arrests and confiscation of unauthorized 
moving people and goods take place, which could be interpreted as the exercise of 
state power in the border. However, borderlanders are not passive actors as 
conventionally described. As Van Schendel notices (2005b: 56), “Often, state 
practices are ignored by borderlanders who continue to scale their world in ways that 




building structure along the riverbank, their rootedness to the border is strong. They 
transcend the dividing boundary between illegality and legality in pursuing their 
livelihoods.  
This kind of transcendence is observable in the cross-border movement of goods 
too. Banned items constitute sizeable portions in border trade and the ethnic military 
band as a trading partner play a part in the trade. The written and official boundary 
dividing allowed and disallowed items is negotiable and flexible. Moreover, 
smuggling is a normal part of border trade and is integrated into the broader 
circulation system. Smuggling is not necessarily portrayed as insidious, dangerous or 
contaminated as the state has labeled it to be. Even the state at times is inconsistent in 
dealing with smuggling.  
This section has shown that border trade contains political issues beyond mere 
statistics. It reflects the imminent political situations of border politics. The 
understanding of border trade is incomplete without the consideration of border 
politics. Especially in the Thailand-Burma borderland, where ethnic political groups 
are present and lots of conflicts, compliances, and negotiations between the 
government and ethnic groups take place, the consideration of border trade in the 
context of political developments is very crucial.      
 
CONCLUSION: ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION OF OTHERS  
 
This chapter has dealt with the economy of Mae Sot, with a specific focus on the 
town market and border trade. In terms of the central market of the town, it has 
described and analyzed the participation of others. Also, it has touched on the issue of 
legality that is nullified and appropriated by the participants. The participation of 




smuggled items constitute a prominent part of the economyscape of the border. It does 
not connote legally authorized or sanctioned modes of economic participation. 
Though they are unauthorized, their contribution in illegal but regular ways is a base 
for sustaining the economy and the trade of the town.88 The starkest example of the 
contribution of others would be the case of the DKBA. Though it is considered to be 
an insidious group, the DKBA plays some part in making border trade possible.    
In fact, the contributions of others are pervasive in almost every part of the 
economic sector, including factories, shops and even the domestic arenas. But the 
focus of this chapter has been confined to the areas of the market and border trade. 
Industrial areas must not be dismissed. However, the industrial contribution of others 
has somewhat different features in comparison to the market and border trade. The 
development and expansion of the industrial sector in Mae Sot was mainly initiated 
and sponsored by the Thai state. This mass participation of foreign labor takes on 
organized and collective patterns, though not all. Chapter 7 will engage in this issue in 
dealing with the state’s massive involvement in development projects in the town and 
its impact on the town.  
The contribution of others that this chapter has addressed takes on rather 
indigenous patterns with intimate relationships to the living environments. Legal 
enforcement hardly breaks down this kind of indigenous relationships between 
borderlanders and the border as a living place as we have seen in the case of the 
riverbank merchants who embrace the border as the living world. Even the state has 
difficulties disrupting their living environment. This chapter has demonstrated that the 
                                                 
88  I do not necessarily mean that informal or illegal ways of doing economic activities are only 
observable in border areas. Other areas such as big cities accommodate informal or illegal patterns of 
economic activities. However, in those areas informal parts seem to be confined to low-class or less-
privieleged groups of people as a means of survival stragegies while in border areas informal economic 
participation is not confined to certain groups. In border areas, the informal pattern of economic 




indigenous ways in which others have participated even nullifies and transcends the 







MIGRANT SCHOOLS: EMERGENCE OF EDUCATION 
INSTITUTION OF OTHERS 
 
 
This chapter is concerned with migrant schools in Mae Sot. As mentioned, what 
distinguishes Mae Sot from other border towns and the inner parts of Thailand is the 
noticeable presence of migrant institution in the form of migrant schools. There are 
more than thirty migrant schools accommodating over 3,000 migrant students. With a 
sizeable establishment of the migrant education system in Mae Sot and its vicinity, we 
need to consider the roles played by the schools in constituting the lives of those in 
the town.  
In conventional approaches to the study of migration and migrants’ adaptation to 
host countries, education is often analyzed to offer insights as to how minority 
students adapt to the educational environments of the host countries (e.g. Eldering et 
al. 1989; Hien 1999). Studies on how the minority population makes use of education 
as a strategy for upward social mobility in host societies have also drawn much 
attention (e.g. Moldenhawer 2005). What is common in these studies is that they 
revolve around the migrants’ education within the educational settings of host 
countries. Thus, only the education system of the host countries was regarded as a 
field where they pursue education. What makes the case of Mae Sot different from 
these cases is that the migrants in the town have their own educational institutions and 
therefore maintain their own schooling systems. Therefore, they do not necessarily 
need to adapt or conform to the education system of the host society. Migrant 
education as a regular form of education system substantially and explicitly runs 




The emergence of migrant schools also makes differences in social patterns 
between the present and the past. The operation of these schools did not just spark the 
beginning of an education system for the migrants but the creation of a form of 
migrant institution with systematic operations and regular participation. In other 
words, the settling type of others became more regularized and organized as a result 
of the establishment of these schools. What needs to be stressed is that the 
regularization and organization of the migrants’ education and their lives in general 
did not come from the state’s controlling endeavors but were driven by the migrants 
themselves, with the help of international relief organizations. 
Another point observed is that this institution is not based on the legal and formal 
structures laid down by the state. Although informal and illegal, migrant schools 
operate on a persistent and regular basis. Therefore, institution-building does not 
necessarily require the adherence to the laws and regulations laid down by the state. 
In conventional understanding, the establishment of institutions is often linked with 
recognition and authorization from the state or other authorized parties. However, the 
case of migrant schools in Mae Sot demonstrates that institution-building and its 
operation are possible without recourse to state sponsorship. We could call the type of 
migrant schools in Mae Sot “non-state informal institution” which is run by non-
citizens. However, the operation of migrant schools had become so prevalent to the 
extent that the state needed to recognize them as a formal institution. Hence, we see 
the transition of an informal migrant educational institution to a formal one. 
This chapter would first show the overall features of migrant schools. Here, the 
basic operation of the schools would be mentioned. Second, it will deal with their 




shall deal with the state’s recent engagement with migrant schools. Here, I will show 
the changing status of migrant education in Mae Sot.  
 
GENERAL FEATURES OF MIGRANT SCHOOLS 
 
There are several contributing factors to the establishment of migrant schools. First, 
political activists had played a great role. After moving to Mae Sot in the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s, they expanded their scope of activities beyond democratic 
movement in order to accommodate the welfare of Burmese migrants. Here, although 
Dr. Cynthia was not considered a political leader, her role was pivotal in creating 
migrant schools and the migrant clinic. After establishing the Mae Tao Clinic in the 
late 1980s, she turned her attention to educational issues for migrant children in the 
early 1990s. Thus, an adjunct migrant school was established near the Clinic. Since 
then, she has been directly or indirectly involved in setting up other migrant schools 
in the town. She played a big role in organizing the BMWEC which was the umbrella 
organization of migrant schools. Her high personal profile became a symbol of human 
rights at the border and attracted international attention for the protection of the 
welfare of the Burmese migrants in Mae Sot.  
Second, migrants’ lives became related to the emergence of the schools. Burmese 
migrants found it relatively easy to bring their children with them. In other countries, 
whether or not they are given legal status, it would be very difficult for low-skilled 
migrant workers to bring their children not only because the host countries do not 
allow it, but also because they cannot afford the overall welfare of their children in 
foreign countries. For example, in Singapore, most low-skilled foreign workers are 




South Korea where there are a lot of unauthorized migrants, it is very hard to see 
family-units. In contrast, this is possible in Mae Sot mainly because of the 
geographical proximity between their hometowns and Mae Sot, easy border-crossing 
and relatively low cost of living. This family unit migration contributed to the 
engendering of the migration compounds all over Mae Sot. To maintain family life-
styles, they need a house even if it is a make-shift one. Eventually, these houses 
became clustered in certain places, resembling a village. Migrant-living based on 
family-unit settlement and migrant compounds laid favorable conditions for the 
establishment of migrant schools. As I have mentioned earlier, these migrant schools 
played other roles such as administering and uniting migrants beyond educational 
matters.  
Third, without financial assistance and participation from international 
organizations or individuals, these schools would not have been sustainable. Even 
though the Burmese activists initiated these educational endeavors, it was foreign 
contribution that sustained the schools’ operation through the provision of salary for 
teachers, food for students and building of proper infrastructure. Therefore, few 
migrant schools could stand on their own feet without foreign aid. In some cases, the 
creation of migrant schools was exploited just to extract financial assistance from 
innocent foreigners. I observed during my stay that proposals for the setting up of 
local NGOs and small-scale migrant schools were becoming more popular among 
migrant leaders and refugees partly for the purpose of material extraction from foreign 
partners. Assuming that their own income is either limited or absent, these external 
financial sources would comprise a significant part of their sustenance. 
Last, the part played by Thai locals in the operation of these schools should not be 




practical aid is much lower compared to international parties, their part is very critical 
in matters such as providing or renting out land and buildings for schools. For 
example, some migrant schools are accommodated within local mosques, whereas a 
Thai Karen rented out his land to a Karen migrant school. Recently, Thai relief 





There are over 30 migrant schools with about 3,000 to 5,000 students enrolled. The 
difficulty in attaining accurate figures stems from various factors. The town has 
witnessed a trend of the frequent establishment of new migrant schools and with 
many foreign givers coming forward to help on an individual basis, this has led to the 
growth of many small-scale migrant schools and to the difficulty in grasping exact 
figures on the number of the migrant schools. Also, student enrolment is difficult to 
estimate as their attendance is inconsistent, depending on the level of organization and 
operation of the schools. During my stay in Mae Sot, according to the chairperson of 
the BMWEC, the number of schools and students was around 30 and 3,000 
respectively. However, according to a recent report (Guinard 2006: 7), in Mae Sot and 
its vicinity in the 2005-2006 academic year, about 5,000 children were enrolled in 43 
Burmese migrant schools with 350 teachers.   
However, despite the growing number of schools, a significant number of migrant 
children are still not enrolled in the education system. A research conducted by the 
National Health Education Committee (NHEC),89 which is an umbrella organization 
                                                 




for the health and education of ethnic nationalities and democratic group, revealed 
that in 2004, out of 10,000 migrant children, only fifty-five percent were attending 
migrant schools while five percent were studying in Thai schools.90 Forty percent of 
these children were estimated to not attend any school (Guinard 2006: 7).  
A list of schools which are relatively well recognized and for which information is 
available is shown below.  
 
Table 5.1 Migrant Schools in Mae Sot and Its Vicinity 
 









Hsa Thoo Lei 237 16 6th BMWEC Hua Fai 
BMSOH 74 5 8th OSI Mae Pa 
Paramee 150 7 5th RENGO Mae Pa 
Phi Chit 70 2 6th Canadian 
group 
Hua Fai 
NLD LA Youth 
School 




Near Wat Don 
Chai 
Moe Ma Kha 46 4 Child 
care 
Dr. Cynthia Islam Community
Life Page 170 3 6th APEBC, 
SAW 
Thung Thong 
Ahnar Ga Pan Khin 64 3 2nd No partner 
yet 
Ansua 
Nursery and Day 
Care 
102 7 Child 
care 
Dr. Cynthia Mae Tao Clinic 
                                                 
90 During my fieldwork, I found out that some migrants sent their children to Thai schools. They told 
me that their children could receive Thai education up to the level of sixth standard (prathom level). 
Close connections with the top management of certain Thai schools such as the headmaster enabled 
their children to receive this education. Recently the Thai government offered more favorable 
opportunities for migrant children, regardless their legal status to attend Thai schools up to high school 
level (mathayom level). I will discuss this issue later.  
91 Acronyms for school names are as follows: BMSOH (Boarding Middle School for Orphans and 
Helpless Youths); CDC (Children’s Development Center); and KYLMTC (Karen Youth Leadership and 
Management Training Center). 
92 Acronyms for the partners not mentioned earlier, including some information about their activities, 
are as follows: OSI (Open Society Institute, the USA); RENGO (Japanese Trade Union Confederation); 
APEBC (Assistance Program For  Education Of  Burmese Children, Burmese exiles and Korean 
activists in Korea organized this group with its base in Korea); SAW (Social Action for Women, it is a 
Burmese NGO with a base in Mae Sot); CCFD (Catholic Committee against Hunger and for 




Hleh Bee 80 4 4th BMWEC Buakhun 
CDC  203 18 6th Dr. Cynthia Thasayluat 
KYLMTC 30 6 Further 
study 
program 
KYO, CCFD Mae Pa 
Elpis Center 150 5 4th Filipino 
group  
Mae Pa 
Say Ta Nar 73 2 4th APEBC Thung 
Boy Ka La 43 2 1st BMWEC Pu Ter 
Nyaung Kyo Met 58 2 6th NCCM Near Asian High 
Way 
Our School 124 6 6th NCCM Islam Community
Pyo Kin School 104 5 6th NCCM Near UNHCR 
48 Km 128 3 6th NCCM Phop Phra 
New Blood School 189 3 6th NCCM Nong Bua 
St. Peter 82 3 6th NCCM Phop Phra 
Dek Kam Phra 65 5 6th NCCM Wangtakhian 
(Source: Fieldwork and NCCM documents) 
 
Among these schools, schools such as Hsa Thoo Lei, Nursery and Day Care, CDC 
and KYLMTC are under Karen leadership. The chairperson of the BMWEC, who is a 
Karen, is in charge of Hsa Thoo Lei. Therefore, the school plays a central role in 
organizing the inter-school activities and external financial assistance is channeled 
through this school, witnessing frequent appearances of foreign individuals and 
groups. The facilities in these Karen schools such as the building, learning materials 
and computer equipment are relatively better than others.  
Though migrant schools receive external financial assistance, the school 
management is usually under the leadership of the Burmese. As I have mentioned, we 
can find former political activists running many of these schools. Notably, NLD LA 
as an organization runs its own school with the help from overseas branches of the 
NLD from Japan and Korea. Former members of ABSDF’s are also active in running 
the schools. Life Page school was established and run by members of the group.  
Religious groups are also notably involved in running these schools. Filipino 




directly in charge of school management unlike other schools where they are managed 
is under the Burmese leadership. Recently the NCCM, a domestic Catholic NGO, has 
also become more active. Apart from operating several schools, it also seeks to bridge 
the migrants and the state authorities in educational matters. 
Schools such as Moe Ma Kha, Our School and Pyo Kin School are accommodated 
within Muslim migrant compounds and mosques. However, the source of finance for 
these schools had been from Dr. Cynthia, a devout Christian, and the NCCM. I heard 
complaints from a priest of the NCCM on a Muslim school which he felt had focused 
too much on teaching Muslim subjects such as Arabic and Quran rather than general 





On average, a teacher takes care of twenty students. Though the ratio of the 
teachers to the students appears reasonable, teachers of smaller schools are required to 
handle many other duties such as administrative management, transportation and food 
arrangement for students and fund raising. Teachers are involved in the affairs of 
migrant living compounds as “leaders.” Thus, matters such as sanitation and health 
require their attention too. 
The backgrounds of teachers vary. Some of them are former political activists; 
some came from Burma through the recommendation of friends and relatives; and 
some of them are from refugee camps. 
The wages of teachers ranges from 1,000 and 3,000 baht, depending on the schools 




and 3,000 baht, while teachers in small-scale and Muslim schools get around 1,000 
baht. Moreover, the wage is irregular especially for teachers in small-sized or less-
recognized schools. A teacher of a migrant school located within a mosque told me 
during my visit to the school in January 2005 that for several months a Japanese 
organization had supported teachers’ wages, paying out 1,100 baht per teacher. 
However, it had ceased its contributions in January 2005. Sometimes his friends gave 
500 to 600 baht and some gave him food. However, he still has to spend a portion of 
his wage for his students’ transportation. At that time, he was desperate to find other 
sources of funding. This led him to ask the chairperson of the BMWEC for financial 
support. The wage of the teachers in Hsa Thoo Lei School came from the Federation 
Trade Union of Burma (FTUB) which is an organization of exiled Burmese laborers 
based in Bangkok. It seemed that the acquisition of financial assistance is dependent 
on the diplomatic ability of each school, with the more capable schools receiving 
more funding. During my stay, the BMWEC, despite the status of the representing 
organization among the migrant schools, did not seem to guarantee the financial 
stability of individual schools though it began to coordinate with external agencies in 
financial and administrative affairs in an attempt to distribute resources evenly to all 
migrant schools.    
 
Educational levels and curriculum 
 
In the Burmese national education system, students receive eleven years of 




comprises KG93 to Grade Four; middle school education consists of Grades Five to 
Eight; and high school education comprises Grades Nine to Ten.  
The migrant schools in Mae Sot also follow this structure. However, as seen in 
Table 5.1, none of the migrant schools are offering up to the Tenth Grade. Only 
BMSOH School provides certain levels of higher education. Most schools offer below 
the Sixth standard. Thus, migrant students who want to further their education need to 
transfer to BMSOH School in Mae Pa. Nonetheless, some schools have attempted to 
offer higher levels of education. For example, Hsa Thoo Lei School was preparing to 
offer up to the Seventh grade starting from the year 2006.  
According to BMSOH School94 which has a total of seventy four students, there 
are only twenty four students enrolled in Grades Five to Eight. This means less than 
twenty students are enrolled in high school education out of the 3,000 to 5,000 
migrant students. A reason for this could be the inadequacy of existing school 
facilities and manpower. However, this reason might not be very convincing as there 
were many qualified teachers holding university degrees capable of teaching at the 
high school levels. Another reason could be that the number of students aged between 
15 to 18 years, the age of which they are expected to be receiving high school 
education, is small. However, one often encounters many of these teenagers in and 
around Mae Sot who are not attending high school education. Therefore, the most 
probable reason would be that most teenagers of this age group are working in the 
town and its vicinity to support their families instead of pursuing higher education. 
Especially since the fulfillment of education in migrant schools does not guarantee 
                                                 
93  Usually the KG (kindergarten) grade offers one-year education. However, those who are not 
qualified to enter the first grade need to study two years at the KG level.  




entry into the Thai job market, these teenagers lose interest in continuing their 
education in migrant schools.95  
KYLMTC offers the post-Tenth grade program under the management of the KYO. 
Most students are Karen from refugee camps and Karen State. They seek 
accommodation in the school. The subjects taught in the school include English, 
social studies, history, computer literacy and management studies. Some foreigners 
also take up teaching position voluntarily for three months.  
In terms of textbooks, standard Burmese school textbooks are used in teaching. 
However, Karen migrant schools and Elpis Center use refugee camp textbooks 
whereas Muslim migrant schools incorporate Arabic and religious subjects into their 
curriculum.  
Subjects offered in BMSOH are as follows: at the primary school level, basic 
English literature, basic arithmetic, Burmese, geography and basic general science; 
and at middle and high school level, English language and basic grammar, arithmetic, 
algebra, geometry, Burmese, geography, and general science. In the case of Hsa Thoo 
Lei School, which is a Karen school, the subjects taught include Burmese, Karen, 
Thai, English, mathematics, geography, sciences, history, and sewing and handicraft. 
Inclusion of Karen language is conspicuous in the composition of the curriculum, 
compared to non-Karen migrant schools. The school refers to Burmese national 
textbooks at the primary levels, whereas at the secondary level, it makes use of 
refugee camp textbooks. Life Page School offers English, Burmese, Thai, 
mathematics, social sciences, history, sciences, Burmese culture, art and music, and 
                                                 
95 It is different from the case of a refugee camp, Mae La Camp. In the Camp, out of the total 
population of around 43,000, the number of primary level students is 6,272; that of middle school 
students 2,739; and that of high school students 3,333 as of January 2005. This figure was acquired 
from the MOI office of the Camp. The enrollment of high school students is very reasonable. It is 
related to relatively stable living conditions of refugee camps, geographical confinement and the high 




sewing and handicraft. In the case of a Muslim school, Arabic, Thai, English, 
Burmese, mathematics, and sciences are offered. Most migrant schools teach Thai 
though inconsistent and irregular. Thai Karen or local Thai individuals take the job of 
teaching Thai.   
In terms of time table, the case of CDC is illustrated in Table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2 Time Table of CDC Migrant School 
 
KG 
Mon English English Science Burmese Break Thai Math Math 
Tue English English Science Burmese Break Thai Math Math 
Wed English English Science Burmese Break Thai Math Math 
Thu English Burmese Science Burmese Break Thai Thai Math 
Fri English Burmese Science Burmese Break special activities 
 
First Standard 
Mon Burmese Burmese Science Thai Break Math English English 
Tue Burmese Burmese Science Thai Break Math English English 
Wed Burmese Math Science Thai Break Math English English 
Thu Burmese Math Science Thai Break Math English English 
Fri Burmese Math Science Thai Break special activities 
 
Second Standard 
Mon Burmese Burmese English Math Break English Thai Science 
Tue Burmese Burmese English Math Break English Thai Science 
Wed Burmese Thai English Math Break Math Thai Science 
Thu Burmese English English Math Break Math Thai Science 
Fri Burmese English Science Math Break special activities 
 
Third Standard 
Mon Math Math Thai G/H* Break English G/H Burmese
Tue Math Math Thai English Break G/H Science Burmese
Wed Math Science Thai G/H Break Burmese English Thai 
Thu Math Science Thai English Break G/H Burmese Burmese
Fri Math Science English English Break special activities 
* Geography/History 
Fourth Standard 
Mon English English Thai Burmese Break Science Math G/H 
Tue English Thai Math Burmese Break Science Math G/H 
Wed English English Science Burmese Break Thai Burmese G/H 
Thu English English Science Math Break Math Thai G/H 






Mon Science Math Math Math Break English English Thai 
Tue Science Math Burmese G/H Break English English Thai 
Wed Science Math Burmese G/H Break English Computer Thai 
Thu Science Math Burmese G/H Break English Computer Thai 
Fri Science Burmese Math G/H Break special activities 
 
Sixth Standard 
Mon Thai English English Science Break Math Burmese Math 
Tue Thai English G/H Science Break Math Burmese Math 
Wed Thai English G/H Science Break Computer Burmese Math 
Thu Thai English G/H Science Break Computer Burmese Math 
Fri English G/H G/H Science Break special activities 
 
The example of CDC should not be taken as a model for all migrant schools 
because it is relatively well-organized. Under the management of Dr. Cynthia and the 
Mae Tao Clinic, it has adequate teachers and enjoys relatively good facilities and 
funding. Other schools, especially the small-sized ones, face difficulties in keeping to 
the time schedule due to a shortage of teachers and study rooms for each level. Thus, 
it was commonly observed that a teacher run a combined class comprising students of 
different levels.  
Nevertheless, the time schedule of CDC provides a general picture of subjects 
taught in migrant schools. As we can see from the table above, students from all 
levels have thirty two hours of learning per week, except for special activities on 
Friday afternoon. Students study for four hours before lunch, after which they 
continue for three hours.  
With regard to the composition of the curriculum, Burmese, English, Thai, Math 
and Science are taught in all grades, whereas from the third grade onwards Geography 
and History are added. Computer lessons are offered from the fifth grade. It is noted 
that from kindergarten level, migrant children are required to learn three languages – 
Burmese, Thai and English – which could be a burden for them. English takes up the 




Table 5.3 Teaching Hours of Subjects (Weekly) 
 











English 8 8 8 6 8 6 6 50 
Burmese 7 7 7 5 5 4 4 39 
Thai 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 32 
Math 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 48 
Science 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 33 
G/H    5 4 4 5 18 
Computer      2 2 4 
 
The emphasis on language education, especially in English is not specific to CDC. 
Other migrant schools also place more emphasis on English than the other subjects. 
This is not unrelated to the specific conditions of the town where international 
organizations and foreign individuals constitute a notable position in educational 
matters as well as in many other sectors of society such as labor and democratic 
activities. According to one of my informants and from my observation, Mae Sot 
might rank first in terms of the number of foreigners per capita in Thailand. Migrant 
leaders encounter them on a daily basis. Here, English draws much attention due to 
the migrants’ attempts to communicate effectively with the foreigners. Many migrant 
activists and refugee leaders revealed that the most conspicuous difference observed 
since they came to Mae Sot was the cooperation with international parties and 
individuals. This was reflected in the running of the migrant schools where teaching 
English was the top priority. For some people, the bias towards teaching English over 
other subjects was deplorable. My informant in an Educational NGO lamented, 
“English is not a medium of education any more but became all about education 
here.” However, many Burmese leaders regarded it as a means for survival in a 
vulnerable situation and in keeping pace with the changing world. In some measure, it 




Inclusion of Thai in the curriculum also demonstrates this coping strategy in Thai 
society.  
 
Joint school activities 
 
The migrant schools have a series of joint activities under the leadership of the 
BMWEC. These efforts to unite and cooperate make migrant education a regularized 
institution. Otherwise, each school would have been run on a separate individual 
learning program without a confederated organizational base. As a consequence, they 
would not have formed the collective institution of migrant education.  
To offer some examples, school health meetings where the education for sanitation 
and health are planned and organized. Monthly training sessions for migrant teachers 
where teachers are taught about subject contents, teaching skills and classroom 
organization methods are also held with the help of NGO trainers. Besides, there are 
several seminars and conferences on children’s rights and the development of 
children’s leadership. To some degree, these activities are influenced by Western 
education which places a lot of emphasis on the “rights” of children and women.96  
Migrant students have many opportunities to participate in sporting activities and 
cultural performances. During the Christmas season, I observed many schools which 
held these inter-school activities. Children enjoyed participating in competitions such 
as volleyball and football matches against other schools. Supporters from each school 
cheered for the participants at the playgrounds. After the events, prizes were awarded 
to the participants.  
                                                 
96 This case is also observed in refugee education. While Western education NGOs and the UNHCR 
had discouraged the Karen’s ways of disciplining children by some forceful means, other people 
involved in the education scene complained that this had caused disobedience amongst students and 




Interestingly enough, traditional Burmese or Karen performances are practiced and 
performed in migrant schools. During those festivals, groups of migrant students 
would sing and perform traditional dances for the audience. I often saw Karen migrant 
students performing “bamboo dances”97 during those occasions.   
These joint activities lead us to rethink the constitution of the migrants’ social lives 
beyond educational matters. Unlike the conventional image of oppression, they have 











                                                 
97 In bamboo dance, sets of eight to twelve long bamboo poles are placed in a grid. Participants kneel 
on the ground and bang the poles together in tune to the music, while dancers step in and out of the 








































There are other challenges in running the migrant schools apart from financial 
issues. The first is related to the language medium used in teaching. In most of the 
migrant schools, the Burmese language is used as the medium of communication. 
However, some ethnic students do not have knowledge of the Burmese language. 
Schools that accommodate a sizeable number of Karen students face this problem. For 
example, Karen students constitute half of all students in Hsa Thoo Lei School. 
Among the Karen students, the Pwo Karen are more numerous than the Sgaw Karen. 
Teachers in the school would have to use both languages in their classes because the 
Karen students do not understand Burmese while the Burmese and Arakan students do 




by the Karen students since the Pwo Karen students do not speak the language of 
Sgaw Karen. Therefore, the learning atmosphere in classrooms is scattered and 
desultory.  
The second challenge is that the role of migrant parents in their children’s 
education has been negligible at the moment. This is mainly because they cannot 
afford to pay much attention to their children’s education in the face of solving basic 
everyday needs. Thus, they do not have suitable positions in the migrant schools, 
compared to other stake holders. The inconsistent attendance of students in schools is 
partly due to the limited role played by parents. However, there have been some 
efforts in mobilizing these parents. For example, when I visited Elpis Center, the 
school had gathered a hundred parents in an attempt to set up a parents’ association 
with which the school administrators cooperate in the educational matters of the 
school.  
The third challenge is to care for the orphans as well as abandoned children whose 
parents were jailed or had gone to work in Bangkok. In these cases, schools had taken 
in these students but this requires a lot of sacrifice and causes financial burden to the 
schools.  
The fourth is threats from the Thai authorities. As ordinary migrants face 
difficulties, these migrant schools have had to deal with them. It was observed that 
some migrant schools had paid money for the villages for security costs. Hsa Thoo 
Lei School paid 3,000 baht to the Thai police every month. Otherwise, according to a 






Other educational programs 
 
Apart from migrant schools, there are other educational programs in Mae Sot 
which run independently from the BMWEC. Most of them are English-learning 
programs run by organizations with the help of foreign volunteers. For example, the 
ABSDF, the KYO, and the ALP operate English-learning classes where foreign 
English speakers, mostly Westerners, conduct classes on a daily basis. Several of my 
Burmese informants took up these classes for free. Upon completion of these courses, 
they also took up other programs. Mae Sot has many of these English programs 
operated by organizations and various individuals. No other towns or cities in 
Thailand would provide similar opportunities to learn English  
The reasons for the proliferation of English-learning programs would be the similar 
to the motivation behind the importance placed on the language in migrant schools. 
However, the difference lies in the foreign individuals’ participation that appears 
more visible. They do not necessarily come from organizations which engage in 
running English programs. Instead, these individuals include tourists, students, 
political activists, philanthropists, medical interns, researchers and so on. Even short-
term visitors are often requested by Burmese organizations and individuals to 
contribute something beneficial towards the migrants. This usually takes the form of 
teaching English. Vulnerable people know how to appropriate the presence of 
foreigners.   
Some English programs operate on a regular and systematic basis. In this case, 
external organizations run the programs. For example, the Burma Volunteer Program 
(BVP) runs some English programs in the ABSDF98 and mobilizes voluntary teachers.  
                                                 




In addition to English classes, there are other forms of education for migrants such 
as leadership training, media training and human rights education. These programs are 
organized by political and ethnic groups like the KYO and the KWO. For example, 
the Karen Information Center (KIC) which publishes newspapers on issues 
concerning refugees and migrants had received training on editing and layout of 
newspapers from an American NGO.99 
In the case of the Peace Education Center (PEC) established by a Japanese 
volunteer in May 2002, refugees take programs which focus on critical thinking as 
well as English. The PEC has more connections with the refugee camps rather than 
the migrants in Mae Sot since its objective is to produce community leaders among 
refugees. Those who have completed the post-Tenth programs such as Further Study 
Program (FSP) within the refugee camps would then pursue further education in Mae 
Sot.  
The Mae Tao Clinic plays a big role in health education beyond treating migrant 
patients. The various trainings provided by the Clinic include Nursing Care Training, 
Laboratory Training, Health Assessment Training, Maternal & Child Health Care 
Training, Traditional Birth Attendant Training, Basic Eye Care Training and 
Computer Training. Most importantly the Clinic trains medics from various ethnic 
groups under the name of “the Border Internship Program.” I met people from some 
Shan and Kachin organizations. They were selected from these ethnic organizations to 
take training courses here for a varied period of time (usually from six months to two 
years). After completing the training, they are supposed to go back to their original 
organizations to practice their skills. Dr. Cynthia pays a keen attention to building a 
                                                 




healthcare network where various ethnic groups are jointly involved, including the 
Thai authorities and international partners.100         
As I have shown, a lot of learning opportunities exist in Mae Sot without much 
intervention from state authorities. The operation of these educational programs also 
makes the Burmese presence at Mae Sot rather unique when compared to other border 
towns such as Mae Sai where these kinds of migrant education system do not exist. 
Migrant education, whether in the form of regular schooling or otherwise, 
demonstrates that the Burmese lives in Mae Sot have been relatively holistic, despite 
the lack of legal sponsorship as compared to other Burmese border towns.   
 
CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER PARTNERS: REFUGEE CAMPS, 
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS, THAI LOCALS AND MIGRANT 
SCHOOLS 
 
In the previous section, I have argued that the migrant schools do not stand on their 
own feet. However, it should not be interpreted that these schools lack a strong 
foundation. In some measure, it could be true that the absence of independent 
financial sources could prevent the endurance of these schools. However, the 
participation of external partners is already a main component behind the 
establishment of these migrant schools. In other words, from the beginning, these 
connections have been an important, inherent part of running the schools. Thus, the 
relevant question is not the question of whether the migrants are able to run the 
schools on their own accord but the question of how and to what degree these schools 
are run through their relationships with other actors.  
                                                 
100 Interview with Dr. Cynthia (8 December 2004). For details on the trainings, see the website of the 




This section delves into these relationships or connections more deeply. Though 
some aspects of these relationships have been dealt with in the previous section, this 
section offers more detail with respect to three aspects of these relationships: 
connections with refugee camps, international partners, and Thai locals.   
 
Connections with refugee camps 
 
Geographical proximity and human flow between Mae Sot and the refugee camps 
create opportunities for exchange of information regarding education. If we compare 
the two education systems, the refugee education system runs more systematic and 
organized manner than the migrant education system. This is because the Karen have 
a long history of running their own education system and even in the refugee camps 
their education system has been maintained although it accommodates the 
participation of external partners. Also, the geographical conditions of the refugee 
camps have made it more conducive for the mobilization of educational matters and 
administrative affairs. Furthermore, the role of the KED as the representative of Karen 
education in Karen State and the refugee camps has been pervasive. Almost every 
school in Karen refugee camps follows the regulations and directions of the KED.  
In contrast, migrant education has not seen such outcomes although it seeks to 
emulate the refugee education system. Therefore, many of the migrant schools are 
indebted to the refugee camps for textbooks, teachers, and teachers’ training system. 
This tendency is more prominent in Karen migrant schools. It is not because they lack 
capacity as compared to other migrant schools but because they have more intimate 
relationships with refugee camps which stems from ethnic affinity. The KED is 
involved in Karen migrant schools such as Hsa Thoo Lei School. These schools adopt 




Teachers from refugee camps also teach in some of these schools. For example, in 
Hsa Thoo Lei School, five out of sixteen teachers are from refugee camps – four from 
Mae La Camp and one from Um Phiem Mai Camp. These teachers received their 
training from the Bible school and the Teacher Preparation Course (TPC) which is a 
training course for teachers at refugee camps. Many other migrant schools have 
benefited from these refugee camps. In another example, a teacher from Um Phiem 
Mai Camp had taken up a teaching position at Life Page School.  
Student exchange programs are also organized between schools in Mae Sot and the 
refugee camps. As we have seen in the cases of the PEC and the KYLMTC, many 
refugee students had come to Mae Sot for educational visits. They stayed in Mae Sot 
during school term and return to their camps during the holidays. In turn, migrant 
students with good academic performance have taken the opportunity to pursue higher 
level education at the FSP and bible schools at the refugee camps. Here, many Karen 
students are more exposed to educational opportunities either in Mae Sot or in the 
camps due to their ethnic affinity. 
The migrant schools had also allowed the children of refugee families to continue 
their education whenever the latter had to reside temporarily in Mae Sot. I met a 
family from Um Phiem Mai Camp who stayed in Mae Sot while they were 
undergoing a resettlement program sponsored by the UNHCR. For several months, 
their children attended Hsa Thoo Lei School without any entry restrictions.  
The involvement of NGOs in migrant schools also strengthens the connectivity 
between the educational institutions of the refugees and migrants. Among ten NGOs 
involved in refugee education, three NGOs – the WE/C, the IRC, and the JRS – have 
begun similar activities for migrant education. Other NGOs such as ZOA, for example, 




to enter the arena of migrant education due to the lack of mandate and their scope of 
work which was exclusive to the interest of refugee education.101 Among the three 
NGOs named above, the IRC and the JRS have offered financial support to the 
migrant schools, whereas the WE/C employs method used by the TPC in training 
teachers in migrant schools.102 However, the involvement of the NGOs in the migrant 
educational institutions appears less systematic or organized due to their recent 
participation. In the case of the WE/C, they began their involvement in 2003 and a 
section for migrant education started in 2005. However, the team has yet to figure out 
the direction for migrant education. Besides, they encountered some practical 
problems such as the use of Burmese language in daily activities which the NGO 
workers who are mostly Karen are not familiar with, and the need to deal with so 
many parties such as migrant school leaders and Thai authorities, compared to the 
case of refugee education where they only deal with the KRC and the KED.  
Nevertheless, educational NGOs in general agree that since refugee education has 
been efficiently run by the KED with the relatively well-organized support of the 
NGOs, they now need to turn to migrant education and engage themselves with 
expanding and developing their present roles and scope of activities. Thus, these 
NGOs decided to engage in school management and special education for the 
migrants. Donors of refugee education have also begun supporting migrant education 
(Kraft 2004). It is expected that the know-how of refugee education would be more 
applicable in the migrant education sector in the future with more stable funding 
sources.   
 
                                                 
101The ranges of NGO activities are heavily influenced by donors’ interest as well as the regulations of 
the Thai authorities. 




Connections with international partners 
 
The supporting partners in Table 5.1 do not constitute all external participants in 
the migrant schools. The aforementioned partners are just main supporters for the 
schools listed. Besides, there are many other organizations and individuals directly or 
indirectly involved in migrant education. Individual schools have other partners in 
several sectors besides these main participants. Taking the example of Hsa Thoo Lei 
School, the wage of teachers is from the FTUB, food is provided by the Burma 
Refugee Care Program (BRCP),103 and computers and student stationeries are offered 
by individual foreigners and organizations. Children’s Dream was carrying out 
several infrastructure-building projects in Mae Sot such as a learning center complex 
in Hsa Thoo Lei School and the extension of the learning center in CDC.104  
Besides material support, many international parties and individuals participate in 
other areas such as in administrative matters and training of teachers, as we have seen 
in the case of education NGOs such as the WE/C.  
The fact that the BMWEC is indicated as a supporting partner in Table 5.1 should 
not be misunderstood that it is an original funding source. As mentioned before, it 
channels outside funding from various organizations to individual schools.  Though 
the BMWEC itself nominally represents the migrant schools, its finances are heavily 
dependent on external partners. The OSI is a main supporter for the BMWEC among 
many other organizations.  
The styles of engagement by external partners in migrant education and migrant 
affairs in general do not appear to be as coordinated and systematic as those of the 
activities of refugee education partners. In the case of refugee education affairs, as 
                                                 
103 Previously the TBBC had provided food for some migrant students including Hsa Thoo Lei School. 
However, it was terminated due to instructions by the Thai authorities that TBBC food assistance 
should be only for the refugees and not for migrants (Interview with a TBBC worker).  




mentioned in Chapter 3, various relief organizations are divided into sub-sectors such 
as health, education and food under the umbrella committee, the CCSDPT, for which 
monthly meetings for information sharing and coordinating refugee-related activities 
are held, although it does not prohibit individual participation of non-members and 
individuals in relief affairs. In contrast, migrant education has not achieved this level 
of cooperation and coordination. It would be in part because, in comparison to refugee 
camps, organizations engaging in migrant education do not have entry restrictions into 
Mae Sot. It is relatively easier for them to begin relief activities without state 
recognition and endorsement. The openness of the town to external partners was made 
conducive for the migrants to make individual connections with them. This 
continuous in-flow of external actors has made it difficult to coordinate activities that 
take place in the town.  
However, this does not necessarily undermine the cooperation between migrant 
schools. It was observed that migrant education leaders felt it was crucial for them to 
be more cooperative and united, despite the uncoordinated activities of other partners. 
Thus, the role of the BMWEC was expected to expand in order to cope with these 
issues. But it must not be interpreted that external partners are staying away from the 
running of the schools. Rather, it suggests that stakeholders of the migrant schools are 
required to work out their respective roles within the system set up by the migrants.  
All in all, whether it is partly cooperative or scattered, partly concerted or 
dispersed, the connections with international partners play an important role in 







Relationships with Thai locals 
 
As we have seen earlier, Thai locals did play some part for the migrant schools. 
For example, the compound of Hsa Thoo Lei School was rented out by a Thai Karen, 
a Thai mosque accommodated a migrant school, and a local Thai church cooperated 
with Elpis Center. Directly or indirectly, many Thai locals had made contributions to 
the migrant schools.  
However, not all Thai locals have positive attitudes towards the migrant schools. 
They might complain that the presence of the migrant schools disturbs their daily 
lives by causing noise pollution and possibly spreading diseases. Although these 
concerns were frequently expressed, very few Thais were disturbed by these migrant 
schools. As mentioned, most migrant schools are located within migrant living 
compounds which seldom accommodate Thai locals, and therefore cases of 
interference with the locals rarely take place. 
Although it might seem that the migrant schools have benefited more from Thai 
locals, in reality, the Thai locals could also take advantage of migrant schools. Some 
examples are shown below.  
Hsa Thoo Lei School sends their English and Burmese language teachers to a 
nearby Thai school in Hua Fai village where they teach everyday. It is done in 
exchange for friendly relationships between the two schools. For the Thai school, it is 
greatly beneficial to learn Burmese and English from native Burmese and English 
speakers. The headmaster of Hsa Thoo Lei School seemed to think that sending its 
teachers to the Thai schools was an essential obligation in return for the allowance of 
utilizing land space for the school.  
There were some cases where migrant schools were open to Thai students. A 




studied Burmese and English. In exchange for allowing the school’s operations within 
the mosque, it was required to take care of some Thai students.  
Individual Burmese were also involved in teaching Thai students. A former 
ABDSF member who used to be involved in Life Page School had taught a group of 
Thai students English every night while he was waiting to be resettled in the USA.  
For individual Thais, the subjects of the Burmese and English languages are of 
high priority. Particularly, many Thai locals wanted to acquire the Burmese language 
to facilitate business dealings with the Burmese and to do investment in Burma in the 
long term. The migrant schools, for them, are learning places to meet their practical 
needs.105 These examples clearly demonstrate that the presence of migrant schools 
benefit not just the Burmese migrants but the Thai locals as well.  
Migrant students have also taken part in the activities of the Thai schools. For 
example, three students of BLSO School were the winners of a province-wide poetry 
reading and public speaking competition where students read and spoke in Thai, 
competing against other students in their age group. They were commended for 
winning a competition against native Thai speakers (BLSO 2006: 1). Though we have 
not seen extensive inter-school interactions between migrant schools and Thai schools 
yet, the former is getting more recognition from the latter as partners with more 





                                                 
105 To the same extent, refugee camp education is also employed by nearby Thai locals as additional 
but important learning opportunities for the subjects of Karen, Burmese and English. Some Thai Karen 
send their children to learn authentic Karen from refugee camps. Even Thai Karen adults who are 




THE STATE AND THE MIGRANT SCHOOLS 
 
In some measure, migrant schools face the threat of having to cease their 
operations due to state intervention. Migrant education would be in serious jeopardy 
without buildings to accommodate migrant students. However, in general, migrant 
schools in Mae Sot managed to continue their existence even without being accorded 
legal status. The most probable reason could be related to the nature of migrant 
education which is formed as institution. Collective efforts from various partners were 
prominent in setting up of migrant education. This made it possible for them to have a 
relatively stronger leverage over the state, in comparison to individual migrants’ 
dealing with the state. In addition, local state agencies’ inertia, as mentioned in 
Chapter 3, whether they are considered deviant or locally adapted, inadvertently 
became conducive to the continued existence of the schools.  
The state used to be indifferent to the management of education in migrant schools. 
The state’s involvement was only limited to checking the legality of the schools 
without engaging in curriculum, training for teachers, and school management. Thus, 
the schools, despite threats from the state in terms of legal establishment of the 
buildings, maintained their own system at least at the management level without much 
interference from the state.  
However, the state has recently begun to actively engage in migrant education. 
This signals the increasing prominence of the migrant schools. Here, the state’s stance 
towards education for migrants appears to be positive in the sense that it attempts to 
incorporate migrant schools into the educational system of the state. Accordingly, 
interactions between the stake holders of migrant schools and the state have been 




educational sector. The following section covers recent state policies towards migrant 
education and deals with the stake holders’ reactions to these policies.  
  
State’s recent policies 
 
There have been cases where non-Thai students are accepted in Thai schools. From 
a humanitarian stance, it was initiated as one of development projects for the 
underdeveloped hill tribes. The Thai monarchy, especially Princess Maha Chakri 
Sirindhorn, championed the education project. Through these opportunities, those 
children coming from hill-tribes, though they do not possess Thai citizenship, could 
pursue education in Thai schools, regardless of whether they are the descendents of 
long-existing indigenous people or recent migrants. In these areas, the majority of 
students in Thai schools are from ethnic group backgrounds. In fact, when I went to 
Thai Karen villages near Phop Phra and Umphang, I witnessed cases whereby Karen 
students without citizenships were attending Thai schools.   
However, these cases were very rare in Mae Sot. It is partly because ordinary 
migrant students would have difficulties adapting to the Thai education system due to 
language barriers, cultural differences and financial inability. However, it is mainly 
because they could pursue their own education in the settings of migrant schools 
without going to Thai schools. 
Apart from the education for non-Thais in the Thai education systems, another 
education sector that sees the involvement of the state in relation to others or aliens 
has been refugee education. But as we have seen in the case of refugee education, the 




themselves shoulder their education matters by themselves with the help from some 
outside organizations.  
In terms of migrant education, as I have mentioned earlier, the state’s roles used to 
be negligible too. But stepping into the year 2000, this stance changed mainly due to 
the monarchy’s new initiatives. Refugee education and illegal migrant education came 
under the name of “Education for All”106 where regardless of legal status all children 
should be offered basic education without barriers up to a certain level.107  
It prompted the Ministry of Education (MOE) to come up with education policies 
for migrants and refugees. In January 2005, the MOE launched a survey on migrant 
education. MOE officials began to visit Mae Sot and organized meetings with migrant 
education leaders and education NGOs such as the WE/C and ZOA. Despite the 
absence of legality in their form of residence in Mae Sot, migrant leaders were invited 
or requested to join the meetings. While I was in Mae Sot, one of the meetings was 
held on 20 April 2005 in a Thai school named Phathraawithaya School which was run 
by a Catholic church that had relationships with the NCCM. Sixty three people 
gathered in this meeting including representatives from migrant schools, NGOs, and 
the Thai government. The NCCM’s representative presented on migrant schools in 
Mae Sot and its adjacent areas, mentioning the problems and suggestions in relation to 
migrant education before the government officials. The government officials also 
explained about the future plan of the government for migrant children.108 
                                                 
106 In fact, the movement of Education for All is a global movement initiated and coordinated by the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). It was launched in 1990. 
Alongside the UNESCO, other UN agencies and a number of INGOs are participating in this 
movement. For details on it, refer to the website (http://www.unesco.org/education/efa/index.shtml).  
107 Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhon’s approaches to the education of refugees and illegal migrant 
people can be observed from her keynote speech at a symposium organized by the Refugee Education 
Trust set up by Sadako Ogata, former head of the UNHCR. The speech was reported in the Bangkok 
Post (4 October 2002). 




In the end, the MOE came up with policies for migrant education and on 5 July 
2005 a Cabinet Resolution on the education of undocumented and non-Thai persons 
was passed. 109  The resolution offers all migrant children, regardless of legality, 
education from kindergarten up to high school. In doing this, the resolution mentions 
that the budget for the education of non-Thai students will be at the same rate as Thai 
students. The students will be issued with a 13 digit personal identity number and will 
be given travel passes in order to allow them to travel to school (Asian Migrant 
Centre 2005: 122).  
The main focus of the resolution is migrant education rather than refugee education. 
Regarding the latter, it mentions that the MOE will organize the appropriate education 
for refugee children, which will teach the Thai language and provide some 
occupational training by supplying teaching materials and organizing activities.110 
After the resolution, the MOE continued to come up with subsequent policies and 
plans. Thus, migrant schools will be registered as “Learning Centers” which could be 
run by anyone and would only require qualified teachers for Thai subjects. In 
consultation with migrant schools and international organizations, the MOE has laid 
down some guidelines on the steps that migrant schools need to follow under the 
directions or jurisdiction of the MOE (Guinard 2006:8; Irrawaddy 11 May 2006). It 
demonstrates that migrant schools are to be integrated into the Thai education system.  
Various government agencies are involved in implementing these policies. For 
example, the National Security Council is supposed to develop a strategy to deal with 
                                                 
109 See Appendix C. 
110 The Bangkok Post 9 April 2005. However, even before this decision, the MOI has been running a 
Thai program in Mae La Camp and many refugee schools have been teaching Thai. It is only now that 
the government seems to formalize it within the regular curriculum. In terms of vocational training 
where ZOA is involved, the government indeed has restricted actual practices inside refugee camps and 
the NGOs has kept asking for the setting up substantial work places such as vehicle repair shops within 
the refugee camps to allow the refugees to practice their skills (Interview with the vocational training 




the status and rights of migrant children in order to grant them status and basic rights; 
the MOI is supposed to conduct a survey to find out the number of undocumented and 
non-Thai students; and the Ministry of Defence is supposed to survey the educational 
institutes in areas which have restricted safety and security issues in order to 
coordinate with the MOE to allow children in these areas access to appropriate 
educational facilities (Asian Migrant Centre 2005: 123). 
 
Reactions of migrant education leaders and NGOs 
 
In the beginning, many of the migrant education leaders and NGOs were skeptical 
of the real intentions behind the government’s involvement in migrant and refugee 
education. Some Mae Sot NGOs had interpreted the move of the government, through 
the MOE, as an attempt to take over the stakes of the education and place it under 
their total control, thus displacing the migrants and the NGOs from their current 
positions. Indeed, in the CCSDPT monthly meetings of May and June of 2005, I 
observed, educational NGOs highlighted this as a major issue. Some of them felt that 
the reason behind the move towards equipping the Burmese refugees and migrants 
with the ability to speak the Thai language was aimed at making use of them as a 
source of cheap labor. Others pointed out that in the long term, the expanded 
influence of the Thai government in the lives of the Burmese could give the 
government greater leverage, even in issues like repatriation of refugees and migrants. 
Furthermore, what seemed like an attempt to nurture the migrants and refugees as 
potential collaborators in education could be a strategy of the government to 




NGOs decided to keep the government at bay in so far as education is concerned and 
wanted the teaching of Thai subjects to remain informal.  
Those Burmese involved in migrant education were not sure of the government’s 
new and different stances at the outset too. The positive attitude of the government in 
the field of education was considered as contradictory given that the government 
continued to enforce legality in the town by the use of physical threats. Fear factors 
did not disappear in the minds of them even in the face of the seemingly benevolent 
attitudes of the government. 
Even though the acceptance of Burmese migrant students in the Thai schools is 
favorable to the migrants, there are expected obstacles in the implementation stage. 
Above all, the cost for a migrant student to attend a Thai school is very high for a 
migrant family. It is said that nearly 3,000 baht is needed for one child per year to 
finance his schools expenses including the uniforms, transportation, books and food 
he or she needs. This financial burden would discourage migrant families to send their 
children to Thai schools. Another barrier is related to cultural and philosophical issues. 
Migrant students would rarely be taught Burmese subjects within the curriculum 
settings of Thai schools. This raises the question of the true meaning of education 
which had been highly associated with their sense of identity. The fear of arrest and 
deportation, as mentioned above, is also an undermining factor. Their lack of legal 
status and confidence prevents them from sending their children to Thai schools 
(Guinard 2006: 6-7). 
The government showed some level of inconsistency in dealing with migrant 
schools, which in turn made the sincerity of the government doubtful. For example, in 
February and March 2006, five schools in Phop Phra District were ordered by the 




operating without the permission of local authorities and that they could pose threats 
like the religious schools in southern Thailand (Irrawaddy 21 March 2006; FTUB 
Report 24 February 2006). 
There was a counter-action from Thai advocates against this government action. 
For instance, on 19 March 2006, Thai Senator Jon Ungpakorn led a delegation to Mae 
Sot to meet several NGOs and assess the conditions of the migrants. He then 
promised to draw up a proposal to improve the living conditions of the migrant 
workers. Speaking on the closure of the migrant schools, he mentioned that citing 
national security as the reason for closing the schools was unreasonable. He also 
stated that the educational opportunities for migrant workers and their children needed 
to be expanded (Irrawaddy 20 March 2006; 21 March 2006).   
Despite these inconsistencies, the government is generally inclusive towards 
migrant education. Thus the government maintains interactions with leaders of 
Burmese migrant schools. More than a hundred people, including high-level Thai 
authorities from Tak Province’s education department, police and immigration 
officials and migrant education leaders attended a comprehensive meeting held in 
Mae Sot on 9 May 2006. Here Thai officials primarily addressed the issue of 
registering migrant schools by urging that Thai subject be included in the schools’ 
curriculum to improve communication and promote better understanding of Thai 
culture between the Thais and the migrants (Irrawaddy 11 May 2006).   
Migrant school administrators who have been involved in a series of meetings with 
Thai official saw these developments as an improvement and were optimistic about 
the move. Paw Ray, chairperson of the BMWEC and headmaster of Hsa Thoo Lei 
School, mentioned in the Irrawaddy (11 May 2006), “In the past, we always worried 




less now.” She also said in the report, “I have sat in five or six meetings with them 
[Thai officials] and I think things are improving.” In the face of this development, 
administrators from the Burmese schools intended to register their schools as 
Learning Centers in accordance with the guidelines laid by the MOE. Due to the lack 
of funds, it is difficult for them to follow all the suggestions put forward by the Thai 
officials such as hiring qualified Thai teachers. However, the overall sentiment 
towards the Thai officials and migrant education policies is positive. 
 
CONCLUSION: INSTITUTION AND INTEGRATION 
 
This chapter has provided general information on migrant schools, their 
connections or relationships with other partners and the state’s involvement in 
migrant education. It has shown that the difference between Mae Sot and the other 
towns is the integral role played by the schools in constituting the lives of the 
migrants. Despite their instability and the illegal form of their residence, they had 
succeeded in establishing migrant schools. This was made possible through the 
connections with other partners from refugee camps, the international NGOs and the 
Thai locals. These relationships were an intrinsic part in the formation and operation 
of migrant schools. This chapter has also revealed that recently the state had begun to 
engage in migrant education with seemingly positive approaches and that the migrant 
education leaders, despite harboring a certain level of uncertainty, had reacted to those 
changes optimistically. 
The key notions of institution and integration are prevalent in this chapter. These 
notions explain the state of migrant schools and their lives in general over the years. It 




institution in the form of migrant schools. This institution-building demonstrates 
collectivity, totality, positivity and determination of their lives even in the precarious 
situation. This goes beyond the conventional perception of these migrants as passive 
actors who lack capability to build up an institution. The establishment of the migrant 
schools is a remarkable development in the constitution of their lives. Though illegal 
or unauthorized, at least they can educate their children in the Burmese educational 
settings.  
Recent attempts of integrating migrant education into the Thai education system 
signals state recognition and acknowledgement. It could be interpreted as an attempt 
by the state to control and regulate them in its own ways. However, in the sense that 
the state maintains the presence of migrant schools rather than destroy them, at least 
we can have a sense of the humanitarian postures of the state. Even if dubious, it 
shows to us that the notions of controlling and regulating do not precisely explain the 
current development of the state’s engagement in migrant education. Rather, we could 
use the notion of integration, as the migrant schools are gaining legitimate and legal 
recognition by the state as an appropriate educational institution. This is done without 
losing their basic functions of educating migrant children. Here we can see the 









CULTURE AND OTHERS 
 
 
I have mentioned in Chapter 2 that in the history of Mae Sot, the cultural affinity 
between various immigrant groups, with most of them sharing the Buddhist belief 
system, provided an amicable condition for inter-ethnic relationships. This trait is still 
evident in modern day Mae Sot. The Burmese and the Thai locals share similar 
religious and cultural activities as seen in the celebration of various festivals. This 
cultural similarity, I suggest, is conducive for them to adapt with relative ease to the 
environments of the town even in the absence of suitable legal status: otherwise, they 
would face much more hardships in overcoming the tremendous task to culturally 
adapt to alien cultural circumstances. 
On top of this cultural closeness, the recent multitude of migration brought in 
massive Burmese cultural elements together with population movement which offered 
more expanded and favorable conditions for them to live their everyday lives 
normally by consuming their own cultural products. They also managed to maintain 
relationships with peers with joining together in those their own cultural spheres. The 
pervasiveness and thickness of those Burmese cultural substances strengthened the 
relative holistic constitution of their lives even in precarious situations. Also, their 
rampant presence over the areas of Mae Sot made the town appear to be more 
Burmese rather than Thai.  
However, it does not necessarily mean that the Burmese are not influenced by 
other cultures. They are widely exposed to different styles of Thai culture and 
international cultures. They are influenced by Thai culture through many sources such 




international cultures. Of course, recent development of advanced technology such as 
the Internet and mobile phones impacts on the cultural aspect of their lives. Cultural 
exchanges as well as cultural maintenance take place in their everyday lives in the 
town. 
In that sense, the notion of cultural plurality that Furnivall described in the colonial 
societies of Indonesia and Burma cannot give adequate explanations for the state of 
cultural lives of the Burmese in Mae Sot. What dramatically challenges this notion is 
the fever of festivals in the town. Festivals nullify the boundaries between “us” and 
“them”, between illegal and legal, by inviting or accommodating even illegal migrants 
into the exhilarating festival moods. Here we even see the amicability between the 
state and them. It also leads us to rethink the associations made between 
rituals/festivals and the state by interpreting rituals/ festivals as the symbolic 
expression of the state power. In the context of traditional Southeast Asian kingdoms, 
according to Geertz (1980) and Reid (1988: 174-182), the rulers of those kingdoms 
demonstrated symbolic power by staging spectacular performances. The theatre states 
employed rituals and festivals to mould “images of power and authority, the popular 
mentalities of subordination” (Thompson 1974: 387, cited in Migdal 1998: 33). 
Migdal applies the traditional roles of rituals into accounting for why modern states 
stay intact. He (ibid) mentions that “the ability of any state to remain intact rests on its 
ability to produce that cultural frame, linking itself to the sacred through a set of 
rituals, and to transform itself so as to fit into a cultural frame that has resonance 
among key elements of the population.” To put it simply, rituals are means whereby 
the states assert their validity over the population.  
Though this suggestion is informative in understanding political functions and 




Thus, in this approach, rituals and festivals are considered as something to be 
manipulated for achieving state purposes. However, the case of festivals celebrated in 
Mae Sot is not necessarily associated with the maneuvering practices of the state. It 
would be a self-contradictory for the state to deploy festivals to achieve legitimate 
recognition from illegal people. Festivals in Mae Sot cast aside the engagement of the 
state and more or less take the form of autonomous celebrations. In the absence of the 
state’s involvement, favorable conditions for transcending boundaries between the 
legal and the illegal are explicitly formed during periods of festivities.  
This chapter seeks to understand how culture is associated with Burmese lives in 
Mae Sot. In the first place, it deals with how they maintain their own cultural lives by 
consuming Burmese cultural products. Second, it discusses the influences of other 
cultures such as Thai and international cultures in Burmese cultural lives. Last, the 
chapter pays specific attention to festivals. Here I focus on the roles of festivals in 
breaking boundaries between groups of people in Mae Sot.   
 
MAINTAINING BURMESE CULTURE   
 
In Mae Sot, we can find a variety of Burmese cultural elements: almost every 
cultural product can be found. The movement of human bodies accompanies with 
cultural substances with retaining consuming behaviors of them. The concentration of 
Burmese population in the town also brought with it a concentration of Burmese 
cultural things. Resorting to a Burmese diet, wearing longyi, enjoying Burmese 
movies and songs, and so on allow them to live as if they are in Burma. The presence 
of peer groups to spend their pastime makes the individuals feel relatively 




tastes. The collective consumption of cultural stuffs plays a crucial role in building up 




My investigation shows that there are over twenty teashops in the town: among 
them, about ten shops are concentrated in the Phajaroen Market; three of them are 
located near the UNHCR around which a garment factory and dormitories are also 
located; and several of them are placed around the central Mosque. The presence of 
several teashops is also observed in the vicinity of the town, for example, near the 
Mae Tao Clinic and around Moei Market.  
The size of most of the teashops is relatively small, accommodating several tables. 
In terms of the types of tables and chairs, some teashops have low wooden tables and 
tiny stools as typically observed in Burma, whereas other teashops are equipped with 
plastic or metal standing tables and chairs. Some of tables and chairs are placed on the 
road side right in front of the teashops.  
The walls of teashops are decorated with pictures of glamorous Burmese actresses 
with long hair reaching to the waist and also of popular English football clubs. These 
kinds of pictures are already part of the natural environments even in many houses of 
the ordinary Burmese. A television set and a DVD/CD player are equipped inside, 
showing Burmese soap operas and playing Burmese karaoke music all day long.  
The price of tea varies from five baht to six baht: town area teashops sell at the 
latter price whereas shops in remote areas at the former price. Tea has different types 
of taste: for example, cho hseint has a sweet taste; and paw hseint is not overly sweet. 




of breads such as the Indian-style bread called naan, several sorts of curry dishes with 
split-pea dips, even cigarettes and betel. Especially in the morning, naan is served as 
the main item with curry dishes for breakfast.  
In the morning, especially from 7 am to 8 am, is the busiest time of the day. 
Teashops are packed with people eating breakfast. And many are standing on the road 
sides to purchase their naan with tea. The Thais constitute a sizeable part of the 
customers. During the day, many empty seats can be seen although there are some 
jobless Burmese hanging around. But in the late afternoon, it is packed again with 
customers. Every day, the total number of customers visiting a teashop, on average, 
varies from fifty to over one hundred, depending on the popularity of each shop.  
 




Burmese Muslims are the dominant figures in running the teashops. A Muslim man 




seemed to use his connections with Thai Muslims in operating his teashops even in 
the absence of legality. Some teashops are owned by Pwo Karen. Interestingly, among 
these shops, one shop was run by a Pwo Karen who had come out of a refugee camp.   
Most of these shops have about one to five employees assisting in their daily 
running. Some of shops operate with the help of family members and relatives. The 
monthly wages of teashop employees vary from 700 baht to 1,000 baht. Most of them 
are young people. I even encountered an employee whose age was as young as 
thirteen years old.111  
Tea is an integral part of Burmese cultural life (Larkin 2004: 14). Teashops do not 
just brew tea but also brew Burmese cultural identity and social relationships. The 
Burmese habitually kill time there. Once they get into the place, peer groups, the 
aroma of tea, Burmese television programs and songs make them feel at home. For 
the jobless, teashops are the place where they can release their loneliness, uncertainty 
and anxiety by hanging around teashops with small pocket money. Comedy dramas 
on television make the environment of the teashops more pleasant with the sounds of 
boisterous laughter. I was urged by my key informant who was fond of this delightful 
environment to go to the teashops as often as possible. In the end, it became my 
delighted habit too to be saturated in the atmosphere. 
Sometimes teashops turned into extremely patriotic places. It happened whenever 
the Burmese national football team played in a competition. Teashops were crowded 
with Burmese migrants cheering for their team by clapping and shouting passionately. 
When goals were scored, the decibel level of shouting hit the zenith with spreading 
                                                 
111 From my conversation with him, I came to know that his father was staying in Burma while his 
mother was in Mae Sot but she could not afford to bring him up. Several months later, he revealed that 
his mother had a new husband in Mae Sot. When I returned to Mae Sot in December 2005, he had 




over the air of Mae Sot. This clamorous noise appeared to proclaim that teashops are 
no other but Burmese territories.   
One day in December 2003, while I was staying in Siam Hotel, a thunderous sound 
awoke me from my napping. I went out of my room and searched for the place that 
generated the sound. I headed for the corner of a corridor on the second floor of the 
guesthouse and peeped at a few groups of Burmese in the teashops clustered in the 
Phajaroen Market, through the crevices of the wall. And I saw a group of Burmese 
watching a match of the Burmese national football team. Their patriotic passion was 
prevailing right in the central place of the “Thai” town.  
Teashops are places for exchanging information among the Burmese. As I have 
mentioned, the jobless were looking for job opportunities from their peers in teashops. 
Some of them shared the recent football results of English football matches, gossips 
about Burmese actors and actresses, their opinions on international affairs and so on. 
As for me, sitting there was like part of my data-collection activities beyond passing 
my time by meeting up with my Burmese friends.  
Interestingly enough, teashops are also places for spreading or generating political 
rumors. Rumors on the political affairs of Burma arrived in Mae Sot from across the 
border and spread among the Burmese in Mae Sot with teashops playing a significant 
role in the circulation. For some time after the fall of Khin Nyunt, the town witnessed 
an abrupt increase in the spread of various political rumors. During that time, I often 
saw my Karen informant come to me, excited with such rumors.  
Teashops are not always pleasant spaces for the Burmese. Teashops as political 
spaces are insidious and dubious since it is assumed that the Burmese intelligent 




government political groups and ethnic groups in the town is said to lend much 




Betel is an essential everyday diet for many Burmese. The betel-chewing habit is 
retained in Mae Sot. Small-scale shops which are situated around the living 
compounds of Burmese migrants, without exception, sell the item. Even individual 
peddlers carry and sell it to passers-by. During my stay in Mae Sot, there were several 
small-scale construction sites (mostly house-building) in front of my house. I often 
saw child peddlers stop by these places, shouting, “Here is betel,” and Burmese 
construction workers put the brakes on their work to buy it from them. It is no doubt 
that this essential habit left the heavy presence of red spots on the surface of the roads 
all over the town. In response to it, Thai authorities put up a notice warning, “No 
betel,” indicating the fine in case of breaking the regulation. But I did not hear any 














                                                 
112 In fact, the events which led to the 1988 uprising were triggered by a brawl in a teashop. In Burma, 
teashops are regarded by the government as potential breeding grounds for anti-government activities 








It is mentioned that the Burmese can watch Burmese television programs. It is 
because a local cable television station by the name of Star Cable transmits the 
television programs. The cable station relays two Burmese channels – Myawaddy TV 
and MRTV.113 Though their news programs seemed to be the propaganda shows of 
the Burmese government and the overall quality of the programs are not advanced in 
comparison to Thai channels, they are not short in terms of catering to the cultural 
                                                 
113 It should not be misunderstood that Myawaddy TV channel is a local television channel based in 
Myawaddy. Launched in 1995 run by the army, Myawaddy TV channel is based in Rangoon. The state-
run MRTV began broadcasting in June 1980 (Irrawaddy 1 August 2001). In Burma there are more 
channels such as MRTV 4 (Myanmar Media Box) which contains non-formal educational programs 
and other entertainment programs and Channel 5 which broadcasts movies in different international 





needs of the Burmese by providing them with Burmese soap operas, songs, and comic 
shows.  
The Burmese enjoy various kinds of sports. I saw some groups of the Burmese 
play football and volleyball in the late afternoon almost every day in the field near the 
UNHCR. Factory workers having finished their daily duties would come out and join 
them with many other people surrounding the field while others would be watching 
the game from teashops opposite the field. Likewise, all over town, many lots and 
corners in the late afternoon were filled with the Burmese taking part in sports. 
During the rainy season when the fields of the town became muddy, they play sepak 
tacraw and footsal in concrete fields.  
Near the cluster of teashops in the Phajaroen Market, there was a big snooker place. 
My key Karen informant and I happened to get into the place after drinking a cup of 
tea in a teashop. I was surprised to see that all the people filling the spacious place 
which was equipped with over ten snooker tables were Burmese, especially 
youngsters. They threw suspicious gazes at us. It was as if I was not allowed to be in 
their territory. We played a couple of games which cost us twenty baht per game, 
despite having their continued dubious attention. Though uncomfortable, that 
experience evidently tells me how even amusement places in the central place like 
that were dominated by others.   
The Burmese can acquire many kinds of books in Burmese, including newspapers 
and magazines from Burmese bookshops as we can infer from the story of a bookshop 
owner in Chapter 4. Burmese clerks often spend their unoccupied time in reading 
books. I often observed female clerks of Hong Long Mini Mart put Burmese novels 




Some of the labor and political organizations in Mae Sot produce their own 
newspapers. For example, the BLSO publish and distribute their newspaper named 
thin yebaw which aims at informing Burmese workers about Thailand's alien migrant 
workers policy; sharing news from and about the factories operating in Mae Sot; and 
creating awareness of the current economic and political situation in Burma.114 The 
KIC also publishes monthly journals focusing on issues related to the Karen and 
Burmese political affairs as well as paying due attention to international affairs. It is 
assumed that these publications not only provide the Burmese with a pastime but also 
awaken and breed a political consciousness among the Burmese in Mae Sot.   
  
Ethnic culture: living as Karen in the town 
 
The presence of the Karen in Mae Sot is more conspicuous than other ethnic 
groups though their exact number cannot be estimated. However, it does not 
necessarily mean that the Karen have a separate form of life when compared to the 
other ethnic Burmese. Rather, ordinary Karen people stay together with the other 
Burmese in migrant living compounds. However, the relatively heavy presence of 
Karen political and social organizations in Mae Sot makes the existence of the Karen 
distinct by promoting Karen cultural activities in Mae Sot. Though seasonal, ordinary 
Karen people are likely to have more opportunities to manifest their ethnic identity by 
taking part in these events.  
                                                 




I witnessed the ceremony of the Karen New Year Day on 10 January 2005.115 It 
was held in a Buddhist monastery in Mae Pa near Mae Sot. It was estimated that 
about five hundred people attended the ceremony. Most of them wore Karen 
traditional costumes. Karen political leaders took their seats on a big stage during the 
ceremony. Behind the stage, a big screen which took the form of the Karen flag was 
hung. The master of the ceremony spoke three languages – Pwo Karen, Sgaw Karen, 
and Burmese – one after another in introducing the programs of the ceremony. 
However, all the speeches by the other participants who spoke in a particular language 
were not translated into the other two: for instance, some speeches in Sgaw Karen 
were translated only into Burmese but not into Pwo Karen whereas some speeches 
were just conducted in Pwo Karen without translation into any of the other languages. 
It seemed that the official language was not compromised and decided yet among the 
Karen in Mae Sot. This leads to a confusion in people’s intra-ethnic understanding, 
which is contrasted to the case of Karen refugee camps where Sgaw Karen is treated 
as the official and national medium.  
Let me introduce some notable programs of the ceremony. The first speaker was 
the chairman of the KYO. He delivered his speech in Pwo Karen though he is Sgaw 
Karen. His speech suggested that the Karen must preserve their tradition, culture, 
language, clothing, and other customs. Following that, all participants sang together 
the Karen New Year Song in Pwo Karen. After that, another speaker talked about the 
history of the Karen with a specific focus on the suffering inflicted by the Burmese 
military. This speech was translated into Burmese by a different speaker. Someone 
read the speech of the President of the KNU, Ba Thin on his behalf. The speech was 
                                                 
115 According to the Karen calendar, it was the 2744th New Year. It is said that the Karen migrated to the 
land now known as Burma in B.C 739. See a Karen website (http://www.karen.org). The first 
celebration of the Karen New Year was conducted in 1939. See Saw Kapi’s writing titled “The Karens’ 
New Year: A Brief Introduction (http://www.karen.org/New Year/2005/intro.htm, downloaded on 22 




written in Sgaw Karen and its contents were as follows: to have their own political 
destiny is very important in maintaining Karen culture; the Karen must be “one” in 
spirit and mind; the Karen must respect other nationalities for mutual benefit; and the 
KNU will continue to make an effort to resolve the political problems in the interest 
of the Karen standing by the basic principles of the revolutionary movement and in 
firm cooperation with fellow ethnic and democratic forces. 116 In addition, several 
other speakers either delivered their own speeches or read the speeches of important 
political leaders on their behalf.  
The main organizer of this ceremony was the Karen Super Society (KSS). This 
group was said to contact Thai authorities to acquire permission to hold the event. The 
group was also believed to engage in security affairs in cooperation with other Karen 
political groups and Thai authorities.  
I felt that most of the participants were united in this ceremony with active 
engaging in singing Karen songs and listening to the speeches despite the perplexing 
languages. Moreover, the Karen costumes strengthened their unity. It was inferred 
that religious factions were meaningless from the fact that Christian leaders delivered 
their speeches in the Buddhist monastery. In the name of the Karen, all sub-ethnic and 
religious factions were resolved.  
According to my informant, the Pwo Karen constituted the majority among all 
those in attendance. This proportion paralleled the sub-ethnic composition of the 
Karen in Mae Sot. I happened to meet a Pwo Karen youth who was working in a gas 
station where I frequently went to fill fuel for my motorbike. Through our many 
contacts, I came to be very familiar with him. From my understanding, he was not a 
very strict Karen but rather a Burmese who was just engaging in his everyday work in 
                                                 
116 I obtained the English translation from the website  




Mae Sot for a livelihood, escaping his previous hard work in agricultural fields back 
in his hometown. Therefore, it was a big surprise for me to see him in this kind of the 
event that seemingly has nothing to do with his livelihood pursuits. Moreover, he 
spent thirty baht, the entire amount of his daily wage (he earned 1,000 baht a month), 
in hiring the motorbike taxi service from his workplace even to the extent of 
sacrificing his off day. Unlike in the gas station, he came to the place fully dressed up. 
He applied hair gel, put on a necklace and wore a neat Karen costume. On that day, he 
was not short of being a true Karen. He had acquired the information on this event 
from an invitation letter distributed by the organizers and from his friends several 
weeks before. It seemed that he had been excitedly anticipating taking part in this 
ceremony, which was evident in his fashion style and the sacrifice of money and 
holiday. His case shows how innocent ordinary ethnic individuals manifest his or her 
ethnic identity through participating in ethnic festivals and ceremonies.  
After the ceremony, various cultural activities and sports events continued till the 
evening and many people remained there to take part in these programs. The Karen 
New Year ceremony was not just held in this place. Other Karen groups also had their 
own forms of celebration apart from joining the ceremony in the monastery. Members 
of a Karen church in Mae Sot came back to the church after the ceremony and 
gathered again to have a special service for the New Year. A leader reminded the 
members of the history of the Karen and the importance of preserving the Karen 
tradition. Hsa Thoo Lei School designated the day as a holiday and prepared various 
cultural events for the students one of which was conducted by a children-drama 
performing group from Belgium. The Mae Tao Clinic also celebrated the New Year in 




in the events. This festival played a role in linking the Karen of various places in Mae 
Sot.  
 
Plate 6.3 Karen New Year Ceremony  
 
 





There was another big Karen festival called “Wrist Tying” ceremony on 30 August 
2004. On that day, I missed the event due to my voluntary work for a Korean medical 
team treating villagers of a Thai Karen village named Mae Ja Lao. But the Irrawaddy 
(30 August 2004) reported that more than 5,000 people, mostly Karen migrants, 
attended the ceremony held at a Burmese temple in the vicinity of Mae Sot. The 
ceremony is rooted in ancestral beliefs in spirits and is known as “lah ku kee su” in 
Karen. It occurs at the time of the August full moon, when the Karen tie white threads 
around the wrists to ward off illness and to maintain the Karen culture. The report 
went on to mention that some leaders of the KNU attended the event and urged the 
Karen to be united. Also it was reported that a trio of popular Pwo Karen singers 
conducted a cultural performance and a singing competition with an award 
presentation also held. Karen noodles and other snacks were served to the attendants. 
It has been celebrated in Mae Sot since 1992. The year 2005 also saw similar a 
number of participants on 19 August (Irrawaddy 19 August 2005). It is assumed, like 
the Karen New Year ceremony, that the Karen in Mae Sot take this opportunity to 
collectively show their identity as Karen even in foreign soil and in the absence of 
proper legal status.   
Besides those festivals, various Karen organizations in Mae Sot which were 
dominated by the Christian Karen engaged in cultural activities in a strong and close 
connection to the Karen church, Hsa Thoo Lei School, and the Mae Tao Clinic. These 
three places are central for cultural activities. One evening in November 2004, I 
attended a big music concert in the Karen church organized by three Karen youth 
groups – the KSNG, the KUSG, and the KYO for the purposes of mobilizing Karen 
youths and raising funds for the Karen Unity Seminar. The number of people 




concert, entitled “Together to Victory, Happily Singing,” had various genres of music 
performed, including Karen traditional songs. Performers were very skillful in singing, 
dancing and playing instruments. Audiences were actively reacting to their 
performances with boisterous shouting and clapping. The church seemed to turn into a 
professional concert hall. A drama was presented too. The theme of the drama was 
about returning to the homeland, with the Karen scattered all over the world hand in 
hand in the end, overcoming hardships. Many of the scenes in the drama contained the 
brutal treatments of Burmese soldiers towards the Karen. Elsewhere, notably in 
refugee camps, I have often seen this kind of scenes as depicted in the Karen dramas. 
Not only through testimonies but through these sorts of cultural performances, the 
cruel image of the Burmese soldiers and government was perpetuated in the minds of 
the Karen.  
During the Christmas season, the church witnessed the massive gathering of Karen 
in Mae sot with lots of cultural activities going on. Groups of people indulged in 
sports activities such as sepak takraw, football, volleyball, tug of war, and running 
races. Participant groups included the KSNG, the KYLMTC, and various NGOs, 
which saw a sizeable presence of Karen workers, such as the SMRU (Shoklo Malaria 
Research Unit), the TBBC, and the ZOA.117 Also, various cultural performances such 
as the performing of Karen traditional songs and dances and not to forget Christian 
dramas and songs were performed by migrant and Sunday school children.  
Hsa Thoo Lei School also celebrated Christmas day with lots of cultural activities. 
The School invited students of other migrant schools to participate in sports and 
cultural activities. They played football and sepak takraw on a competitive basis. In 
                                                 
117 The Karen are preferred in the employment of NGOs since they need those who can speak Karen, 
Burmese as well as English in the relief activities for refugees. Since having legal status is necessary to 
hold positions in the NGOs, the Burmese Karen who have the Thai citizenship card are eligible to work 




the evening there was a music concert and prize presentations. Though many migrant 
schools were not associated with Christianity, they were active participants in the 
events prepared by Hsa Thoo Lei School.  
Besides, the Karen church and Hsa Thoo Lei School were served as places for 
holding ceremonies such as weddings and funerals among the Karen. The church was 
more frequently used for these rituals since it has a spacious building to accommodate 
them. Especially those related to the KNU or other Karen organizations held those 
ceremonies in the Church or the School. Therefore, it often saw many important 
Karen political figures present in those places. Among several rituals, a funeral drew 
my special attention. The deceased was the father–in-law of the Hsa Too Lei School’s 
headmaster who used to work with the KNU. The funeral service was held in Hsa Too 
Lei School and was attended by many Karen including political figures. After the 
ceremony, I was wondering, “Where did the dead body go for burial?” After a while, I 
got to know that it would be Mae La Camp. Several cars were heading for the Camp 
in array, carrying the deceased and the groups of the Karen. For the Karen in Mae Sot, 
refugee camps are final destinations in the absence of their homelands. Rather, it 
might be said that refugee camps are already their hometown in the actual world. This 
is due to their imagined hometown not coming true yet, and therefore there are no 
other places to be buried in. Refugee camps are now the places where one’s journey 
starts and ends.  
As we have seen so far, the Karen have their own ways of cultural life. Again, it 
does not necessarily mean that the Karen have a totally separate form of life compared 
to the other Burmese. Most of the ordinary Karen constitute their lives in mixing with 
the other Burmese in Mae Sot. However, at least there are cultural events that often 




Christian Karen and those Karen involved in the activities of Karen organizations is 
more conspicuous as seen above.  
 
NEW CULTURAL EXPERIENCES 
 
The suggestion that the Burmese maintain their own cultural life does not 
necessarily mean that they are not exposed to and influenced by other cultures. It is 
inevitable for the Burmese to experience them in their everyday lives. There are 
various sources whereby they engage in this cultural experience: interactions with 
others, daily exposure to the media such as television, self-aspiration of tasting other 
cultures, etc are influential factors.  
Other cultures do not just include Thai culture. International cultures are also 
prominent components of other cultures since international actors, for example, 
foreign relief agencies, have a noticeable presence in the town and thus their cultural 
influence is not negligible.  
 
Thai cultural influence 
 
Television is an important source for the Burmese to be exposed to Thai culture on 
a daily base. Though they do not exactly understand Thai television programs, they 
are impressed by the more attractive presentation. Some people said that compared to 
Thai television programs, Burmese television programs were very boring due to slow 
dancing styles and due to less-attractive actresses and actors in their fashion style. 
Even people in the border area of the Burmese side who had access to Thai television 




immigration in the Myawaddy immigration office, I saw officials of the office watch a 
Thai television channel, I TV. The Burmese from Kyaikdon town in Dooplaya 
District of Karen State told me that they liked to watch Thai television programs when 
I met them in a remote border village, called Buangkhler, in Umphang District.  
By watching Thai television programs, some Burmese learned about the popular 
culture of Thailand such as songs. I often saw some of my Burmese informants 
mumbling Thai songs. In general, they acknowledged the advancement of Thai pop 
culture. Thus, at the level of young Burmese, it led them to imitate the ways television 
programs are presented, for instance, in the sector of fashion.  
Bazaars opened near the District Office and the Municipal Office whenever 
festivals were held. Bazaars were popular for Burmese migrants to buy cloths at cheap 
prices. From there, they could buy jeans at as low as around a hundred baht. They 
spent the money that they had saved in these night markets. Some of my informants 
preferred to wear those jeans that they bought in bazaars, taking off longyi.   
Thai food also attracts the taste of the Burmese. There is a famous food stall 
serving chicken rice and pork rice, located several blocks away from the entrance of 
the Burmese market. It sells a dish of roasted and steamed chicken rice at twenty baht. 
It also sells a dish of pork cooked in a similar fashion at the same price. The food stall 
was dominated by Burmese customers. Since the price of the dishes was relatively 
cheap, ordinary Burmese could afford to make a visit to the place. I also frequently 
stopped by the place with my Karen informant who was fond of the food. Besides, 
such food as minced pork rice with basil leaves is a popular food among the Burmese 
in the town. 
The Burmese were influenced by modern styles of consumption. Let me introduce 




April, the place where I often went to avoid the scorching heat was Jumpin, a fast 
food restaurant equipped with air conditioners, providing a range of MacDonald’s-
like hamburgers, pizzas and other kinds of fast food in a fancily-decorated 
environment. It was located in the central area of town, a few blocks away from Siam 
Hotel and jewelry markets. The price of a set of hamburger ranged from sixty baht to 
a hundred baht, which exceeds the price level of normal food in Mae Sot. Whenever I 
entered the place, I saw it packed with Burmese who were also cooling themselves 
down while consuming fast food and cold beverages. It was assumed that the place 
was not for general Burmese migrants as their wage level could not give them such a 
prestigious opportunity. Many of the Burmese customers in Jumpin seemed to be 
merchants, especially jewelry traders or regular visitors from Myawaddy. The place 
was very popular for those merchants not only because it is very convenient due to its 
close proximity to the jewelry markets but also because it attracted them by providing 
food consumption of a modern style which they might not easily find in Myawaddy 
and other areas in Burma. It seemed that Jumpin played the role of a training place for 
contemporary consumption styles of food for them.  
Though it was mentioned that it was out of the reach of ordinary Burmese migrants 
living from hands to mouths, Jumpin was not totally separate from them. Through 
contacts with foreigners and others with financial ability, they had chances to be there, 
though little. I myself also brought my informant to the place sometimes to escape the 
heat and to show some kind of gratitude in return for his help in my research. Like his 
case, Burmese migrants individually had opportunities to get into the place through 
personal relationships with others.  
Hong Long Mini Mart takes a central position in terms of shopping not only for 




the entrance of the Burmese market. All day long the nearby area of the Mart 
witnessed the constant movement of people. The Mart is not a “mini” mart but a big 
mart which might represent a modern-style shopping place in Mae Sot. Though there 
are several big marts in Mae Sot, Hong Long Mini Mart is the most popular shopping 
place due to its central location and the number of selling items and its fanciful and 
attractive display styles. The Burmese, especially people from Myawaddy, preferred 
to shop here. This place provides various kinds of necessities which the shops of 
Myawaddy do not serve. For the ordinary Burmese living in Mae Sot, the Mart is like 
an amusement place. Though they cannot afford to buy whatever they want, they are 
amazed at the variety of choices and the style of presentation of selling items.  
Information and communication technologies give some groups of Burmese new 
cultural experiences. Though the usage of those technologies should not be 
exaggerated, they are not totally left behind in being influenced by advanced 
technologies. For example, it was often seen that the main customers of the Internet 
cafes were the Burmese. For those who engaged in political activities in Mae Sot, 
these Internet cafes were used to communicate with others in the outside world and 
for the dissemination of information.  
 
Influence of international cultures 
 
The noticeable presence of foreign individuals and organizations has brought into 
foreign cultural elements in Mae Sot. Particularly, the area between the Police Traffic 
Box and Wat Chumphonsiri along the Intharakhiri Road witnesses their relatively 
heavy presence. Western style restaurants such as “Bai Fern” and “Crocodile Tear” 
cater to foreigners, especially Westerners. Many foreigners, including the NGO 




Their discussion ranges from their everyday affairs to serious concerns such as 
refugee-related issues and the political situation in Burma. This is discussed over nice 
food and in comfortable environments. Besides, several guesthouses and Internet 
cafes accommodating tourists make the landscape of that area very different from 
other areas of the town.  
In general, many Burmese are beyond the influence of Western culture. However, 
those Burmese, especially those Karen who were working with foreigners in NGOs, 
are under the influence. As they spend time with foreigners not only in their working 
places but also in cultural spheres, they are naturally or advertently exposed to 
Western culture. What I observed, during my stay and interactions with the people 
from NGOs, was that parties or social gatherings took place very often among them. 
Some people said cynically, “Mae Sot is a party town.” Whenever a special occasion 
happened in a certain NGO such as the opening of new offices and the promotion of 
new people to higher positions of NGOs, united parties were called on. In many cases, 
they were held in spacious restaurants with buffet-style banquets. Throughout the 
party, the participants were attended to by restaurant employees. There were many 
kinds of drinks including wine. While others were eating, some people were singing 
on a stage equipped with Karaoke facilities. For those Karen NGO workers, these 
kinds of party styles are totally different from their traditional social gatherings which 
associate with traditional village life styles. However, it seemed that as time went by, 
they were familiar with these party styles.  
Some of the Karen NGO workers attempted to apply the running styles of 
organizations that they learned in NGOs to the Karen church. They criticized the 
church for not running in systematic ways. For example, in their eyes, the positions 




lacked concise responsibility and efficient outcomes. They tried to reform the church 
for some time by using their working experience in Western organizations. But it 
brought about severe tensions between them and other church members. Their 
attempts ended without much “reformation.” However, the case was enough to 
demonstrate the influence of Western culture among certain group of the Burmese or 
Karen people in Mae Sot.  
Western culture was not a sole force in representing foreign cultures. Asian 
cultural influences were also observed. Asians coming from Japan, Taiwan, the 
Philippines, and Korea engaged in relief assistance activities for migrant people and 
refugees as NGO workers, missionaries, and volunteers. Of course, those Burmese 
who had deep relationships with them were influenced by them in the cultural sector. 
I as Korean, beyond the roles of an innocent researcher, sometimes reacted to the 
enquiries of my Burmese or Karen informants on Korean culture. While I was in Mae 
Sot, the Korean cultural wave, called “hallyu”, spread rampantly all over East Asia. 
Burma was no exception. Two Burmese television channels, Myawaddy TV and 
MRTV, in Mae Sot often broadcasted Korean soap operas, though very old ones. 
Many recent migrants had already begun their interest in those Korean dramas back in 
Burma. Whenever I encountered young Burmese migrants, they were very interested 
in talking about Korean actors and actresses. Some of these youths knew about them 
even more than me. At that time, as I had a number of Korean movies in the format of 
VCD and DVD, I often lent them to my informants. It was fun to see them mimic 
some Korean expressions from those movies. Also, my wife and I treated members of 
the Karen church to Korean food sometimes. Some women close to my wife often 




one of the mediators delivering a somewhat different cultural experience to the 
Burmese or the Karen.  
My suggestion again is not meant to exaggerate the influences of international 
cultures in the everyday lives of ordinary vulnerable people. Still, these new cultural 
experiences were only observed in particular groups of people. However, ignorance of 
the influences of those cultures might be led to an attempt at compartmentalizing 
cultures without looking at interactions with other cultures. Beyond the plural features 
of cultures, various cultures are going through the process of interactions which 
subsequently affect people’s cultural lives. My suggestion is that Mae Sot sees this 
kind of new aspects of Burmese cultural lives.  
 
FESTIVAL FEVERS: BREAKING BOUNDARIES   
 
At the outset of my field research, in August 2004, I encountered a festival which 
celebrated the birthday of the Queen. There were two places that attracted many 
people to various fun activities with bazaars established: around the District Office 
and beside the Municipal Office. What struck me was that the Burmese were active 
participants in the various festival programs such as darts, merry-go-round, and many 
other kinds of entertainment typically found in amusement parks elsewhere. It was 
impressive for me at that time to see “others” invited to a “Thai” festival. Afterwards, 
whenever seasonal festivals were held throughout my stay in Mae Sot, I observed the 
continued participation of others in such Thai festivals such as the King’s birthday, 
loy krathong and songkran.  
Festivals brought together not only the Thai locals but also the Burmese. Festivals 




Nobody questioned the legal status and divided people according to racial or national 
lines. The Thais and the Burmese got together in the festivals by participating in 
various activities, though this togetherness is not on a persistent basis.  
This section suggests that festivals and rituals in Mae Sot have a positive function 
which is to bring various groups of people together. They are not necessarily 
employed by the state to enforce legitimacy in a symbolic way. Rather, in such a 
delightful atmosphere, the festivals render state engagement in enforcing legality 
irrelevant and awkward.  
This section deals with two big festivals – loy krathong and songkran – to show the 
participation of others in the festivals and the breaking of boundaries that occurred 




Loy krathong takes place on the night of the full moon of the twelfth month of the 
Thai calendar. The festival is said to originate in Sukhothai as a kind of Thai 
Thanksgiving. The word “loy” in Thai means “to float” whereas “krathong” refers to 
“a cup” or “a bowl” which is traditionally made from banana leaves. Each float is 
decorated with joss-sticks, flowers, small amounts of money or coins, and a lighted 
candle. Decorated floats are then released on the water as an offering in giving thanks 
to Mae Khongka or the “Goddess of Water” for providing life-sustaining water 
throughout the year and in asking for forgiveness for polluting the water.118  
                                                 






While I was in Mae Sot in 2004, the day of loy krathong fell on 26 November. A 
few days before that, I had heard from my local friends with whom I played football  
that they would go to the Moei River on the evening of loy krathong to float some 
bowls and that various exciting programs would be held there. As the day came nearer, 
the town entered into a festive mood. On the day of loy krathong, none of my local 
friends came to the playground to play football. They were fully engaged in 
celebrating that festival.  
When darkness was cast over the town, my wife and I headed for the River, on the 
motorbike. When I passed through the downtown area, I saw groups of people get on 
a car and head for the river too. I witnessed more people and cars as I entered into the 
Asian Highway connected to the border. Not long before I continued my journey in 
the Highway, I faced a heavy traffic jam. Cars crawled along bumper to bumper. 
Motorbikes and bicycles were also stuck in the heavy traffic jam. However, people on 
pickup trucks were already saturated in such an exhilarating festive mood and made 
boisterous noises with their peers on board. Some people got off a car and decided to 
walk all the way to the border. Though I saw the presence of the Thais, the dominant 
figure of the ethnoscape on the road was the Burmese. It seemed that they arranged 
for transportation, particularly pickup trucks, to get to the River. The number of cars 
was countless as if all the cars in Mae Sot came out to pick up the Burmese. Thai 
voluntary guards and policemen took charge of the safety of the people by trying to 
make the traffic and the movement of people fluent. The Burmese, though many of 
them were illegal, were also attended to by those security guards.  
When I arrived in an area near the Immigration Office, it was already crowded 
with a great number of people. A stage was located there and some programs were 




the way to the riverside, I encountered my Thai neighbors also carrying it. They were 
a rather minority among the groups of Burmese. At the riverside, people lighted a 
candle in the krathong and prayed for some time before they set it on the water. The 
river was full of lighted floating containers, making the landscape of the river fully 
romantic. People at the riverside silently sat and gazed at the bowls which contained 
their longings.  
What made the scenery of the River more impressive was that a large number of 
Burmese at the other side of the River in Myawaddy came out and floated lighted 
containers on the water. It was spectacular to see people at both sides of the border 
take part in the same activity. At that time, the border turned into the collaborating or 
accommodating place rather than a dividing and blocking obstacle. The floating 
containers released on each side were met in the middle of the river making it difficult 
or meaningless to differentiate their original place.  
In fact, the Burmese in Burma also meaningfully celebrate this day though the 
name of the festival and the forms of celebration are different. The Burmese call the 
festival held on this day “tazaungdaing,” tazaung meaning light and daing referring to 
festival. In Burma, on that day, thousands of lights such as candles and oil cups are 
displayed at pagodas and outside of homes.119 However, the Burmese in Mae Sot and 
Myawaddy follow the Thai styles of celebration, transforming the Thai festival into 
their own festival.  
After a while, I came back to the place near the Immigration Office. To my 
surprise, the barricade was removed and people were free to move across the 
Thailand-Burma Friendship Bridge. The Bridge literally became friendly to people 
without blocking their movement. No officials checked for legal travel documents. If I 
                                                 
119 See the website (http://hawaii.cambodiaworldwide.com/lantern.html). Taunggyi is famous for the 





had not stupidly asked an official whether I as a foreigner could cross the Bridge, I 
would have had a chance to do that. However, such a privilege belonged to true 
borderlanders engaging their lives in the border. At any rate, I observed that the 
ownership of property of the borderland such as the River and the Bridge returned to 
the people. 
Turning to the stage, various cultural performances such as singing and dancing 
were going on. Of course each program was interpreted in Burmese. Onlookers were 
surrounding the stage and enjoying those performances. Though I did not see the all 
the performances, the BBC Burmese radio service reported the next day that a group 
of cultural performances was invited from Rangoon and various Burmese cultural 
shows were also introduced.  
When I came back to Mae Sot, I saw, at a park near the intersection of the outskirt 
of the town, groups of people floating containers on the water of a pond and placing 
candle lights all over the park. It seemed that those who did not go to the River came 
here instead. They were enjoying less crowded celebrations together with their friends. 
The former bus station near the Municipal Office turned into an amusement park, 
hosting a night market. There, I encountered several Karen who were with their 
children. Some of them did not have legal status. But no one checked and questioned 
one’s legal status in the place. They were freely going around the place. By taking this 
opportunity, it seemed that they wanted to show to their children the urban styles of 
amusement, though not fully advanced. I also played some games such as shooting 
and darts with my wife and we were nearly addicted to these fun games. We observed 
the excited mood in many faces of the people in the place too. Not exceptionally, the 
dominant group filling the place was the Burmese. Till late at night, we were in the 











Songkran festival usually falls between 13 and 15 April. It is the Buddhist New 
Year day and it is also called “Water Festival” because water takes an important 
position in the festival and people exuberantly engage in splashing water during this 
period. Songkran, a Thai word originating from Sanskrit, means “move” or “change 
place” as it is the day when the sun changes its position in the zodiac.120 Not only 
Thailand but also the other mainland Southeast Asian countries celebrate the festival 
at the same time. The festival is called “thingyan” in Burma, “chaul chnam thmey” in 
Cambodia, and “pimai” in Laos.121  
                                                 
120 See the website (http://sunsite.au.ac.th/thailand/special_event/songkran/index.html). 




During the festival in 2005, the official holidays were from Wednesday to Friday 
but the mood already started earlier and lasted till the end of the week. A few days 
before the official holidays, naughty boys began to splash water on the passers-by, 
bicycle or motor vehicle riders, placing unexpected persons like myself in dangerous 
situations causing potential damages. The festive mood was getting more exuberant as 
songkran came nearer. In the end, the town was saturated in water and was full of 
extreme excitement with various cultural activities and ceremonies during the 
songkran holidays. Whenever I rode my motorbike into the town during that time, I, 
without exception, was hit by baskets of water and ended up drenched. All the people 
in the town, whether they were Burmese, Thais, or foreigners, soaked themselves 
enthusiastically in the festivities.  
During this period, various kinds of cultural and sports activities took place. In the 
evenings, a temporary movie theater was set up in the corner of the former bus station, 
the main celebration place, showing various movies. In a stage built in the middle of 
the square, such cultural activities as concerts and a beauty contest selecting Miss 
songkran attracted a multitude of people throughout the days. Unlike loy krathong, 
this time, celebrations and activities were concentrated in the square near the 
Municipal Office and more crowds came to the place to celebrate the festival. A 
temporary amusement park was also set up to cater to the needs of children by 
providing with more playing items than at the time of loy krathong. A bazaar selling 
many items at cheaper prices also attracted customers. Of course, the Burmese were 
the dominant figures filling this space. It was not rare to encounter my Burmese or 
Karen acquaintances with their kids at the place. In the mixture with other people, 




the bazaar, playing some entertaining games such as shooting and bingo, and 
watching concerts and the beauty contest.  
The border area also saw some organizing activities. For example, boxing matches 
were held in the place near the Immigration Office. Interestingly, Burmese players 
were invited from Burma to compete against Thai players. A Thai TV channel aired 
the matches nationwide. As in the case of loy krathong, cross-border cultural and 
sporting activities constituted important programs of the festival. The MP of Mae Sot 
constituency and nayok PAO of Tak Province were among the onlookers of the 
matches. It seemed that these sporting activities were organized in a concerted 
cooperation between public and private agencies.122  
In the day time, during the songkran holidays, the central area of Mae Sot was 
totally turned into a water battle field. The area was packed with a huge number of 
people. I heard the Burmese, Thai and Karen languages from here and there. Pickup 
trucks carrying groups of Thais and Burmese with water buckets passed by bumper to 
bumper. At the right time, people on both sides of the road waged “water war” against 
those in pickup trucks. People on the trucks also splashed water onto people on the 
road. Westerners were also actively joining this water war. Ethnicity never got in the 
way of these the exhilarating happenings. It was meaningless to differentiate those 
participants along racial or ethnic lines in the area, given that the exuberant 
atmosphere totally nullified the dividing criteria. Everyone was welcomed to the 
exchange of water, whether one was illegal or legal, Burmese or Thai. All the 
participants were resolved into one people of the town regardless of ethnicity, class, 
legality and status. They were fully saturated into the emancipatory world.  
                                                 
122 A noticeable cross-border program that does not take place in the festival periods is the Thai-
Myanmar Bicycle Project mentioned in Chapter 3. It was also engendered by the combined efforts by 




The most dramatic happening occurred when a group of Burmese in a pickup truck 
poured water on policemen who were guarding to ensure the safety aspects of the 
festival. At the right time, I was compelled to see what kind of reactions came from 
them. In response to the actions of the Burmese, the police gave a big smile and 
sprinkled some water back at them rather than showed any anger and frustration that 
might be possibly triggered by the bold actions of the seemingly illegal migrants. 
Existing tensions and conflicts between the police and the migrants seemed to be 
dissolved in amicable terms through the exchange of water. The boundary dividing 
the two extremes was nullified, and the Burmese experienced the transition from 
liminal or marginal status to the members of the town society in the redemption of the 
water, to adopt Turner’s argument in the case of rituals of the Ndembu (e.g. 1967; 
1969).   
The elimination of the boundary was strikingly observed in the border too. When I 
drove my motorbike to the Moei River, I was speechless at what was happening in the 
River. A huge number of people, mostly Burmese, were swimming and dabbling in 
the River under the Bridge and around. At other times, I witnessed some individuals 
swim in the River and someone trying to cross the border on foot. But there had been 
no such massive presence of people in the River like during the time of this festival. A 
thought came to my mind, “Is it really the border?” and then the second thought that 
came up was “Are they not shot by Thai soldiers closely spying on them?” These 
naïve questions originated from my background that the border between South Korea 
and North Korea has been almost a death line and thus this kind of demoralizing the 
sacred border was absolutely unthinkable and dangerous. But all day long and 




without any problem. I did not see any Thai or Burmese soldiers march into the River 
to scatter them.  
The River totally lost its official function of dividing two countries. The ownership 
of the River returned to the borderlanders from the state, with a restored or 
refashioned function of accommodating or encompassing people. Though not always, 
at least the festival fever of songkran played a great role of nullifying even the 
international boundary. And it makes us rethink the ownership of the border which 
does not always belong to the states.  
 






















This chapter has dealt with the cultural aspect of the lives of others in the town. It 
has suggested that they can maintain their own ways of cultural life by consuming 
their own cultural stuffs which are pervasive all over the town. Especially, taking the 
example of the Karen, this chapter has revealed how they maintained their ethnic 
culture through Karen organizations.  
However, it has suggested that the maintenance of the Burmese or Karen culture is 
not meant to restrict the cultural interactions with other cultures. The chapter has 
shown that they are influenced by other cultures such as Thai and international 





The chapter has focused on festivals in showing how they play the role of breaking 
ethnic or geographical boundaries. The festivals do not question who enjoys them: 
everyone can join the joyful activities regardless of legality, ethnicity and class. The 
legal issue hardly finds its validity in the festive environments. The operation of 
festivals is beyond the hands of the state. In that sense, the state-centered notion of 
festivals where they are a symbolic means to legitimize the validity and control of the 
state towards the people is problematized. On the contrary, the case of festivals in 
Mae Sot proposes that they open up the space for the mingling of various groups of 
people rather than provide an opportunity for the engaging practices of the state. The 
festive moods of the town mould favorable conditions for inter-ethnic mingling. They 
also play a big role in invalidating the state function of the border by returning it to 
the borderlanders. In the festive mood, close and friendly associations between the 
place and the people and the refashioned meaning of the border, are truly recovered.  
I do not necessarily dismiss the suffering and stress that the Burmese have to cope 
with in their everyday lives. My argument revolving around festivals should not be 
meant to apply to other conditions. By focusing on festivals, my aim is to demonstrate 








DYNAMICS OF THE BORDER SOCIAL SYSTEM 
 
“Mae Sot is like a kindergarten for the Burmese where they 
go through the period of adapting to the Thai society by 
learning the basic language and culture of Thailand before 
leaving for ‘big places’ after a while” (A Thai rose farm 
owner). 
 
“Now we are returning to the Stone Age in the absence of 
educated people. What we are going to learn in the future is 
only to make fire with using stones” (General Secretary of 
the KWO). 
 
“For the KNU, the real threat does not come from the 
Burmese government but from the UNHCR and Western 
countries” (An NGO worker). 
 
 
Previous chapters have demonstrated that others are prominent actors in 
constituting the society of the town. They are explicit components of the social system 
of the town even in the absence of proper legal status. Their massive presence forms a 
particular nature in the operation of the town’s social system. It is the integration of 
two seemingly opposite sectors of the legal or formal and the illegal or the informal in 
various sectors of the system such as administration, economy, education, and culture, 
as we have seen so far.  
However, in addition to this characteristic, what more strikingly makes the social 
system of the border town distinguish from elsewhere is the continuous ebb and flow 
of people. The border social system is not static but dynamic. The society always 
reflects changing conditions brought by the movement of people.  
To a great degree, the flow of people is generated by the geographical character of 
the Thailand-Burma borderland. This borderland is a highly complex and 
differentiated space. Border porosity is common. Thus many people do move back 




going fighting and in militarized sections. However, this is not the single cause for the 
flow of people. Insufferable conditions and low-intensity warfare in some sectors and 
places have forced people to move to Thailand. In addition, Mae Sot’s status as a 
border town offering economic opportunities has attracted many migrants.  
Mae Sot is not only engaged in population circulation with connections with 
Burma but also has further connections with other places beyond the borderland such 
as Bangkok and even third countries. Once the Burmese get to the town, they soon 
find other compelling opportunities elsewhere beyond the town. On the one hand, the 
town is the small cosmos for many of people rooting their lives in the close 
connections with the place; while on the other hand, people make another further 
movement by taking the town as springboard. 
During my stay in Mae Sot, it was a hot issue that Burmese migrants attempted to 
advance to Bangkok for better opportunities and refugees were excited in being 
resettled in third countries, mostly Western countries. I often heard from factory 
owners that they lost their Burmese employees because they had headed for Bangkok. 
Also, I clearly recognized that resettlement programs rampantly affected refugees in 
refugee camps and urban areas. This had a great impact on both the town overall and 
the lives of normal migrants and refugees. The town encountered this massive force of 
the flowing-out of people though it sees new people come over to town from the 
Burmese side. Though the ebb and flow of people is the natural characteristic of the 
border social system, it does not always take place without tension and impact on the 
society. 
Another force that is challenging the current state of the town and generating the 
immense flow of capital as well as people is the massive economic projects, notably 




international bodies. These projects have been changing the landscape of the town 
through the development of infrastructure and the attempt to attract global investment. 
Accordingly, in a move to exploit the town as a base for the broader regional and 
global economic prosperity, this modern capitalistic development is increasingly 
exposing the town to the outside actors. The town is facing these exogenous modern 
economic forces at the moment while on the other hand it still sees people live their 
lives in intimate connections with the border. 
This chapter deals with these challenges that the social system of the town is facing 
at the moment. Mae Sot acts as an intermediate node for the Burmese from the 
Burmese sides to Bangkok and at the same time, also attracts the Thai and 
international investors the other way around. Both the population drainage to other 
places and multitude economic projects have great impacts on the current society of 
the town. Though flows of population and external influences have been inherent 
characteristics of the town throughout its history, the current stage of events draws our 
special attention since they take place in the context of the global phase of population 
movement and capitalistic development.  
 
DEPARTING THE BORDER 
 
This section touches on the out-flow of people in Mae Sot. Present days see the 
massive flowing-out of others from Mae Sot to other places. There are two big factors 
in this ebb of people: the first is Bangkok Dream and the second is resettlement 
programs. These are the main causes of population movement to other places, making 
the social system very fluid and dynamic. However, despite the drainage of 




people from Burma still. Rather, these two incidents speed up the circulation of the 




Nukphan was running a garment factory with 420 workers, mostly the Burmese, 
under her payroll. She began to operate the factory in 2000 after taking over the 
ownership of it. She took production orders from Bangkok in the form of subcontract 
of global brands such as Nautica. As recently as July 2005, she revealed to me that 
around 110 workers left her factory in that year; most of them had gone to Bangkok. 
This meant that she lost over twenty-five per cent of her entire work force. Her case 
was not exceptional. Suanpha, who ran a garment factory, producing clothes for the 
brand of Reebok, also disclosed to me that around ten per cent of her 120 workers had 
departed her factory. Most of them had also headed to Bangkok. These incidents were 
observed almost all over the factories in Mae Sot around that time. Bangkok Dream of 
the Burmese migrants was tremendously devastating the industrial sector of Mae Sot.  
Farms and shops also witnessed their employees leave Mae Sot for Bangkok. 
Paradon running a rose farm near Phop Phra District mentioned that quite a number of 
his workers had quitted the job in his farm for advancing to Bangkok. According to 
him, “Mae Sot is like a kindergarten for the Burmese where they go through the 
period of adapting to the Thai society by learning the basic language and culture of 
Thailand before leaving for ‘big places’ after a while.”   
When I revisited Mae Sot in December 2005 after five months of absence, I was 
bewildered by the fact that I could only recognize a few of the ten workers in a 




restaurant. Neither did I see a teashop boy that I used to chat in a teashop. When I 
went around the town at that time, I saw in many shops that new employees replaced 
those whom I had known in the past. Despite the absence of the exact information of 
whereabouts of these previous employees, it can be easily assumed that they might 
have gone to Bangkok with little possibility of going back to Burma and working in 
other shops in Mae Sot. Though I had also sensed the frequent altering of employees 
in many of the shops during my year-around stay, the five-month gap gave me a 
clearer picture of the fast-changing flowing of people.    
It was partly due to the labor transferring policy where the Tak Governor made an 
agreement with other provinces in need of cheap labors to transfer Burmese workers 
in Tak Province to those provinces-in-need in 2004. To take an example, a fishing net 
factory in Khon Kaen Province had been granted a quota to hire 1,800 alien workers 
after the manager of the factory had requested of hiring alien workers from Tak 
Province. The factory’s request had been approved and the transfer took place after 15 
November 2004 (Bangkok Post 18 November 2004). In implementing this policy, it 
was believed that some policemen and officials mobilized innocent Burmese workers, 
who were holding proper permits, to meet the requests of other provinces. It was also 
believed that some of these policemen extorted brokerage bribe from the Burmese 
migrants and even gangs were involved in this movement of workers (Bangkok Post 
13 September 2005). This policy propelled ordinary Burmese workers, whether or not 
they were holding the Work Permit, to seek better opportunities in other places, 
beyond the border.  
The factory owners’ complaint against this policy grew and in the end erupted in 
the form of demonstration to annul it on 29 August 2005 at the District Office, as I 




incident. But according to Metta, an official in the Mae Sot Labor Office, though the 
policy became defunct due to the objections, the illegal or unauthorized movement of 
Burmese laborers to Bangkok still continued, initiated by the Burmese themselves in 
connections with brokers (Interview 13 December 2005).   
The effect of this policy was never negligible, enhancing the trend of leaving the 
border for inner places, notably Bangkok over the years. As Paradon mentioned, they 
spend some time in Mae Sot, gathering information on the opportunities of 
livelihoods in Bangkok after crossing the border, before embarking on another 
journey. 
Above all, the higher job opportunities and the relatively higher level of wages 
encouraged the movement of the Burmese to Bangkok. In Mae Sot factories, an 
individual Burmese labor earns around 130 baht a day. But in Bangkok, he or she gets 
about 170 baht a day. For ordinary Burmese labors, this wage gap is a compelling 
reason for the Burmese to depart Mae Sot. Especially jobless Burmese and temporary 
workers in work places such as small-scale construction sites are very keen on 
seeking for a job in Bangkok as an alternative survival strategy in an effort to get over 
their precarious living conditions.  
Not just from the stance of material gain but from the cultural stance, more 
modernized metropolitan environment play a certain role of attracting them to 
Bangkok. The news that came from their friends and relatives in Bangkok to Mae Sot 
included the showy description of the lifestyles of the global city. People circulated 
this news in their factories and teashops, contributing to the Bangkok Dream.  
Not only Mae Sot but also Mae La Camp sees a similar phenomenon. One of my 
informants told me that it was not exaggerating to say that roughly each family had at 




ten per cent of the whole residents of the Camp were working in Bangkok whereas the 
similar number of people working in nearby areas. The condition that the job 
opportunities of the Camp are extremely limited propels refugees to make a 
movement to Bangkok.   
The pathways to Bangkok are full of obstacles. They are to pass through several 
checkpoints guarded by soldiers and policemen on the road between Mae Sot and Tak. 
Some individuals attempt to climb the rugged mountain rather than take a car to evade 
those checkpoints. Once they get to Tak, it is relatively easy for them to take a car and 
head for Bangkok in the absence of checkpoints. Some of them even kept walking to 
Bangkok. A group of the Burmese from Chin State told me that they walked from 
Mae Sot to Bangkok for several days. In the case of Mae La Camp refugees, they 
climb the nearby mountain, keep walking through mountain pathways to Omkoi 
which is over 100 km away from the Camp, and then advance in the direction of 
Chiangmai to meet a main road. From there they get on a car to get to Bangkok. For 
the refugees, this route is more secure and convenient than to choose the Mae Sot-Tak 
passage.  
However, these methods of evading the checkups were very rare options. Most of 
them were connected to brokers to whom they paid around 6,000 baht for bringing 
them to Bangkok without being caught at the checkpoints.123 If they do not have this 
amount of the money, they could borrow money from brokers and the debt is paid off 
in the form of deduction from their monthly wages. As mentioned earlier, even some 
officials and gangsters were involved into this affair. Some people were deceived by 
brokers in transferring to Bangkok. According to one of my informants, he was told to 
be brought to Bangkok by them. But the place he reached in the end was Pattani in the 
                                                 
123 According to my informants, the brokerage fee has been increased to 10,000 baht since November 
2006. However, if they use a pick-up service after crossing over the mountain, the fee will be reduced 




southern Thailand. For some time, he had to work in fishing sectors and his monthly 
wages were taken by them. He was checked and arrested by the police there and was 
brought back to Mae Sot to be deported to Burma. But he was released before 
deportation.124  
There are consequences of individual people’s movement to Bangkok at the level 
of families as well as at the level of economy. Family members saw separation. Due 
to parents working in Bangkok, remaining children in Mae Sot lack proper care. 
Though some migrant schools run dormitories for those children, it is a tough job to 
give enough care for them in the lack of manpower and funding. Also elderly 
Burmese do not have proper care from their sons and daughters working in Bangkok 
though remittance solves financial difficulties to some degree. In the case of factories, 
farms and shops, it discourages owners to conform to legality. Since the departure of 
their employees means the loss of their money in assisting them to apply for Work 
Permits at the initial stage, they are very reluctant to have their new employees apply 
for Work Permits again for fear that they too would leave soon. It partly explains why 




Throughout my year-around stay, resettlement programs were hot issues among 
urban political refugees – so-called “the POCs” 125 in Mae Sot as well as among 
ordinary refugees in refugee camps. It was, of course, a big issue for innocent 
Burmese migrants in the town given that those political activists, the number of whom 
                                                 
124 For general information on human trafficking in Thailand, see the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) (2005). 




was estimated to be around 1,000, were living together with them in the town and 
given that refugee camps are near the town.   
At first when the programs were noticeably implemented in the early 2004, those 
POCs staying outside the refugee camps were only eligible for the programs and the 
UNHCR was in charge of moving them to other countries, mostly Western countries 
such as the USA, Canada, Norway, Sweden, and Australia. But stepping into the 
middle of 2005, the programs in charge by the UNHCR were in the process of being 
expanded to the refugees in the camps in cooperation between the UNHCR and the 
governments of those countries. Even before this expansion, there were individual 
cases of refugees’ resettlement into other countries under the responsible sponsorships 
of individuals and organizations in the resettled countries and in recognition or 
approval of the resettlement by the concerned governments. But now the governments 
of those countries themselves massively expanded the opportunities of resettlement to 
ordinary refugees (Interview with the Head of the UNHCR Mae Sot Field Office 12 
April 2005).  
Through resettlement programs, as many as about 2,500 Burmese had left Thailand 
as of June 2005 since January 2004.126 The figure has been surging up continuously 
and thus nearly 7,000 refugees have been resettled to third countries by the latter part 
of 2006 since 2004. In September 2006 alone, 1,119 refugees left Thailand for 
resettlement among whom 820 went to the USA and 93 to Canada (UNHCR News 13 
Oct 2006). It was expected that 6,000 people were to be resettled in third countries in 
2006 (Irrawaddy 7 September 2006; 18 September 2006). The UNHCR plans to 
resettle as many as 15,000 refugees from Thailand in 2007 (UNHCR News 13 Oct 
                                                 
126 This figure was acquired from my attendance at the monthly meetings of the CCSDPT in May and 
June 2005 and especially from the documents and presentations of the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) which is in charge of some parts of the resettlement processes such as transportation 




2006; Irrawaddy 29 August 2006). Given the commitments of the UNHCR to the 
programs in the strong cooperation with individual governments of the countries such 
as the USA, Australia, the UK, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, 
Norway, and Canada, more Burmese refugees are expected to be transferred to these 
countries in the future.    
As people departed from Mae Sot through the programs, the minds of innocent 
people were intrigued to take the opportunities. Impressively, the UNHCR Mae Sot 
Field Office had to handle the massive and frequent visits of ordinary people to ask 
about the programs. The Head of the Office told me that as of April 2005, she 
received 2,600 cases of application. Whenever I passed the Office, I often saw people 
asking about application forms at the gate of the Office. It was an everyday scene 
during my stay. But according to her, many of them misunderstood that the 
application was about resettlement programs; indeed the application was about the 
entitlement of the POC. After screening the application form and an interview, one 
can be entitled to the POC. Then another round of interview processes for actual 
resettlement is conducted by the embassies of those resettled countries. Those who 
pass the embassy interviews are to have medical checkups. After that, cultural 
orientations where they learn about life styles of their destinations take place. Then 
they board on airplane from the Mae Sot airport for third countries with transit in 
Bangkok. Though the Office kept informing new applicants of these processes, the 
misunderstanding continued.  
At any rate, the status of the POC gives the great priority in taking the 
opportunities since they received special attention from those countries under the 
grounds of the advocacy of democracy and also from the Thai government for the 




with resettlement programs. During my stay, the Thai government took action for the 
POCs, attempting to move all of them out of urban areas to refugee camps by 31 
March 2005, notably Noh Poe Camp in Umphang District where they were supposed 
to stay until they leave for third countries. The reason for this move is to prevent 
political activities from building up in urban areas (Bangkok Post 1 April 2005; 
Irrawaddy 30 March 2005). Urban refugees were kept transferring to the camps in 
2006 too (Irrawaddy 18 September 2006).  All of the POCs are meant to be resettled 
in the future eventually. Hence, for those who yearn to live in third countries, their 
status as POC allows them the privilege to take the opportunities easily. POC Status 
has become a sort of a “passport” and way out beyond the symbol of persecution.  
At first, the UNHCR Mae Sot Field Office laid down the form of application that 
applicants needed to fill in but later the Office let them describe their personal 
biography by using their own styles of form. Here personal biography was regarded as 
most important in the process of screening. It was said that many, if not all, of 
applicants fabricated, exaggerated or omitted parts of their biographies while stressing 
the political persecutions from the Burmese authorities. An official of the Office in 
charge of the screening and interview job mentioned that he can tell the genuineness 
by using some know-how accumulated over the years. It is said that having the record 
of service as soldiers of opposition groups is beneficial for being selected. One of my 
informants who used to be a Karen soldier passed the screening process by proving 
his record in the form of showing his photos in the uniform of the Karen military. But 
he omitted some parts of his life that could raise the doubts of the interviewers. At the 
first stage, one of the conditions was that the applicants must not be camp refugees. 
But he had lived in a refugee camp during his pursuit of a relatively higher level of 




I knew of stressed his relatedness to his relatives who were involved in the KNU 
activities though he himself did not have any evidence of political suffering. A 
middle-aged woman highlighted that she was not promoted to a higher position in the 
government organizations of Burma because of his relatives’ involvement in political 
activities though it appeared that her retirement was seemingly due to natural age 
limit. Here we can see the politics of personal biography in play revolving around the 
application. People emphasize some points of their life history whereas omitting 
certain parts of their biography. I do not intend to judge it from a moral point of view. 
Rather what we see from these cases is that personal biographies are not neutral but 
selective and even political especially for those vulnerable people as an appropriating 
means for resettlement programs. And suffering and hardships that one had 
experienced indeed became resources that one can evidently appropriate in the 
application processes. It would be called “the resourcification of hardships and 
adversities.”    
The trend of increasing number of the application was outstanding among the 
Karen in Mae Sot, especially those who were involved in Karen organizations 
including the Karen church and the Mae Tao Clinic. It is not exaggerating to say that 
most of the young people in those groups submitted their applications to the UNHCR. 
In fact several of them left for other countries while several of them were ready for 
departure during my stay. Whenever youngsters got together at the church, the hot 
topic of their dialogues was about the application and the interview process. 
Successful applicants gave some suggestions on how to fill in the application form 
and how to prepare for the interview with the interviewers of the UNHCR or 




In the Mae Tao Clinic, the medics and trainees shared their information on the 
programs while they were engaged in the activities of the Clinic. I often heard that the 
work ethic of the medics was becoming insincere due to the anticipation of taking the 
chances of the programs. A report of the Irrawaddy on 7 September 2006 delivered 
the complaint of an official in the Clinic that some 40 medics were leaving the clinic 
to seek resettlement. 
The trend was strikingly observed among Burmese political groups too. It was 
reported that 600 Burmese exiles with UN documents left the so-called “Liberated 
Area” in 2004 (Irrawaddy February 2005). In the case of the NLD, it saw as many as 
100 members have left the border for third countries during the period between 2003 
and June 2005 with 250 members remaining in Mae Sot and its vicinity border areas 
as of June 2005. And the NLD was witnessing many of the remaining members 
applying for resettlement programs whereas some people were ready for leaving 
sooner or later. Given that the membership of the NLD was regarded as a convincing 
guarantee for the selection, it saw even innocent Burmese apply for the membership 
in an attempt to have an advantage in being entitled to the POC and resultant 
application for resettlement programs. However, the NLD took some processes of 
receiving new members in the basis of the records of previous activities of them with 
consents from old members (Interview with a person in charge of Foreign Relations 
and Youth of the NLD 21 June 2005). In the case of the Mae Sot-based Assistance 
Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), 21 of the 100 members of the 
organization resettled in 2004 in the USA and Norway with the rest, having applied 
for UN refugee status, likely to follow (Irrawaddy February 2005). The ABSDF also 




the rule of forbidding members to apply for UN refugee status to maintain the group’s 
strength (Irrawaddy 7 September 2006).  
Reasons for individuals’ applying for resettlement programs vary from person to 
person though they share some obvious reasons. Most of political activists had to go 
through such difficulties in attempts to bring democracy into Burma in the border. But 
political situation of the country never improved and they were getting more and more 
discouraged in retaining a hope of political change. Furthermore, unstable conditions 
that they must tackle in their everyday lives caused by the lack of financial stability 
and proper legal status mounted more hardships. These prolonged adversities 
propelled them to make a decision to apply for the programs in the end. In the face of 
expanded opportunities of getting away from the hardships to seemingly promising 
future in developed countries, it was extremely tough for them to dismiss such 
chances.  
Refugees were also fed up with protracted staying in confined refugee camps 
though the places were like their new hometowns with maintaining social and family 
relationships. In the absence of foreseeable solutions of their deadlock situations, the 
news of massive resettlement was like a welcome rain after long period of drought.  
As they went through the long-existing difficulties in restricted conditions, the 
notion of “freedom” had become a form of nostalgia that existed only in their 
imagination but not in reality. They anticipated that resettlement in fully free 
developed countries would restore the full-scale of freedom to them.   
My investigation reveals that there are other reasons. Many of young applicants 
mentioned “education” as a main reason. They did not have proper education in 
Burma in the appalling education system. They are very restricted in the pursuit 




expect that it would be easy for them to take up those education opportunities in third 
countries in the sponsorships of individual governments of third countries.  
For many of parents having their children, the reason of children education drove 
them to the approaching the programs too. I often heard from the parents that they 
themselves can stay here but they want their children to have better education without 
restrictions in third countries.  
Usually the aged were not as fascinated as the young in the programs since they 
were afraid of newly adapting to totally new environments in the lack of language 
ability. But many of them just followed their sons and daughters to other countries 
rather than living a lonely life in the borderland. Some of them, especially the 
educated old-aged people, even took the programs as a way of spending their latter 
part of their lives in comfort with receiving pension from the governments.  
Economic opportunities are also one of reasons. A refugee complained about free 
conscription of labor in a construction site of a camp, saying, “If I go to foreign 
countries, even toilet cleaning work would bring me seven dollars per hour.” Like this 
case, though appearing to be confined, refugees know about the outside world and 
they attempt to seek much more livelihood opportunities beyond refugee camps if 
possible. Not only innocent refugees, but many of applicants in general expected 
economic prosperity in their future lives in resettled countries. Some people were 
determined to say that they would financially support their organizations in the border 
by sending some amount of their money earned in those countries.  
Resettlement programs are the great impact on the level of organizations and 
communities. In the level of individuals, it might be regarded as a blessing that opens 
up numerous opportunities with starting a new life though they are facing imminent 




communities, it is a disaster in maintaining their capacity in the face of brain drainage. 
As shown in the cases of political movement groups, those groups lost a great number 
of members and constantly encountered the pain of expulsion. The ABSDF strength 
in border areas had shrunk to about 800 from a force which one numbered in the tens 
of thousands (Irrawaddy February 2005). Education system in refugee camps was 
being shattered because of the departures of qualified teachers to other countries. At 
the meetings of the CCSDPT in June and July, many of NGOs revealed that their 
refugee employees had left their organizations and it was difficult to find suitable 
teachers making up for the empty positions. The Mae Tao Clinic was also losing 
skilled medics. The Karen church witnessed faithful members gone abroad. Many 
other Karen organizations such as the KWO and the KYO also saw the drainage of 
human resources too.  
Zipporah, the General Secretary of the KWO, sarcastically lamented in a talk with 
me, “Now we are returning to the Stone Age in the absence of educated people. What 
we are going to learn in the future is only to make fire with using stones” (Interview 
14 January 2005).   
Of course it is lessening the capacity of the KNU. An NGO worker mentioned: 
“For the KNU, the real threat does not come from the Burmese government but from 
the UNHCR and Western countries.” It was becoming difficult for the KNU to find 
committed young people, compared to in the past. And soldiers were deserting their 
battlefields in the face of the imminent opportunities for the better life. Even DKBA 
soldiers knew about resettlement programs and attempted to seek the chances. A 
soldier in charge of Burmese areas near Umphang District revealed his excitement to 
my informant who was a former classmate of his during my visit to Umphang District 




Pado Man Sha, General Secretary of the KNU, showed his concern to me in 
acknowledging negative impacts of resettlement programs, mentioning “It is a real 
danger for the KNU given that educated people depart from the organization” though 
he defended, saying, “Not all people are leaving and those resettled would do some 
contributions in the future.”  
People are divided with regard to the programs. The aching question to those 
supportive of it is how to carry on the missions of the nation or political changes 
without the presence of human resources. In contrast, the acute question to those 
opposing it is what alternatives individuals would have in the prolonged hardships. 
Here we see two notions – individualism and communalism – in play in these two 
conflicting stances. However, it seems evident that the force of individualism is 
triumphant in the current massive exodus of population. Political leaders are not clear 
about this issue because at the group level they have duties to maintain the capacity of 
human resources whereas on the other hand they have their sons and daughters for 
whom they want to give better educational opportunities in developed countries.  
Resettlement programs enormously generated population movement: on the one 
hand it drives people from the border to third countries but at the same time on the 
other hand it induces a great deal number of people to Mae Sot and refugee camps. As 
mentioned earlier, many people voluntarily crossed the border and came over to Mae 
Sot from the Burmese sides such as Rangoon in a move to approach the UNHCR with 
the hope of taking advantage of resettlement opportunities. After submitting 
application forms, they continued to stay in the town with engaging some livelihood 
activities or taking part in group activities while they waited for interview 




did not want to go back. One of reasons, I often heard, was that Burmese authorities 
would interrogate them on their approach to the UN agency. 
Population inducement to refugee camps is also striking. The UNHCR began to 
carry out the registration project in October 2004 in cooperation with the MOI. The 
original MOI/UNHCR registration and headcount was carried out in 1999 and 
although initially new arrivals were added to the registration, there was no official 
registration of new arrivals after the end of 2001 when the Provincial Admissions 
Board (PAB) which determines the status of new asylum seekers in the camps ceased 
to function. (TBBC 2005: 2; 2004:2; 2003: 2). The project started from camps in the 
southern part and extended northward to the camps in Tak Province in 2005. 
Coincidently, resettlement programs were expanded during this period. Hearing the 
news about the registration, people attempted to get into the camps to register their 
names as camp residents in the hope of putting their names in the lists of resettled 
people. But the main objective of the registration project was to re-register the 
original camp population for exact calculation. For the matter of registering new 
people, although the UNHCR and the MOI register their names, the PAB was 
supposed to decide the entitlement of camp residents afterwards. In other words, their 
status as asylum seekers and, hence, their resettlement chances were not confirmed. 
Whether they knew about the processes or not, it did not stop their strong 
determination to get into the camps by whatever means. Interestingly enough, 
innocent Thai Karen were also agitated by resettlement programs and they 
endeavored to get into the camps by using ethnic connections with Burmese Karen 
refugees.  
The registration project brought back those refugees pursuing their livelihoods 




Bangkok to Mae Sot by bus, I saw a lot more alien people than other times, seemingly 
looking like refugees, on board from Bangkok. On the way to Mae Sot, they were 
caught and assembled at the checkpoint close at the entrance of Mae Sot. They 
seemed to come back to refugee camps for the registration. Likewise, the project 
generated the great centripetal movement from other parts of Thailand to the camps in 


























FLOWS OF CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
Mae Sot is a very promising town for those who have ambitions to expand their 
economic gains since it provides cheap laborers as well as potential opportunities for 
cross-border business and investment in Burma. Hence the town sees the participation 
of many outside people having resources and capital. First, this section deals with the 
current phase of border trade and the fact that the locals are losing their stakes to 
outside people. Second, it takes a look at the relocation of factories and patterns of 
production and relation between employers and employees. Here I identify how 
exogenous the operation of the factories and how the current stage of people’s 
relations have been changed. Finally, this section touches on economic development 
projects rampantly undertaken by the state in cooperation with international bodies 




and the border areas for expanding economic opportunities. The impact of these 
projects is immense; the landscape of the town is changing with the numerous 
development projects going on all over the town. All in all, it shows that the town 
does not exist without engagement of other actors but it is exposed to the outside 
world, which brings about more dynamic features in the social system.  
 
 Encroaching of Bangkok in border trade 
 
One day when I attended a meeting of the Tak Chamber of Commerce, I witnessed 
serious discussions exchanged among participants. It was initiated by Ekamon, saying 
to them,  
 
In the past, main participants of the border business were the people of Mae Sot. 
Though commodities were ordered from Bangkok, these had to stay for some 
days in Mae Sot before crossing the border with leaving some margin here. But 
nowadays these go directly to Burma without necessarily staying in Mae Sot due 
to the development of road conditions. Now it is happening that Bangkok 
businessmen directly contact partners in Rangoon and initiate shipment instantly 
to the Burmese side through Mae Sot. Mae Sot is becoming a mere transit point 
for them and thus margin generated from border trade for Mae Sot is becoming 
less. 
 
His statement prompted many participants to express current patterns of border 
trade with converging on the concerns revolving around the massive participation of 
outside people in the border business, notably from Bangkok. Someone recollected 
the hectic days of the black markets, the time when Mae Sot was an exclusive center 
with inconvenient connectivity to Bangkok due to less developed infrastructure. Their 




border business under the sponsorship of the state and international bodies in the form 
of the development of infrastructure and massive economic projects. In fact, the Chief 
Officer of Mae Sot Custom Office revealed to me in June 2005 that Bangkok’s 
portion of the export volume to Burma through Mae Sot was 20% with the rest from 
Mae Sot and Bangkok’s participation was increasing.    
Though in the past, it also saw the participation of exogenous people, they were 
soon localized and became almost indigenous people with permanent settlement in the 
border and their business centering on Mae Sot. This was mainly due to the 
inconvenient transportation system that restricted their mobility between Bangkok and 
Mae Sot. However, due to current massive enhancement of road conditions and 
communication technologies, outside participants do not necessarily pursue 
permanent settlement to engage in border trade. The infrastructure development gives 
easy access to the trade, opening up new challenges and tensions for the locals.      
 
Relocation of factories 
 
Besides border trade, other economic spheres of the town saw enormous increases 
of outside participation, especially in the industrial sector. As mentioned earlier in 
Chapter 2, the number of factories increased from 118 in 1993 to 218 in 2000. It is 
said that 80% of factory owners are non-locals. The introduction of factories changed 
economyscape of the town. The commerce-centered pattern of town’s economy with 
hiring indigenous people gave way to the industry-driven pattern of the economy by 
employing exogenous people or migrants who had recently crossed the border. The 
number of Burmese factory workers in factories increased throughout the years: 3,708 




recent as January 2005, it saw 31,196 Burmese working in Mae Sot factories as 
shown in Table 3.3 in Chapter 3. However, actual number is assumed to be more 
because this figure only concerns registered workers. 
The style of operation of these factories, dominated by garment factories, is very 
alien in the local context. The production orders are from Bangkok and other 
countries in the subcontracted form, not reflecting the need of the locals. And their 
products are sent to Bangkok or exported to other countries and not circulated and 
consumed among the locals. Also raw materials flow from Bangkok not from the 
local areas (Maneepong 2006: 18). In terms of the volume of production, it is not 
controlled by the local consumption power but by the demand of outside contractors 
in the global supply chain (Arnold 2006; Arnold and Hewison 2005). Likewise, the 
economic contribution of Burmese workers is not for the local consumption but for 
the global consumption, which is quite different from in the past when their labor was 
intimately attached to the local consumption. 
As the factories do not reflect the needs of the local but are only interested in cheap 
labor cost, it is highly likely that they shut down and move to another place providing 
cheaper cost. Especially, due to the global supply chain where most of factories are 
tied, the possibility of removal of them increases and also it witnesses unstable and 
fluctuated production in competition with countries such as China. One day, on my 
visit to Nukphan’s factory, I saw sizeable number of machines not in operation. To 
my question for the redundant machinery, she replied that since nowadays many 
orders turned to China she seldom utilized the full machines. It demonstrates again 
that production control is not based on local conditions but on global demand with so 




The expansion of industrial sector changed the pattern of relations between 
employers and employees. Unlike previous relations based on personal closeness and 
traditional patron-client relationships, now it saw the contractual relationships 
between them which share common features in industrial sectors elsewhere. Hence, 
negotiations became tools of communications between them. Also various other 
means in pushing forward their interests are employed. For example, Burmese 
workers at times resort to strikes and sabotages in responding to the unreasonable 
treatments of their employers. Though indeed they experienced certain level of 
exploitation, they came to be conscious of their rights defended by regulations and 
used those tactics. Nukphan and Suanpha encountered these actions of their workers. 
Especially when they took new large volume of product orders and began to operate 
producing lines, they saw the workers raise a strike in an attempt to ensure their 
overtime charges beforehand. It shows that the workers know how to deal with their 
employers in collective actions.  
A report told that more than 700 Burmese workers at a garment factory near Mae 
Sot walked off the job in protest at low pay and other conditions of employment 
(Irrawaddy 12 September 2006). There were even cases of legal actions taken by 
Burmese workers. For example, according to a report of the Irrawaddy on 27 March 
2006, nearly 300 Burmese workers from three garment factories in Mae Sot filed legal 
actions in a local labor court against the factory owners, claiming they were underpaid 
over the past two years. There was a case of legal victory for Burmese workers. On 24 
August 2004, the Thai labor court in Tak Province ruled that the owner of the Nut 
knitwear factory in Mae Sot must pay eighteen of his former workers a total of 




And they finally received compensation on 7 October 2004 for unpaid back wages 
and exploitation (Irrawaddy 8 October 2004).  
Here it saw the involvement of domestic and foreign activist groups in labor issues 
in cooperation with labor organizations of the Burmese themselves. In fact, in the 
above affair of legal victory, such groups as the Chiang Mai-based Migrant 
Assistance Program, the Thai Human Rights Commission and the Law Society 
provided the workers with legal assistance, protection, food and shelter in 
collaboration with Yaung Chi Oo Burmese Worker’s Association, according to the 
above report. And connections with outside groups strengthened and Burmese 
workers became more and more aware of their rights. This fact shows that the current 
state of Mae Sot’s human relationships saw the active engagement of non-local or 
exogenous groups centering on the issues of human rights and labor rights, which 
markedly distinguishes from the past. 
 
Massive economic development projects 
 
In the early days, Mae Sot saw the engagement of the state. As dealt with in 
Chapter 2, the town was administratively incorporated in the state system at the turn 
of century from 19th to 20th. However, the influence of the state at that time was only 
seen in the administrative sector. Throughout most of the last century, the penetration 
of the state in the border areas was halted due to the inconvenient transportation and 
communication, insurgent movements, and less promising economic opportunities in 
comparison to the central area of the country. But since the latter part of 1980s, the 




more accessible with providing new economic opportunities for advancing into 
neighboring countries.  
Over the 1990s and the 2000s, the attempts of the state to exploit the border 
resulted in concrete strategies and ideas. In the seventh development plan (1992-96) 
laid down by the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), 
border towns were referred as new economic bases for stimulating decentralization by 
linking regional cities to peripheral areas (Maneepong 2002/2003: 77). In the eighth 
development plan (1997-2001), it was identified that opportunity of industrial 
development should be created by establishing special economic zones and tax-free 
zones along the borders to promote trade and investment both inside Thailand and 
with neighboring countries (Tsuneishi 2005: 6). Also in the ninth development plan 
(2002-2006), the development of border provinces and towns draws special attention. 
In the plan, balanced regional development and the strengthening of economic 
relations and mutual prosperity in regions were emphasized. It was also mentioned 
that regional competitiveness through expanding markets and bargaining power over 
trade, investment and economic cooperation is necessary (Tsuneishi 2005: 6).  
Not only through the domestic national plan but also through economic 
cooperation strategies with neighboring countries, the Thai government pushes 
forward its development ideas for the border areas. In 1992, the GMS Program was 
formed as a result of economic and integration agreement among Cambodia, Laos, 
Burma and Thailand, Vietnam and Yunnan Province of China; in 1993, Indonesia-
Thailand-Malaysia Growth Triangle (ITM-GT) was set up; in 1997, Bangladesh, India, 
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC) was established, 
the name of which was changed in July 2004 to the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-




Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) which is just called 
Economic Cooperation Strategy (ECS) was formed (Tsuneishi 2005: 12).  
Among the programs, the ECS comprising Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand 
with Vietnam becoming a member in 2004 is the most significant in the direction of 
Thai policy since the concept is to implement the decisions and ideas created in the 
GMS Program by Thai Initiative (Tsuneishi 2005: 12). The ECS is based on two 
inter-related core promises: to curtail illegal migrant workers in Thailand, particularly 
in the Bangkok and central regions; and to concurrently decrease the disparity of 
incomes in the Greater Mekong Sub-region by relocating light manufacturing and 
agricultural production to border areas with exploiting the cheap labor and resources 
of neighboring countries (Arnold 2006: 27-28). A cornerstone of the ECS is to set up 
four Special Border Economic Zones (SBEZ, more commonly referred as SEZ) in 
Mae Sot-Myawaddy (Burma), Mukdahan-Savannakhet (Laos), Trat-Koh Kong 
(Cambodia) and the Chiang Rai SEZ (Arnold 2006: 28).  
These programs are sponsored by international bodies such as the ADB and the 
UNCESCAP. For example, the ADB approved $1.2 billion in loans from 1992 to 
2003 for regional development projects and mobilized another $922 million in 
cofinancing. In addition, the ADB together with cofinanciers and GMS governments 
has provided $79 million in technical assistance for projects preparation and for 
studies to promote effectiveness (ADB 2004: 27). 
Mae Sot has been situated in the vortex of these massive programs. Especially Mae 
Sot lies in the East-West Economic Corridor connecting between Da Nang in Vietnam 




the GMS Program identifies as one of flagship programs.127 In the Corridor, Mae Sot 
plays a role of node in connecting between Burma and Thailand.  
 
Map 7.1 The East-West Economic Corridor 
 
 
(Source: ADB 2001: xiii) 
 
To implement this plan, concrete development projects began to be implemented. 
Construction of an 18 km of highway in Myawaddy across Mae Sot is currently 
underway under the project (Arnold 2006: 31). The 18km stretch will run between 
Myawaddy and Thingan Nyi Naung, Kawkareik Township, and will form part of a 
                                                 
127 To further focus on the GMS Program, eleven flagship programs were identified and endorsed at the 
GMS Ministerial Conference of the ten-year GMS Strategic Framework. These programs are as 
follows: North-South Economic Corridor; East-West Economic Corridor; Southern Economic Corridor; 
Telecommunications Backbone; Regional Power Interconnection and Trading Arrangements; 
Facilitating Cross-Border Trade and Investment; Enhancing Private Sector Participation  and 
Competencies; Developing Human Resources and Skills Competencies; Strategic Environment 
Framework; Flood Control and Water Resource Management; and GMS Tourism Development (ADB 




1,300km road from Mae Sot to Moreh in India via Rangoon (Irrawaddy 3 February 
2005). The road construction connecting Mae Sot and Pa-an in Myanmar the length of 
which is 153km was requested by Burma in 2003. Thailand is scheduled to grant 80 
million baht to improve the 18km road in the first place. This 153km construction is 
an ambitious plan for Thailand to become a crucial point along the East-West 
Economic Corridor to transport goods from India to Vietnam (Tsuneishi 2005: 17). 
Here the importance of Mae Sot as node in this plan is conspicuous.  
As mentioned above, the government has pushed forward concrete steps in 
establishing the Special Economic Zone in Mae Sot and its vicinities. On 19 October 
2004 when Thaksin and his cabinet members held a mobile meeting in Mae Sot, the 
cabinet approved the setting-up of the Special Economic Zone in Mae Sot, Phop Phra 
and Mae Ramat districts. Mae Sot is to be developed as the center for industry, 
commerce and tourism whereas Phop Phra and Mae Ramat are to be the center the 
agricultural industry. It was agreed that the government gives various tax and labor 
incentives to induce investors in the Special Economic Zone. Also in the plan, the 
establishment of duty-free shops, transport and packaging centers and warehouses 
was included. To facilitate transport and travel, more hotels and hostels would be built. 
Other projects that won the nod of the cabinet on that day included a 40 million baht 
expansion project for the Tak-Lansang section of Tak-Mae Sot road; a 192.2 million 
flood prevention project for Mae Sot Municipality; a 46.55 million baht tap water 
system for the new zone; and a 50 million baht illegal alien labor deportation center. 
The cabinet also agreed on feasibility studies for such projects as the development of 
Mae Sot airport, the setting-up of manufacturing bases in Tak’s industrial estates and 
the construction of a Mae Sot cargo terminal. The ultimate objective of the plan of the 




base for the Greater Mekong Subregional Development Project (Bangkok Post 20 
October 2004; MOCT News 19 October 2004; Tsuneishi 2005: 20-21). 
Not only in Mae Sot, but in nearby Burmese towns such as Myawaddy, Pa-an and 
Moulmein, the Thai government attempted to engage in the building of industrial 
zones as part of the projects of the ECS. The Thai industrial Estate Authority 
surveyed the project zones and completed a feasibility study as recently as July 2006. 
The project is to provide enough local employment to halt the Burmese from illegally 
entering Thailand to work as migrant labors (Irrawaddy 7 August 2006; 27 October 
2005). 
Throughout my stay in Mae Sot, I encountered various responses to the plan of the 
Special Economic Zone from the locals. Indigenous civil groups such as Mae Sot 
Civil Society mentioned that in principle they agreed on the plan to develop Mae Sot. 
But while they agreed that Mae Sot would be a center for commerce and tourism, they 
showed a very critical stance towards an industrial center, highlighting that it would 
deteriorate the environments of the town to the serious degree. In fact, current 
conditions of Mae Sot’s environments are in worse condition due to over-population 
and the sprawling of factories. The future industrial development, according to them, 
would drive the town to face appalling environmental problems. This concern was 
shared by many other activists nationwide. When the government approved the draft 
bill on Special Economic Zones in the form of a Cabinet resolution in 11 January 
2005, national NGOs and activists criticized that the move for establishing Special 
Economic Zones was unconstitutional as the Zones would be exempted from laws 
governing national parks, forest reserves, irrigation, labor, the environment and land 
with creating environmental problems. Also they mentioned that the bill aims to 




Prime Minister and only a small number of investors would be benefited from the 
Zones (Nation 3 February 2005; 4 February 2005; 6 February 2005; Bangkok Post 13 
February 2005). 
Factory owners in the town were cautious about the plan because on the one hand, 
they would benefit from the sponsorship of the state but on the other hand, they would 
have to face massive flowing of big-size factories and the competition between them 
would not be favorable in view of their current capacity. Local businessmen were also 
afraid that though economic pie would be bigger due to the Special Economic Zone, 
they would lose sizeable portion of it to the outside people holding capital and 
resources under the sponsorship from the government. But they expected that 
Burmese labors would have more economic opportunities created by this development 
which would continue to be mainly dependent on cheap laborers from Burma.  
At any rate, the plan of the Special Economic Zone gave rise to the economic 
boom in the town and its vicinities. For example, it accelerated the sales of property in 
Mae Sot, Mae Ramat and Phop Phra up to 90% increase in 2004 in the wake of the 
Special Economic Zone. The Mae Sot branch of the Tak Land Office handled 
transactions valued at 648 million baht in 2004 generating 50 million baht in taxes 
(Arnold 2006: 30). All over the town, throughout my days there, small and big-scale 
constructions were underway with the expansion of the Asian Highway too. Thai 
locals who were conscious of this development prepared themselves to take potential 
chances by equipping the language skills of Burmese. When I talked with my local 
classmates in a Burmese language class, they often opined that having Burmese 
language ability would be more crucial in the future in doing business with the 
Burmese in Mae Sot and in nearby Burmese areas. The news of developing the border 




informants made a phone call to his father in a village near Pa-an and persuaded him 
to prepare for the future in order to benefit from development projects. In truth, some 
Burmese businessmen established some stores like computer shops in Mae Sot and 
attempted to expand his business to Burmese border areas with taking Mae Sot as 




This chapter has dealt with population flowing and massive economic projects. 
These make the social system of the town more dynamic at the current stage than ever 
and other places. The presence of vulnerable people in Mae Sot is never static or 
passive but active. They always pursue other opportunities elsewhere beyond the 
particular boundary. The border is like a springboard for them to approach to other 
places. The border is an embarking point for further movements on the one hand 
while it is their living environments on the other hand. Both characteristics of the 
border coexist without necessarily dismantling the social system of the border.  
While Mae Sot sees the flowing-out of people, it observes the flowing-in of people 
across the border. Though the ebb and flow of population has been inherent nature of 
the border throughout the history, the current stage draws our specific attention due to 
the multitude size of the incident. It also reminds us of the necessity to take a look at 
the town with respect to other places. The presence of places like Bangkok providing 
more economic opportunities generates this massive out-flow of people from the town. 
Mae Sot is never a disconnected place but is exposed to the influences of other places. 
The population movement does not necessarily take place within a particular 




countries beyond the geographical limit. Though this transcendental movement 
appears to be unnatural and unprecedented, it shows the current state of population 
movement in the age of globalization with participations of many other outside actors 
beside the particular government in resettlement programs. The above discussion on 
the movement of the Burmese beyond the border is vividly illustrated below. 
 
Figure 7.1 Cross-Border Movement of Burmese Population 
 
 
While Mae Sot experiences the flowing-in and out of others, it encounters 
incredible encroaching of outside people in the sectors of border trade and industry. 
Also it sees rampant movement of the state and the capital undertaking massive 
economic development projects in Mae Sot and its adjacent border areas. Here Mae 
Sot draws a specific attention not just in the development of the town but in the 
broader regional development including the neighboring country. The nature of this 
development is exogenous because it is undertaken by outside people, in view of the 
lack of the participation of the locals. Thus production does not reflect local 
consumption; products are not circulated within the producing place; and resources 








are from the outside. The plan of Special Economic Zone also only reflects the 
objectives of the state without much consultation with the local partners.  
How does these challenges relate to the issue of the presence of the unauthorized 
Burmese? Seemingly, the penetration of the state and the industrial development 
appear to regulate the town in the state’s own right. However, current stage of 
development would have not been possible without the participation of illegal migrant 
workers. In other words, illegal Burmese have been the essential partners of Mae 
Sot’s development. Future development also would need to rely on the labor of others. 
However, it needs to be pointed out that they would not be confined to the limited 
place. Once they see other promising opportunities, they would transcend the 
particular place and embark on another movement. The flowing-in and out of people 










This study has explored how the presence of others is prevailing in the social 
system of the town and its vicinity in the Thailand-Burma borderland. The society of 
the town is not possible without the contribution and the participation of others. This 
study attempted to overcome the conventional description of others as victims and 
thus passive actors. In the common understanding, the roles of others in operating the 
social system are either absent or rarely recognized. This understanding mainly comes 
from the assumption that the absence of legal status in the type of settlement in the 
town does not allow them to have a proper position in the society and moreover it 
drives them to be vulnerable to physical threats from state authorities. Obsession with 
the existence of legality as a prerequisite for analyzing a particular society obscures 
the possibility that the social system can be possible in the absence or lack of it. 
Unlike pathological approaches to illegal people’s ways of life, this study rather 
attempted to make a deeper understanding of their lives and give credence and due 
recognition to them in forming the social system of the town in the borderland.  
The case of Mae Sot explicitly vindicates such a possibility that the society is not 
just founded in the legal base. Despite the situations that the type of residence of 
others is preponderantly illegal, unofficial or unauthorized, the society of the town 
never becomes disarrayed. This study proposed that it is quite necessary to take into 
account illegality as a norm in constituting the society to achieve an adequate 
explanation in the formation of the society in the town. Furthermore it suggests that to 




The pervasiveness of illegality is very much due to the geographical traits of the 
Thailand-Burma borderland, the place where people’s cross-border movement is not 
seriously restricted and where the interference of two neighboring states cannot be 
firmly exercised. Though an ideological boundary is delineated, the borderland is not 
fully placed under the control of the states. Still we witness flexible and fluctuating 
geographical domains in the borderland, which framed the geographical nature of pre-
modern states in the Thailand-Burma borderland (Rajah 1990: 127). Based on this 
trait, Mae Sot as a central place in the borderland saw a unique social system which 
the flowing of alien people across the border played a great role in establishing. In the 
border social system, it is extremely difficult and meaningless to distinguish between 
the legal and the illegal since these two domains are pervasively integrated into the 
system. We have seen that any attempts by the state to root the legal domain did not 
take place without discrepancy. In the border town, it is an inherent characteristic to 
accommodate the unofficial domain in almost every sector of the system. 
At the first place, this study sought to excavate the historical traits of the town by 
tracing the development of the social system. In doing this, it disclosed that the 
history of the town is the history of others. In the historical processes of the 
development of the town from a mere passing point to a substantial settlement area, 
the migration of other ethnic groups played a great role. They began to fill the place 
by establishing and developing the town throughout its history. Even the current stage 
of development witnesses the pervasiveness of the contribution of others with much 
more expanded roles in every sector of the town. 
This study delved into how others are administered in the governing systems of the 
town. Here it revealed that the administrative system of the state does not monopolize 




people. This research pointed out the problems of common understanding of the 
modern state since other regimes too participate in governing a sizeable portion of the 
population, rendering the town into another state having unique features in 
administration and governance, accommodating even unauthorized people. 
In dealing with the town’s economy, this study vividly illustrated how the Burmese 
actively engage in economic activities inside the town together with the Thai locals. 
Also it described the lives of unauthorized traders at the border by highlighting the 
integration of smuggled goods in the whole system of the town’s economy. It showed 
that the cross-border movement of goods is still unofficial to a great degree, involving 
political and ethnic issues too.  
This study gives a special attention to migration education since it shows a new 
phase in the presence of alien people. Throughout the years, it has seen the 
development of migration institution taking root in the town. It provides an alternative 
education for migrant children even in the precarious situation and in the absence of 
proper legal status. Especially we see the state’s positive involvement in migration 
education and thus the positive trend of integrating between the Thai education 
system and the migrant education system.  
This study touched on the cultural aspect of the lives of others. It described how 
they maintain their own culture by consuming Burmese cultural stuffs. This study also 
engaged in how other cultures influence their cultural lives. Above all, this study 
focused on the roles of festivals in bringing various groups of people together in 
celebrating activities. Festivals do not raise the issue of legality; rather they nullify the 
boundary between legality and illegality and even the statist function of the border. 





Finally, this study has dealt with current challenges generating the massive flow of 
people and capital in the town. Here it focuses on Bangkok Dream and resettlement 
programs that drive the Burmese out of the border. On the other hand, we witness the 
flow of capital into the town due to huge economic development projects. These facts 
demonstrate that the social system of the town does not remain static but encounters 
dynamic changes. Mae Sot continuously sees the movement of people and goods, 
including outside forces such as the state and international bodies. It is the crucial part 
in constituting the border social system 
Throughout the chapters, the lives of others in various sectors of the social system 
have been illustrated. The main theme overarching these chapters is the integration of 
the informal and the formal in the border social system. Throughout this study, we see 
this integration in various sectors of the border society such as in the field of 
administration, economy, education and culture. Also, these chapters show the 
dynamics of the border social system by dealing with the flow of population and the 
challenges from outside. 
The findings of this thesis and its theoretical arguments will contribute to the better 
understanding of the border society in particular and other societies in general by 
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Appendix C: Cabinet Resolution, RTG (Royal Thai Government), 5th July 2005 
 
Main points of the Cabinet Resolution, RTG, 5th July 2005 
On Setting up the system to document the day, month and year of entry of 
undocumented or non-Thai persons into the education system (implementing the 
education of undocumented or non-Thai person 
 
The Cabinet approved the setting up of a system to document the day, month, year of 
entry of undocumented or non-Thai persons into the education system according to 
the recommendations put forward by the Ministry of Education as follows: 
 
1. To expand the opportunity for undocumented and non-Thai persons to enter into 
the education system, including groups who had previously been excluded from 
some levels of education. In order to make the education more widely available, 
there will no longer be restrictions on levels of education or on travel to 
educational institutes. Educational institutes will now accept, register and give 
certificates to all undocumented and non-Thai persons at all levels. 
2. To allocate a budget per student for the educational institute which is giving 
education to the undocumented and non-Thai person, from kindergarten to high 
school. The amount per student will be the same as per Thai student. An extra 
budget of 6.5 million baht will be needed to support the entry of the 1,269 
undocumented and non-Thai students and will be organized by the Office of the 
Committee for the Promotion of Private Education.  
3. The Ministry of Interior will provide the 13 digit personal identity to 
undocumented and non Thai persons to be able to identify the status of 
undocumented and non-Thai persons. The Ministry of Interior will grant 
permission and facilitate children and youth who are restricted by law to live in 
certain areas, to be able to travel to the education facility according to the term 
times without have to ask for permission each time. Students “displaced by armed 
conflict” and POCs are excluded from this permission to travel to their place of 
study. 
4. The Ministry of Education will organize the appropriate education for children 
and youth who are “persons displaced from armed conflict” to develop their 
quality of their life and solidarity.  
 
(Source: Asian Migrant Centre 2005: 124) 
 
 
